RUSSIA - Drones & Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Inventory

Last Updated: 2026-03-29 | Next Review Due: 2026-04-29

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT Last Updated: 2026-03-28 Compiled by: EOD OSINT Research Cell Purpose: Comprehensive identification guide for Russian military and field-improvised UAS encountered as UXO, crashed/downed aircraft, or active threats. Emphasis on Ukraine combat-observed systems and EOD-specific hazards.

SAFETY WARNING: Crashed, downed, or failed drones are UXO. Batteries (LiPo, Li-ion) present thermal runaway and fire hazards. Armed warheads on loitering munitions and FPV drones may be impact-armed or have anti-handling features. NEVER assume a crashed drone is safe. Always refer to current EOD 60-series pubs, NAVEODFLTDIV guidance, and JODIC reporting. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher.

CROSS-REFERENCE: Loitering munitions (Lancet, KUB-BLA) and Iranian-supplied OWA drones (Shahed/Geran series) are also covered in ordnance_inventory.md Sections 14-15. This document provides expanded UAS-specific detail and covers all additional drone categories.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Loitering Munitions / One-Way Attack (OWA)
2. Iranian-Supplied / Russian-Manufactured OWA Drones
3. Reconnaissance / ISR UAS
4. Strike UCAVs (Medium/Heavy)
5. FPV Attack Drones
6. Drone-Dropped Munitions
7. Naval Unmanned Systems
8. Chinese-Supplied Components
9. Counter-UAS Downed Drones as UXO
10. Field-Modified / Improvised Drones
11. EOD Master Hazard Reference

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1. LOITERING MUNITIONS / ONE-WAY ATTACK (OWA)

1.1 ZALA Lancet-3 (Izdeliye-52)

Identification

• Designation(s): ZALA Lancet-3; Izdeliye-52; Product-52
• Type: Loitering munition / OWA drone
• Category: Man-in-the-loop precision strike
• Country of Origin: Russia
• Manufacturer: ZALA Aero Group (Kalashnikov Concern subsidiary), Izhevsk, Udmurt Republic
• In Service With: Russian Armed Forces (extensively since 2022)
• NATO Reporting Name: None assigned

Physical Characteristics

• Configuration: Cruciform wings, X-tail, electric motor with pusher propeller
• Wingspan: 2.95 m
• Length: ~1.2 m
• Weight: 12 kg (launch)
• Warhead: 3-5 kg HE-fragmentation or HEAT (shaped charge) — variant dependent
• Fuzing: Impact fuze, piezoelectric trigger; some variants with grazing-angle fuzing for top-attack
• Power: Electric motor, lithium battery pack
• Distinguishing Features: Twin forward-swept canard-like wings; visible camera dome on nose; ZALA branding on recovered airframes; distinctive high-pitched electric motor whine reported by troops

Performance

• Range: 40-70 km (dependent on launch altitude, loiter pattern)
• Endurance: 30-40 minutes
• Speed: 80-110 km/h cruise; 250-300 km/h terminal dive
• Altitude: Typically 100-1,500 m loiter; terminal dive from altitude
• Guidance: EO/TV seeker (onboard camera), operator-in-the-loop via encrypted datalink; GLONASS waypoint navigation to search area
• Launch: Catapult rail launch; typically paired with ZALA 421-16E or Orlan-10 ISR drone for target acquisition and battle damage assessment (BDA)

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Primary targets: Artillery (howitzers, MLRS), air defense systems (radar, TELs), armored vehicles, C2 nodes, logistics vehicles
• Effectiveness: High single-shot kill probability against static or slow-moving targets; multiple confirmed kills on Western-supplied equipment (M777, HIMARS launchers, Leopard 2 MBTs)
• Concept of Operations: ISR drone (typically ZALA 421-16E or Orlan-10) locates and designates target; Lancet launched, guided to target area via GLONASS waypoints; terminal guidance by operator viewing through onboard camera; steep diving attack
• Countermeasures encountered: Ukrainian anti-drone nets (cage armor equivalent for drones), EW jamming of datalink, small-arms fire, mobile concealment
• Engagement volume: Hundreds confirmed employed 2022-2025; Oryx/open-source databases document 400+ confirmed strikes with visual evidence

Sources

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1.2 Lancet-3M (Improved Variant)

Identification

• Designation(s): Lancet-3M; Izdeliye-52M
• Type: Improved loitering munition
• Manufacturer: ZALA Aero Group / Kalashnikov Concern

Key Improvements over Lancet-3

• Weight: 12-15 kg (increased warhead capacity)
• Warhead: 5-7 kg (reported); improved shaped charge penetration
• Guidance: AI-assisted target recognition for terminal phase; reportedly capable of autonomous terminal engagement without operator datalink (fire-and-forget mode)
• Seeker: Improved EO sensor with scene-matching capability; can reportedly lock onto target type (e.g., "radar antenna," "howitzer") and track autonomously
• Range: Reportedly extended to 70+ km
• Datalink: Improved encryption and jam resistance

EOD-Specific Concerns

• AI autonomy means downed Lancet-3M may still be "seeking" — if seeker/guidance is intact and battery has charge, the system may attempt to re-engage if disturbed
• Anti-tamper: No confirmed anti-handling devices, but warhead impact fuze may be armed and sensitive to movement
• Battery hazard: LiPo battery packs; thermal runaway risk if damaged; do not puncture or short-circuit
• Dud rate: Relatively low but duds documented; warhead may be armed even if drone appears intact
• Field identification: Near-identical to Lancet-3 externally; look for additional sensor apertures on nose, updated circuit boards if airframe is opened

Sources

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1.3 KUB-BLA (KUB-UAV)

Identification

• Designation(s): KUB-BLA; KUB-UAV
• Type: Loitering munition
• Manufacturer: ZALA Aero Group / Kalashnikov Concern
• Configuration: Flying wing / delta planform; single electric pusher motor

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~1.2 m
• Weight: ~3 kg
• Warhead: ~3 kg HE-fragmentation (integrated, entire drone is the munition)
• Speed: ~80-130 km/h
• Range: ~40 km
• Endurance: ~30 minutes
• Guidance: EO/TV seeker, operator-in-the-loop; inertial/GLONASS waypoint to search area

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Limited confirmed employment compared to Lancet
• First documented use in Syria (2019), sporadic use in Ukraine
• Largely superseded by Lancet-3/3M in Russian preference
• Small number of recovered/crashed specimens documented

EOD Relevance

• Small size — may be mistaken for commercial drone debris
• Entire airframe is the munition; warhead is integral
• Same battery/fuze hazards as Lancet
• Less commonly encountered than Lancet

Sources

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1.4 ZALA KYB (Product-53)

Identification

• Designation(s): KYB; Product-53; sometimes confused with KUB-BLA
• Type: Loitering munition (larger class)
• Manufacturer: ZALA Aero Group / Kalashnikov Concern

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~3.0 m
• Weight: ~7-12 kg
• Warhead: ~3-5 kg HE-frag
• Speed: ~80-130 km/h
• Range: ~40-70 km
• Endurance: ~30-40 minutes
• Configuration: Conventional aircraft planform with folding wings; catapult launch

Combat Use

• Documented in limited numbers in Ukraine
• Operational niche overlaps with Lancet; Lancet generally preferred
• Some units reportedly employed for saturation attacks alongside Lancet

EOD Relevance

• Same hazard profile as other ZALA loitering munitions
• Impact fuze, armed warhead, LiPo battery
• Treat any crashed ZALA-marked drone as potential armed UXO

Sources

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2. IRANIAN-SUPPLIED / RUSSIAN-MANUFACTURED OWA DRONES

2.1 Shahed-136 / Geran-2

Identification

• Designation(s): Iranian: Shahed-136; Russian military designation: Geran-2 (ГРАНЬ-2); manufacturer: HESA (Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company) / Shahed Aviation Industries
• Russian-built designation: Geran-2 (manufactured at Alabuga Special Economic Zone, Tatarstan, from 2023 onward)
• Type: One-Way Attack (OWA) drone; cruise-missile-like employment
• NATO reporting: No formal NATO name; commonly "Shahed drone" in media

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: 2.5 m
• Length: 3.5 m
• Weight: ~200 kg (fueled, armed)
• Warhead: ~40-50 kg (explosive fill, HE-fragmentation; some sources report 36 kg TNT equivalent)
• Engine: MADO MD-550 (Iranian copy of Limbach L550E, German 2-cylinder, 2-stroke) — 50 hp; runs on MOGAS (automotive gasoline)
• Fuel capacity: ~45-50 liters gasoline
• Configuration: Delta wing with vertical stabilizers; rear-mounted pusher propeller; launched from rack system (5-unit launcher frames typical)
• Distinguishing features: Triangular planform; long pointed nose (GPS/INS guidance package); fiberglass/composite construction; gasoline smell from wreckage; clearly stenciled serial numbers in Cyrillic on Russian-manufactured variants

Performance

• Range: 1,000-2,500 km (variant/fuel load dependent; the 2,500 km figure from Iranian marketing, operationally 1,000-1,800 km typical in Ukraine employment)
• Speed: 150-185 km/h cruise (slow, subsonic)
• Altitude: 60-4,000 m (typically flies at 100-1,000 m to avoid radar; terrain following not confirmed)
• Guidance: INS + GLONASS/GPS (satellite navigation to preprogrammed coordinates); NO terminal seeker — flies to coordinates and dives
• CEP: ~5-10 m (GPS-aided); degrades to ~50+ m if GPS/GLONASS jammed
• Launch: Rail-launched from ground frames (5-per-frame typical); truck-mounted multi-rail launchers

Russian Domestic Production

• Alabuga SEZ (Tatarstan): Russian-built copies designated Geran-2; production reportedly reached 100-300 units/month by late 2024
• Component supply chain: Western-manufactured microchips, GPS modules, servos sourced through sanctions-evasion networks (documented by Conflict Armament Research/CAR)
• Modifications observed on Russian-built variants:
  • Improved GPS antenna (jam resistance)
  • Modified warhead configurations (some with pre-fragmented casing)
  • Updated electronic components (non-identical to Iranian originals)
  • Some with inertial backup for GPS-denied terminal phase

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Mass employment doctrine: Launched in waves (5-50+ per attack); overwhelm air defenses through saturation; often paired with cruise missiles (Kalibr, Kh-101) — drones launched first to exhaust SAM/gun interceptor ammunition, cruise missiles follow
• Primary targets: Electrical infrastructure (transformers, substations — highly effective), civilian/military logistics, port facilities, fuel depots
• Employment tempo: Thousands launched 2022-2025; peak rates of 50-100+ per night in late 2023-2024 infrastructure campaigns
• Weaknesses: Slow speed makes it vulnerable to fighters, MANPADS, even machine gun fire; GPS jamming effective; commercial-grade components limit reliability

EOD-Specific Hazards

• FUEL: 45-50 liters of gasoline — fire/explosion hazard; post-crash wreckage often burning or has residual fuel
• WARHEAD: 40-50 kg HE; impact-fuzed; dud warheads may be armed; fuze is in the nose section
• BATTERY: Onboard electronics powered by separate battery; LiPo thermal runaway risk
• FRAGMENTATION: Pre-fragmented casing on some variants; warhead debris scattered over wide area on detonation
• INTACT DUDS: GPS/guidance failure results in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) at unexpected locations; drone may be largely intact with armed warhead
• ENGINE: Small gasoline 2-stroke engine with fuel — fire risk; engine may be separated from airframe on impact
• Western components: Recovered electronics contain identifiable Western microchips — document for sanctions enforcement/intelligence exploitation

Sources

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2.2 Shahed-131 / Geran-1

Identification

• Designation(s): Iranian: Shahed-131; Russian: Geran-1
• Type: Smaller OWA drone (same family as Shahed-136)
• Manufacturer: HESA / Shahed Aviation Industries; Russian-assembled variants

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~2.0 m
• Length: ~2.5 m
• Weight: ~135 kg
• Warhead: ~10-15 kg HE
• Engine: Smaller 2-stroke gasoline engine (~25-35 hp)
• Configuration: Similar delta-wing planform to Shahed-136 but smaller; same launch rack system

Performance

• Range: ~700-900 km
• Speed: 150-185 km/h
• Guidance: INS + GLONASS/GPS (same as Shahed-136)

Combat Use

• Employed alongside Shahed-136 in mixed salvos
• Less frequently observed than Shahed-136 in Ukraine; smaller warhead limits utility against hardened targets
• Used for harassment and defense saturation

EOD Relevance

• Same hazard profile as Shahed-136 but smaller scale
• Smaller fuel load but still gasoline-powered (fire hazard)
• Warhead and fuze same basic design
• May be more easily confused with debris from other systems due to smaller size

Sources

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2.3 Mohajer-6 / Iyasa

Identification

• Designation(s): Iranian: Mohajer-6; Russian designation: reportedly "Iyasa" (unconfirmed in open sources)
• Type: Tactical ISR/strike MALE UAS
• Manufacturer: Qods Aviation Industries (Iran)
• In Service With: Iran (primary), Russia (transferred units, limited numbers)

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~10 m
• Length: ~5.7 m
• Weight: ~600 kg MTOW
• Payload: 100 kg (ISR equipment + munitions)
• Engine: Rotax 912 or Iranian copy (~100 hp); some variants with Iranian-built engines
• Endurance: 12 hours
• Range: ~200 km operational radius (datalink limited)
• Ceiling: ~5,500 m

Weapons

• Qaem-series PGMs: Qaem-1 (IR-guided), Qaem-5 (TV-guided); small glide bombs, 10-25 kg class
• Almas ATGM: Iranian Hellfire-equivalent; laser-guided
• Sadid-series: Small guided bombs

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Limited confirmed use: Far fewer confirmed than Shahed-136; Ukrainian forces have shot down confirmed Mohajer-6 specimens
• Role: ISR and limited precision strike; likely providing targeting for other systems
• Vulnerability: Operating at medium altitude, susceptible to Ukrainian air defenses; several shoot-downs documented with visual evidence

EOD Relevance

• Larger airframe; crashed specimens contain more hazardous material (fuel, larger batteries, unexpended munitions potentially still on pylons)
• Any attached munitions (Qaem PGMs, Almas ATGMs) should be treated as armed UXO
• Rotax-type engine uses AVGAS/MOGAS — fuel hazard
• ISR payloads may contain sensitive electronics (exploit if possible per intelligence directives)

Sources

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3. RECONNAISSANCE / ISR UAS

3.1 Orlan-10

Identification

• Designation(s): Orlan-10
• Type: Tactical ISR / reconnaissance UAS
• Category: Small tactical UAV
• Country of Origin: Russia
• Manufacturer: Special Technology Center (STC), St. Petersburg
• In Service With: Russian Armed Forces (all branches), multiple export customers
• Status: Most widely employed Russian military drone in Ukraine; thousands produced

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: 3.1 m
• Length: 1.8 m
• Weight: 16.5 kg (MTOW)
• Payload: 5 kg (modular payload bay)
• Engine: Saito FG-36 (Japanese commercial model aircraft engine — CONFIRMED in recovered specimens) or Chinese-made clones; 36cc gasoline 4-stroke
• Fuel: Gasoline (~2.5 liters)
• Configuration: Conventional high-wing monoplane; tube-launched via catapult; parachute recovery (damages propeller on landing — intentional, propeller is expendable)
• Distinguishing features: Distinctive tubular fuselage; Canon consumer camera visible through belly aperture; "STC" markings on some airframes; bright orange parachute recovery system

Performance

• Range: 120 km (datalink range; can fly autonomously to waypoints beyond datalink)
• Endurance: 10-16 hours
• Speed: 90-150 km/h
• Altitude: Up to 5,000 m (typically operates 1,000-3,000 m)
• Guidance/Navigation: GLONASS/GPS waypoint; autonomous flight plan with operator override via datalink
• Launch: Folding-wing catapult launch from vehicle-mounted rail
• Recovery: Parachute (soft landing; propeller breaks on impact — by design)

Payloads

• EO/IR camera: Typically Canon DSLR (Canon EOS series confirmed in recovered units) or similar commercial camera; some with dedicated IR/thermal
• Electronic warfare: Some variants configured as EW relay nodes or as electronic intelligence (ELINT) collectors
• Communications relay: Can serve as airborne radio relay
• Reported weaponization: Some field reports of Orlan-10 fitted with small munitions (grenades, small bombs) but this is NOT its primary role; improvised modifications
• Chemical/radiation detection: Specialized variants for CBRN reconnaissance

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• THE most commonly encountered Russian drone — thousands deployed; ubiquitous at all echelons from battalion to army level
• Primary role: Artillery spotting, target acquisition, BDA, general ISR
• Paired with: Artillery batteries for fire correction; Lancet systems for target handoff
• Losses: Extremely high — hundreds shot down; easily replaced due to mass production and low cost (~$80,000-120,000 per unit, though actual costs with imported components may be higher)
• EW vulnerability: Susceptible to GPS jamming (loses navigation accuracy) and datalink jamming
• Component analysis: Recovered specimens consistently contain commercial Western/Japanese components: Canon cameras, Japanese engines, European GPS modules, commercial autopilot boards

EOD Relevance

• Generally low explosive hazard — ISR platform, no integral warhead
• FUEL: Small gasoline engine; ~2.5 liters fuel; fire hazard if fuel remains
• BATTERY: LiPo flight battery for electronics; thermal runaway risk
• INTELLIGENCE VALUE: Extremely high — recovered units contain commercial Western components useful for sanctions enforcement; camera may contain imagery of military value; autopilot/GPS may contain flight logs, waypoints, mission data
• Do NOT destroy without intelligence exploitation if situation permits
• Parachute recovery: Intact Orlan-10s found under parachutes may be in good condition; electronics may still be active (transmitting location)

Sources

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3.2 Orlan-30

Identification

• Designation(s): Orlan-30
• Type: Improved tactical ISR UAS
• Manufacturer: Special Technology Center (STC), St. Petersburg
• Status: Upgraded successor to Orlan-10; entering wider service

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~3.1 m (similar to Orlan-10)
• Weight: ~18-20 kg MTOW
• Payload: ~8 kg
• Engine: Improved gasoline engine (similar class to Orlan-10)

Key Improvements over Orlan-10

• Laser designator: Can designate targets for laser-guided munitions (Krasnopol 152mm, KAB-250LG)
• Improved EO/IR: Better optics, stabilized gimbal (no longer reliant on consumer Canon cameras — dedicated military-grade sensor)
• Improved datalink: Greater range and jam resistance
• GPS anti-jamming: Improved GLONASS receiver

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Increasingly replacing Orlan-10 in frontline artillery units for precision fire missions
• Laser designation capability allows direction of laser-guided munitions — significantly increases lethality of artillery
• Less commonly encountered as UXO than Orlan-10 (fewer in service)

EOD Relevance

• Same basic hazard profile as Orlan-10 (fuel, battery, no integral warhead)
• Laser designator may cause eye injury if active — do not look into sensor apertures
• Higher intelligence value than Orlan-10 due to improved sensors and electronics
• Recover if possible for exploitation

Sources

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3.3 ZALA 421-16E

Identification

• Designation(s): ZALA 421-16E; ZALA 421-16E2 (variants)
• Type: Tactical ISR UAS
• Manufacturer: ZALA Aero Group / Kalashnikov Concern, Izhevsk
• Role: Paired ISR platform for Lancet loitering munitions

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~4.4 m
• Length: ~2.3 m
• Weight: ~19-25 kg
• Payload: EO/IR camera, datalink relay
• Engine: Electric motor
• Endurance: 4-6 hours (battery dependent)
• Range: ~50-80 km
• Launch: Catapult rail
• Recovery: Parachute or belly landing

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Primary role: Target acquisition for Lancet strikes — the "eyes" of the Lancet system
• Locates and identifies targets; relays video to Lancet operator; provides BDA post-strike
• Deployed as part of integrated ZALA ISR/strike package at brigade level
• High-priority target for Ukrainian forces (destroying the ZALA 421 blinds the Lancet)

EOD Relevance

• No integral warhead — ISR platform only
• Electric motor: large LiPo battery packs; fire/thermal runaway hazard
• Intelligence value: may contain video recordings of Lancet strikes, target coordinates, operational patterns
• ZALA branding and serial numbers on airframe

Sources

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3.4 Supercam S350

Identification

• Designation(s): Supercam S350
• Type: Tactical ISR UAS
• Manufacturer: Unmanned Systems LLC (formerly Unmanned Systems Group), Izhevsk
• In Service With: Russian Armed Forces, National Guard (Rosgvardia)

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~3.4 m
• Length: ~1.5 m
• Weight: ~9.8 kg
• Payload: 1.5-3 kg (modular EO/IR/multispectral)
• Engine: Electric motor
• Endurance: 3-4 hours
• Range: ~100 km
• Launch: Hand launch or catapult
• Recovery: Parachute

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Widely used for tactical ISR at battalion/brigade level
• Artillery spotting and BDA
• Less commonly encountered than Orlan-10 but present across the front

EOD Relevance

• No warhead — ISR only
• LiPo battery fire hazard
• Lower intelligence priority than Orlan series but still worth recovering

Sources

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3.5 Eleron-3

Identification

• Designation(s): Eleron-3; Eleron-3SV
• Type: Mini tactical ISR UAS
• Manufacturer: Enics JSC, Kazan
• In Service With: Russian Army, Airborne Forces (VDV), Naval Infantry

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~1.47 m
• Length: ~0.63 m
• Weight: ~4.3 kg
• Payload: EO daylight camera + optional IR
• Engine: Electric motor
• Endurance: ~2.5 hours
• Range: ~25 km
• Speed: 70-130 km/h
• Launch: Hand-launched (bungee-assisted)
• Recovery: Parachute / deep stall landing

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Company/battalion-level ISR
• Quick-deploy reconnaissance of immediate frontline area
• Lower tactical echelon than Orlan-10

EOD Relevance

• Minimal hazard — very small, electric, no warhead
• LiPo battery is primary risk (small pack)
• Intact units have moderate intelligence value
• Very small; may be mistaken for hobbyist drone debris

Sources

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3.6 Takhion

Identification

• Designation(s): Takhion (Тахион)
• Type: Mini tactical ISR UAS
• Manufacturer: Izhmash-Unmanned Systems, Izhevsk

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~2.2 m
• Weight: ~25 kg MTOW
• Endurance: 2-4 hours
• Range: ~40 km
• Engine: Electric motor
• Payload: EO/IR camera

Combat Use

• Tactical ISR; limited documented use in Ukraine compared to Orlan-10
• Some units reportedly in service with artillery and reconnaissance formations

EOD Relevance

• No warhead; battery hazard only
• Low priority for EOD unless intelligence exploitation requested

Sources

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3.7 Forpost (IAI Searcher Copy)

Identification

• Designation(s): Forpost; Forpost-R (domestically produced variant)
• Type: Tactical MALE ISR/light strike UAS
• Country of Origin: Originally Israel (IAI Searcher Mk.II license); Forpost-R is Russian-produced
• Manufacturer: Ural Civil Aviation Plant (UZGA), Yekaterinburg (license production)
• Original Design: IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries) Searcher Mk.II

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: 8.55 m
• Length: 5.85 m
• Weight: ~436 kg MTOW
• Payload: ~100 kg
• Engine: UEL AR-731 (Limbach L550 derivative) or Rotax 914; gasoline
• Endurance: 16-18 hours
• Range: ~250 km operational radius
• Speed: 110-200 km/h
• Ceiling: ~6,100 m

Forpost-R Improvements

• Domestic production: Eliminates dependency on Israeli components
• Engine: Russian-made alternative (reliability reportedly lower)
• Payload: Reportedly can carry light guided munitions (small PGMs, ~20-30 kg class)
• Sensors: Russian-made EO/IR gimbal (KAE "Argus" series)
• Strike capability: Some Forpost-R configured with weapon pylons for light PGMs; limited confirmed use in strike role

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• ISR role at operational level (above Orlan-10 in capability tier)
• Some reported strike missions with light munitions
• Moderate number of shoot-downs documented (more expensive loss than Orlan-10)
• Declining use as newer Russian systems enter service

EOD Relevance

• Larger airframe — more fuel (gasoline), larger batteries
• If carrying munitions, crashed specimens may have armed weapons on pylons
• Intelligence value: sensors, datalink equipment, mission computer with flight logs
• Engine is gasoline-powered — fire hazard

Sources

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4. STRIKE UCAVs (MEDIUM/HEAVY)

4.1 S-70 Okhotnik (Hunter)

Identification

• Designation(s): S-70 Okhotnik-B (Hunter-B); Sukhoi S-70
• Type: Heavy stealth UCAV
• Manufacturer: Sukhoi (United Aircraft Corporation / Rostec)
• Status: Developmental / limited pre-production; first flight 2019; NOT in mass service

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~19 m
• Length: ~14 m
• Weight: ~20,000 kg MTOW (estimated)
• Payload: Internal weapons bay; ~2,000-4,000 kg (estimated)
• Engine: Saturn AL-31F (same family as Su-27/30) or AL-41F1 derivative; single engine
• Configuration: Flying wing; stealth planform; weapons bay internal

Performance

• Range: ~3,500 km (estimated)
• Speed: Subsonic (~920 km/h)
• Ceiling: ~18,000 m (estimated)
• Endurance: Reportedly 6+ hours
• Autonomy: Designed for manned-unmanned teaming with Su-57

Combat Use

• Ukraine: ONE confirmed combat use — October 2024, Russian forces reportedly used an Okhotnik to deliver a guided bomb (likely KAB-series) against a target in Ukraine; limited evidence
• Not in operational service — still in flight testing and pre-production
• Primarily an R&D program with very limited numbers (estimated 2-5 flight articles)
• Not an EOD concern at this time except as awareness of future capability

EOD Relevance

• If encountered (extremely unlikely): very large airframe with jet fuel (kerosene), potential unexpended ordnance in internal weapons bay
• Stealth coatings/materials may be hazardous (radar-absorbing materials contain heavy metals, carbon fiber composite debris)
• Very high intelligence value — intact or partial recovery would be priority intelligence exploitation
• Notify national-level intelligence immediately

Sources

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4.2 Kronshtadt Orion (Inokhodets)

Identification

• Designation(s): Kronshtadt Orion; Inokhodets; formerly Pacer
• Type: Medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) ISR/strike UAS
• Manufacturer: Kronshtadt Group (formerly Transas), St. Petersburg
• Status: In limited production and service; first combat use 2020 (Syria)

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: 16 m
• Length: 8 m
• Weight: 1,000-1,100 kg MTOW
• Payload: 200-250 kg (external pylons)
• Engine: APD-110/120 (Russian-developed piston engine, ~120 hp); some sources indicate Rotax 914 on prototypes
• Fuel: Gasoline / AVGAS
• Configuration: Conventional planform; high aspect ratio wing; three external weapon pylons per wing; V-tail

Performance

• Range: 250+ km operational radius
• Endurance: 24 hours (ISR mission, reduced weapons load)
• Speed: 120-200 km/h
• Ceiling: ~7,500 m
• Guidance: GLONASS/GPS, autonomous waypoint, operator-controlled via ground station

Weapons

• Guided bombs: UPAB-series small guided bombs; KAB-20 and KAB-50 class; 25-50 kg guided munitions
• Missiles: Light ATGMs (reported but unconfirmed); possible integration of Kornet-type laser-guided missile
• Payload stations: 3 per wing (6 total), with inner stations rated for heavier stores

Combat Use (Ukraine)

• Confirmed operational in Ukraine; limited numbers (estimated 10-20 in service)
• ISR and precision strike against frontline targets
• Several shoot-downs documented; remains recovered for exploitation
• Represents Russia's equivalent of MQ-1/MQ-9 capability but at much lower production numbers
• Employed for long-endurance ISR over contested areas

EOD Relevance

• Medium-sized airframe; substantial fuel (gasoline — fire hazard)
• Unexpended munitions on pylons — primary EOD concern; may carry armed guided bombs or ATGMs
• Weapons may have armed fuzes if the aircraft was in strike mode when downed
• Intelligence value: very high; sensors, datalink, mission computer, weapons integration hardware
• Composite airframe: carbon fiber debris can be irritant/hazardous

Sources

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4.3 Altius-RU (Altair)

Identification

• Designation(s): Altius-RU; formerly Altair; Altius-M (prototype)
• Type: Heavy MALE / HALE UAS
• Manufacturer: Ural Civil Aviation Plant (UZGA), Yekaterinburg (transferred from Kazan OKB Simonov design bureau)
• Status: Development / early production; NOT confirmed in combat use in Ukraine

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~28.5 m
• Length: ~11.6 m
• Weight: ~6,000-7,500 kg MTOW
• Payload: ~1,000-2,000 kg (internal + external)
• Engine: Twin piston or turboprop (APD-500 diesel engines, ~500 hp each); some variants reportedly with turboprops
• Endurance: 48 hours (claimed)
• Ceiling: ~12,000 m

Weapons (Planned/Projected)

• Internal weapons bay + external pylons
• Planned integration of guided bombs (KAB-250, KAB-500), cruise missiles (Kh-38 family), ATGMs
• Satellite datalink for beyond-line-of-sight control

Combat Use

• NOT confirmed in Ukraine combat as of early 2026
• Ongoing flight testing; limited pre-production batch
• Intended as Russia's MQ-9 Reaper equivalent

EOD Relevance

• If encountered: very large airframe; substantial fuel, large battery systems, potential weapons on board
• Treat as you would any medium-sized aircraft crash with potential ordnance
• Extremely unlikely to encounter at this time

Sources

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4.4 Kronshtadt Sirius

Identification

• Designation(s): Kronshtadt Sirius; Helios-RLD (related program)
• Type: Heavy MALE strike/ISR UAS
• Manufacturer: Kronshtadt Group, St. Petersburg
• Status: Development; first flight reportedly 2022; NOT in service

Physical Characteristics

• Wingspan: ~25-30 m (estimated)
• Weight: ~5,000-6,000 kg MTOW (estimated)
• Payload: ~500-1,000 kg (estimated)
• Engine: Twin diesel or turboprop (details limited)
• Endurance: 20-40 hours (claimed)

Combat Use

• NOT in combat use — developmental program
• Intended to complement Orion as a heavier strike platform

EOD Relevance

• Not currently an EOD concern
• Awareness item only for future capability

Sources

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5. FPV ATTACK DRONES

THIS IS THE FASTEST-EVOLVING AND MOST CRITICAL THREAT CATEGORY. FPV (First Person View) drones are now the single most common cause of casualties and equipment destruction on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Tens of thousands are employed monthly. This section describes observed types and trends but the specific models change faster than any document can track. Focus on HAZARD PATTERNS rather than specific model identification.

5.1 Overview of Russian FPV Drone Employment

Scale of Use

• Volume: Russia and Ukraine each produce/employ an estimated 50,000-100,000+ FPV drones per month as of late 2025 (combined both sides; estimates from RUSI, Ukrainian MOD, various defense analysts)
• Cost: $300-2,000 per unit (basic FPV); $3,000-10,000 for advanced versions with night vision, thermal, or fiber-optic guidance
• Manufacturing: Mix of factory production (drone workshops at scale), volunteer/NGO production, field-improvised assembly from commercial components
• Doctrinal shift: FPV drones have fundamentally changed ground warfare; any exposed personnel, vehicles, or positions within ~10-15 km of the front are vulnerable

General FPV Configuration (All Variants)

• Airframe: Typically quadrotor (most common), but also racing-style fixed-wing, tricopter, hexacopter, or bicopter configurations
• Size: 200-500mm frame class (motor-to-motor diagonal); some larger 7" or 10" builds
• Weight: 500g-3 kg (including munition)
• Flight controller: Typically commercial FC boards (Betaflight, iNav, ArduPilot based); increasingly purpose-built military FCs
• Motors: Brushless DC motors; predominantly Chinese-manufactured (T-Motor, BrotherHobby, iFlight, Emax); 2205-2806 size class
• Propellers: 5"-7" (125-180mm); Chinese commercial racing drone propellers
• Battery: LiPo 4S-6S (14.8V-22.2V); 1300-2200 mAh typical; some larger builds with higher capacity
• Video transmitter: Analog (25-600mW typical) or digital (DJI O3, HDZero, Walksnail); encrypted digital links increasingly common on military builds
• Control link: ExpressLRS (ELRS), Crossfire, or proprietary encrypted links; 868 MHz / 915 MHz / 2.4 GHz
• Range: 5-15 km typical (LOS, dependent on VTX power and antenna); fiber-optic guided variants: range limited only by spool length (10-20+ km)
• Speed: 80-160+ km/h (attack speed)
• Flight time: 8-15 minutes typical (battery limited)

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5.2 Common Russian FPV Drone Types

5.2.1 "Standard" 5-inch FPV (Most Common)

• Frame: 5" racing quadrotor frame (Chinese commercial: iFlight, Diatone, GEPRC, or clones); increasingly Russian-designed 3D-printed or CNC frames
• Warhead: RPG-7 warhead (PG-7V, PG-7VL HEAT) most common; also VOG-17/VOG-25 grenade, RKG-3 anti-tank grenade, improvised HEAT charges, 3D-printed tail assemblies for stabilization
• Typical payload: Single warhead, 300g-1.5 kg
• Guidance: Pilot FPV (operator wears goggles, sees real-time video from drone camera, steers into target)
• Terminal attack: Pilot dives drone directly into target; suicide mission for drone
• Anti-armor capability: RPG-7 HEAT warhead can penetrate 260-300mm RHA; effective against IFVs, APCs, MBTs (hitting top armor, engine deck, rear)
• Anti-personnel: HE-frag grenades (VOG-17M, F-1, RGD-5 variants); extremely lethal against exposed personnel in trenches

5.2.2 Heavy-Lift FPV ("Baba Yaga" class)

• Frame: Large hexacopter or octocopter; 800mm-1200mm class; some based on DJI Agras agricultural drone frame
• Payload: 5-20 kg
• Warhead types:
  • Multiple mortar rounds (82mm, 60mm)
  • Anti-tank mines (TM-62 series, improvised EFP mines)
  • Large IEDs (5-15 kg explosive fill)
  • Thermite/incendiary payloads
  • Cluster-type dispensers (multiple grenades dropped sequentially)
• Range: 10-20+ km
• Endurance: 15-30 minutes (heavy payload reduces flight time)
• Employment: Night attacks predominant; flies to target area, drops payload, returns (recoverable, unlike standard FPV)
• Name origin: "Baba Yaga" is a Slavic folklore witch — named by troops for the sound of large multirotor drones at night

5.2.3 Fiber-Optic Guided FPV (CRITICAL EMERGING THREAT)

• Configuration: Standard FPV drone with fiber-optic spool replacing radio datalink
• How it works: Thin fiber-optic cable (0.1-0.2mm diameter) spools out behind the drone during flight; video feed and control signals pass through fiber, not radio
• Advantage: IMMUNE TO ELECTRONIC WARFARE / RF JAMMING — the primary countermeasure against standard FPV drones does not work
• Range: Limited by spool length; 10-20+ km spools documented
• Manufacturers: Multiple Russian and Ukrainian developers; "Vostok" fiber-optic system is one documented Russian implementation
• Status: Rapidly proliferating on both sides; considered the most significant tactical drone development of 2025
• EOD concern: Same warhead hazards as standard FPV; the fiber-optic cable may be visible trailing from crash site

5.2.4 Night-Vision / Thermal FPV

• Configuration: Standard FPV with thermal camera (FLIR-type) or digital night vision
• Thermal cameras: Predominantly Chinese-manufactured (InfiRay, iRay, Guide Sensmart); 256x192 or 640x512 resolution
• Advantage: 24-hour operations; particularly effective at night when targets are less alert
• Employment: Night hunter-killer teams operating pairs of drones — one with thermal for search, one with daylight camera for precision attack
• Proliferation: Rapidly increasing; thermal cameras now available for $200-500 (Chinese commercial)

5.2.5 AI-Assisted / Autonomous FPV (EMERGING)

• Concept: FPV drone with onboard AI that can recognize targets and maintain lock even if video link is disrupted
• Capability: Target lock-on and autonomous terminal guidance; pilot designates target, AI tracks it through the final seconds
• Advantage: Defeats certain EW countermeasures (drone can complete attack even if control link is jammed in final seconds)
• Status: In development/early deployment by both sides; Russian "Piranha" and "Izdeliye-59" reportedly include AI-assisted features
• Companies: Multiple Russian tech companies developing AI modules for FPV (ZALA, iLab, STC, various startups)

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5.3 FPV Warhead Types (CRITICAL FOR EOD)

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5.4 FPV Anti-Handling / Booby Trap Features (CRITICAL EOD WARNING)

TREAT EVERY CRASHED/DOWNED FPV DRONE AS A POTENTIAL BOOBY TRAP

Documented anti-handling features on crashed/downed FPV drones (observed on both Russian and Ukrainian drones):

1. Secondary fuze on warhead: Some FPV warheads have been observed with a secondary tilt or vibration-sensitive fuze that arms after a set time; if the drone crashes without detonating, the warhead may be armed and sensitive to disturbance

2. "Dead man's switch" circuits: Circuits that arm the warhead when the control link is lost (e.g., if shot down or jammed); the act of EW-downing the drone may ARM the warhead

3. Pressure-release mechanisms: Under the drone body; lifting the drone initiates detonation — classic anti-handling booby trap

4. Timer circuits: Delayed detonation after crash (minutes to hours); the drone is bait

5. Motion sensors (accelerometer-based): Onboard accelerometer repurposed to detect movement/tilt after crash; triggers detonation

6. Daisy-chaining: Crashed drone placed/crashed near other munitions; designed to create secondary detonation

7. Battery as initiator: LiPo battery deliberately short-circuited on impact to provide incendiary/initiation energy to warhead

EOD RESPONSE PROTOCOL (Advisory — consult current TTPs)

• Minimum standoff: 300m for observation; treat as you would an IED until proven otherwise
• DO NOT APPROACH until assessed by EOD
• Remote observation first: Use ISR, binoculars, or own drone to observe from distance
• Look for wires, secondary devices, disturbed earth around crash site
• Battery venting: If LiPo is swelling or smoking, the drone may be about to catch fire — maintain distance; LiPo fires produce toxic fumes (hydrofluoric acid)
• RPG warhead on intact drone: The piezoelectric fuze in PG-7 series warheads is IMPACT SENSITIVE — any jarring could detonate
• Report IMMEDIATELY: Model, warhead type, condition, GPS location, any visible wires or secondary devices

Sources

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6. DRONE-DROPPED MUNITIONS

6.1 Overview

Small commercial and modified military drones (DJI Mavic series, Matrice, Autel, and larger multirotor platforms) are used by both sides to drop modified grenades and small munitions. This section covers the munitions themselves.

6.2 Common Drop Munitions

6.2.1 Modified VOG-17M / VOG-25

• Description: Standard 30mm/40mm grenades modified with 3D-printed fin assemblies (tail kits) for stabilization when dropped from drone
• Fuzing: Original impact fuze retained; 3D-printed fins ensure nose-down impact orientation
• Fin kits: Distinctive 3D-printed plastic fins (PLA, PETG, or ABS); often brightly colored (white, yellow, green)
• EOD concern: Same fuze hazards as parent munition; plastic tail kit may separate on impact, leaving just the grenade body as UXO
• Prevalence: EXTREMELY COMMON — the single most common drone-dropped munition on both sides

6.2.2 Modified F-1 / RGD-5 Grenades

• Description: Standard fragmentation/offensive hand grenades with improvised impact fuze replacing standard delay fuze
• Modification: UZRGM fuze removed; replaced with improvised impact fuze (piezoelectric, spring-loaded striker, or electronic)
• 3D-printed tail assembly: Same concept as VOG modifications
• EOD concern: Improvised fuzing is UNPREDICTABLE; may be more or less sensitive than standard fuze

6.2.3 RKG-3 Anti-Tank Grenade (Modified for Drone Drop)

• Description: Soviet-era HEAT hand grenade; drogue parachute assembly provides natural stabilization for air drop
• Original purpose: Thrown at tanks; parachute deploys and orients shaped charge downward
• Drone adaptation: Ideal for drone drop — parachute provides perfect terminal orientation; no modification needed except release mechanism
• Penetration: 170mm RHA (effective against IFV/APC top armor, light vehicles, bunkers)
• EOD concern: HEAT warhead; impact fuze; handle safety mechanism may be bypassed

6.2.4 Shaped Charge Munitions (Improvised)

• Description: Purpose-built shaped charges designed specifically for drone delivery
• Construction: 3D-printed bodies, machined copper liners, cast or pressed explosive fill (PE-4, TNT, or improvised)
• Caliber: 40-100mm shaped charge diameter
• Penetration: 100-300mm RHA depending on design quality and liner material
• Fuzing: Piezoelectric (most common), crush fuze, or electronic impact fuze
• EOD concern: Non-standard construction; fuzing may be extremely sensitive; quality varies wildly

6.2.5 Mortar Rounds (Dropped from Heavy-Lift Drones)

• Types: 60mm, 82mm mortar rounds (O-832DU, 3-O-12, etc.)
• Modification: May have original fuze or modified fuze for drone drop; sometimes fitted with drone-drop-specific tail assemblies
• Platform: Large hexacopter/octocopter "Baba Yaga" type drones
• EOD concern: Standard mortar round hazards; fuze may be in armed condition; nose fuze on mortar rounds is impact-sensitive

6.2.6 Submunition Dispensers

• Description: 3D-printed or fabricated dispensers carrying multiple small bomblets
• Capacity: 4-8 grenades or small bomblets per dispenser
• Release: Sequential electronic release (each bomblet dropped individually over target area)
• Coverage: Simulates small cluster munition effect
• EOD concern: Multiple UXO items over wide area; dud rate of individual submunitions; 3D-printed components may fragment or be hard to spot

6.3 Drop Mechanism Types

Sources

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7. NAVAL UNMANNED SYSTEMS

7.1 Russian Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs)

Note: Most documented naval drone warfare in the Black Sea has been Ukrainian USVs attacking Russian naval assets. Russian naval USV development is less mature but emerging.

7.1.1 Russian USV Programs (Limited Data)

• Status: Russia has begun developing naval USVs in response to Ukrainian maritime drone success
• Types observed:
  • Small explosive-laden speedboat USVs (similar to Ukrainian Sea Baby concept but less documented)
  • Remotely operated mine-laying platforms (reported, unconfirmed)
  • Reconnaissance USVs for Black Sea/naval base security
• Manufacturer: Multiple Russian defense firms reportedly developing; no dominant producer identified
• Maturity: FAR BEHIND Ukrainian USV capability as of early 2026

EOD Relevance

• If encountered: treat as waterborne IED
• Explosive payload likely in hull (50-300 kg estimates)
• May contain anti-tamper/anti-recovery devices
• Battery banks (lithium) for electric propulsion — fire/explosion hazard
• Fuel (gasoline for some, diesel for others) — fire hazard
• Navigation electronics have intelligence value

7.2 Uncrewed Undersea Vehicles (UUVs)

7.2.1 Known Russian UUV Programs

• Poseidon (Status-6/Kanyon): Nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed autonomous torpedo; strategic weapon; NOT a tactical concern for EOD in conventional operations (strategic deterrent)
• Harpsichord/Klavesin-2R: Deep-sea autonomous survey/reconnaissance UUV; oceanographic/ISR; no warhead
• Galtel: Mine countermeasures UUV; used for mine detection/classification
• Yunona: Lightweight reconnaissance UUV; man-portable

EOD Relevance

• Russian naval UUVs are primarily ISR/survey platforms; minimal direct EOD hazard
• If recovered: intelligence value for sensor packages, navigation systems
• Battery hazards (lithium polymer/lithium ion, potentially large packs)
• Poseidon is a strategic weapon — not expected to be encountered in conventional EOD operations

Sources

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8. CHINESE-SUPPLIED COMPONENTS

8.1 Overview

Chinese commercial components form the backbone of Russian (and Ukrainian) FPV and tactical drone production. Sanctions have limited but not eliminated the flow of these components. Understanding what Chinese parts are in Russian drones is critical for supply chain interdiction and forensic exploitation.

8.2 Component Categories

8.2.1 Motors

8.2.2 Flight Controllers / ESCs

8.2.3 Cameras and Video Systems

8.2.4 Navigation / GNSS

8.2.5 Batteries

8.2.6 Commercial Drone Platforms (Used Whole)

8.3 Supply Chain Observations

• Chinese components are critical enablers for Russian (and Ukrainian) drone production at scale
• Sanctions evasion: Components flow through third-country intermediaries (Turkey, UAE, Central Asia, China → Russia)
• DJI has restricted sales but commercial distribution channels remain porous
• Thermal cameras from InfiRay/iRay are a critical capability enabler for night operations
• Motor and FC supply is commercial hobby-grade — available globally via AliExpress, Banggood, direct from Chinese manufacturers
• Russian domestic alternatives: Limited; some Russian FC boards and motor production emerging but Chinese components dominate by volume

Sources

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9. COUNTER-UAS DOWNED DRONES AS UXO

9.1 The Problem

When drones are defeated by electronic warfare (EW jamming), kinetic intercept (guns, MANPADS, interceptor drones), or directed energy, they crash. The crash does NOT disarm the warhead. This creates a new category of UXO — drones downed by friendly or enemy counter-UAS systems that litter the battlefield with armed munitions.

9.2 How Counter-UAS Creates UXO

9.3 Scale of the Problem

• Estimates suggest 10-30% of FPV drones fail to detonate on target (miss, malfunction, EW defeat)
• With 100,000+ FPV drones used per month (both sides combined), this creates tens of thousands of drone UXO items per month across the conflict zone
• Ukraine humanitarian demining organizations report drones are now a significant percentage of UXO encountered
• The contamination pattern is DIFFERENT from traditional UXO — drones can crash anywhere, not just along known firing lines or impact areas
• Areas far behind frontlines (30+ km) still receive drone UXO from long-range systems (Shahed, Lancet, heavy-lift drones)

9.4 EOD Implications

• Every drone found on the ground is potential UXO until proven otherwise
• Commercial-looking drones may carry warheads — do not assume a DJI Mavic-looking drone is benign
• Scattered debris fields: EW-downed drone swarms create wide debris fields with multiple armed warheads
• Contamination mapping: Traditional minefield/UXO survey methods must be adapted for drone UXO; overhead ISR or own-drone survey recommended
• Training gap: Many EOD technicians trained before drone warfare era; TTPs are still being developed

Sources

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10. FIELD-MODIFIED / IMPROVISED DRONES

10.1 Overview

Both sides have extensive "garage" and workshop-level drone production. Russian improvised drones range from crude to surprisingly sophisticated. This section covers what is being built outside formal military production lines.

10.2 Categories of Improvised/Modified Drones

10.2.1 Volunteer/NGO-Produced FPV Drones

• Source: Russian volunteer organizations, pro-war NGOs, private companies producing FPV drones for frontline units
• Quality: Ranges from hobby-grade assembly to semi-professional production lines
• Volume: Significant — thousands per month from non-state producers
• Standardization: LOW — each workshop may use different components, wiring, configurations
• EOD implication: Non-standard construction means unpredictable hazards; wiring, fuzing, and warhead attachment methods vary

10.2.2 Field-Modified Commercial Drones

• Base platforms: DJI Mavic series, DJI Mini, Autel EVO, any available consumer drone
• Modifications:
  • Grenade drop mechanisms (servo-actuated clamps, 3D-printed bomb racks)
  • Camera stabilization modifications for ISR
  • Extended-range antenna modifications
  • Night-vision camera additions
  • Reinforced structures for heavier payloads
• EOD implication: May look like a normal consumer drone but have attached munitions; always check for drop mechanisms or attached explosives

10.2.3 Improvised Fixed-Wing Drones

• Type: Foam or coroplast (corrugated plastic) fixed-wing airframes
• Construction: Built from hobby RC aircraft kits, foam board, or scratch-built
• Payload: Modified to carry grenades, small bombs, or IED payloads (1-5 kg)
• Range: 10-50 km (depending on configuration)
• Employment: Used where FPV range or endurance is insufficient; some configured as improvised loitering munitions (fly to GPS waypoint, dive)
• EOD implication: Foam/plastic construction may not look "military" — can be confused with hobby aircraft; check for warheads/payloads

10.2.4 Improvised Loitering Munitions

• Concept: Commercial drone + GPS autopilot + warhead = improvised Lancet
• Implementation: ArduPilot/PX4/iNav autopilot on fixed-wing platform; programmed to fly to GPS coordinate and dive
• Warhead: Typically improvised shaped charge or HE pack
• Sophistication: Some units have demonstrated multi-waypoint navigation, terrain avoidance, and autonomous terminal dive
• EOD implication: Crashed improvised loitering munitions may have armed warheads and be functionally identical to military OWA drones in terms of hazard

10.2.5 3D-Printed Drone Components

• What's being 3D-printed:
  • Airframes (partial or complete)
  • Warhead bodies and tail assemblies
  • Grenade drop mechanisms
  • Mounting brackets for warheads
  • Fin kits for dropped munitions
  • Fuze housings
• Materials: PLA, PETG, ABS, Nylon (FDM printing); some resin-printed components
• EOD implication: 3D-printed components may fragment unpredictably; plastic fuze housings may be less reliable than metal; warhead bodies may not contain fragments (or may have embedded metal fragments — ball bearings, nails)

10.3 Workshop/Factory Locations (OSINT)

• Multiple drone production workshops documented across Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Izhevsk, Tatarstan, Novosibirsk, various)
• Frontline "repair and assembly" shops operating within 20-50 km of contact line
• Volunteer organizations (e.g., "People's Front" and various pro-war groups) publicly crowdfund and produce FPV drones
• University and tech-company partnerships for AI/autonomy features

Sources

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11. EOD MASTER HAZARD REFERENCE

11.1 Quick Reference: Drone UXO Response

11.2 LiPo Battery Hazard Guide

• ALL drones contain lithium polymer (LiPo) batteries
• Thermal runaway: Damaged LiPo can spontaneously ignite; temperatures exceed 500C; produces toxic fumes including hydrofluoric acid (HF)
• Signs of imminent failure: Swelling (puffed battery), hissing, smoke, sweet chemical smell
• DO NOT: Puncture, crush, short-circuit, immerse in water (water reacts with lithium), or expose to heat
• Fire response: Sand, dry chemical, CO2; allow to burn out if safely possible; evacuate area due to toxic fumes; SCBA if available
• Damaged batteries: Even if not currently burning, a damaged LiPo can reignite hours or days later

11.3 Intelligence Exploitation Priority

11.4 Key Trends to Monitor (2025-2026)

1. Fiber-optic FPV drones — immune to EW; rapidly proliferating; game-changer
2. AI-assisted autonomous targeting — reduces vulnerability to jamming; Lancet-3M and FPV variants
3. Thermal/night FPV — 24-hour drone operations now standard
4. Anti-handling features on crashed drones — booby-trapping trend increasing
5. Heavy-lift drone bombing — "Baba Yaga" class carrying anti-tank mines and mortar rounds
6. Swarming — coordinated multi-drone attacks (early stage, not yet mature)
7. Drone-on-drone combat — interceptor FPV drones ramming attack drones (creates paired UXO)
8. Russian domestic drone production scaling — reducing dependency on imports but Chinese components still dominant
9. Longer-range FPV — 20-30+ km range with improved batteries and fiber optic
10. EFP warheads on FPV — explosively formed penetrators for standoff armor defeat

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APPENDIX A: VISUAL IDENTIFICATION AIDS

Silhouette Recognition Key

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APPENDIX B: RUSSIAN DRONE MANUFACTURERS

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APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY

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END OF INVENTORY

Document Control:

• Version: 1.0
• Date: 2026-03-28
• Next Review: Monthly — FPV/drone technology evolves faster than any other ordnance category
• Distribution: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT — EOD community use
• Cross-reference: ordnance_inventory.md Sections 14-15 for additional loitering munition and Iranian OWA detail