Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Ordnance Database

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT Created: 2026-03-28 Last Updated: 2026-03-28 Source Reliability: B-2 to C-3 (Usually Reliable to Fairly Reliable / Probably True to Possibly True) -- compiled from ODIN (TRADOC), CAT-UXO, CSIS Missile Threat, GlobalSecurity.org, DTIC, Jane's, UN Panel of Experts reports, RUSI, 38 North, Landmine Monitor (ICBL), Mine Action Review, Arms Control Association, SIPRI, bulletpicker.com, nolandmines.com, lexpev.nl, navweaps.com, Korea Herald, NPR, Defense Express, Army Recognition Purpose: Comprehensive EOD reference for DPRK-origin ordnance identification, hazard assessment, and clearance planning

SAFETY WARNING: This document is for IDENTIFICATION AND AWARENESS ONLY. It does NOT replace official EOD technical publications (60-series pubs, NAVEODFLTDIV, JODIC). Always refer to current TMs for render-safe procedures. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher.

PROLIFERATION NOTE: North Korea is one of the world's most active illicit arms exporters, operating through KOMID (Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation) and a web of front companies. The UN Panel of Experts has documented DPRK arms exports to Iran, Syria, Myanmar, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Angola, Cuba, DRC, Mozambique, Namibia, Sri Lanka, and others. Since 2023, North Korea has supplied Russia with an estimated 4-12 million artillery shells (122mm/152mm) and multiple weapon systems for use in Ukraine. DPRK has NOT signed the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty and remains an active mine producer and layer.

QUALITY WARNING: DPRK-manufactured ordnance exhibits significant quality control problems. During the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island bombardment, approximately 25% of North Korean shells and rockets that struck the island failed to detonate. Russian forces using DPRK ammunition in Ukraine report cases of rounds breaking in barrels, causing loss of weapons and personnel. Dud rates are significantly higher than Western or even Russian/Chinese standards. This means UXO contamination from DPRK ordnance is DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH relative to expenditure.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Anti-Personnel Mines

1. APP M-57 (Plastic Blast Mine)
2. NK-PFM "Leaf Mine" (Scatterable Blast Mine)
3. NK Box Mine (Wooden AP Blast Mine)

Anti-Tank Mines

1. ATM-72 (Metallic AT Mine)
2. ATM-74 (Wooden AT Mine -- TMD-B Copy)

Naval Mines

1. DPRK Naval Mine Inventory (Soviet-Origin)

Artillery Projectiles

1. 170mm HE-FRAG (Koksan M1978/M1989)
2. 122mm HE-FRAG (Soviet-Pattern)
3. 130mm HE-FRAG (Soviet-Pattern)
4. 152mm HE-FRAG (Soviet-Pattern)

Rockets

1. 240mm M1985/M1991 MLRS Rocket
2. 122mm BM-21 Grad-Pattern Rocket
3. 107mm Type 63-Pattern Rocket

Mortar Rounds

1. 60mm HE Mortar Bomb
2. 82mm HE Mortar Bomb
3. 120mm HE Mortar Bomb

Grenades

1. DPRK Hand Grenades (Soviet/Chinese Copies)
2. DPRK Anti-Tank Grenades (RPG-43/RKG-3 Pattern)

Export and Proliferation

1. DPRK Arms Export Map

Korean Peninsula Conflict Scenario

1. Seoul Bombardment Risk Assessment
2. DMZ Mine Contamination Assessment

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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

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APP M-57

designation: "APP M-57"
country_of_origin: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)"
manufacturer: "DPRK state arsenals"
year_introduced: ~1957
type: "AP blast (plastic body)"
status: "In service; actively produced and deployed in DMZ"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: MUV-type pressure fuze (Soviet-pattern mechanical)
• Arming: Safety pin removed; mine is armed
• Mechanism: Tab molded into lid pushes fuze downward when stepped on, freeing striker from winged retaining pin, striker hits detonator
• Arming delay: Minimal -- armed upon pin removal

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• None documented in base configuration
• WARNING: Field-modified variants may incorporate anti-lift elements

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• None -- mines remain active indefinitely until mechanical degradation

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive drab or dark green plastic
• Shape: Rectangular with rounded edges, two-piece hinged design
• Top: Distinctive cross-hatched pattern on lid
• Markings: Korean characters (if present); production lot/date stamps

EOD Hazard Warnings

• LOW METAL SIGNATURE -- metal detector may not reliably detect
• 200-250g explosive fill is SIGNIFICANTLY more than M14 (29g) or Type 72 (34-50g) -- will cause traumatic amputation above the ankle
• MUV-type fuze is a known "problem fuze" -- corrosion and aging can make it unpredictable
• Hinged plastic body can become brittle with age, making handling extremely dangerous
• DO NOT ATTEMPT manual clearance without confirmed identification and current RSP

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• DPRK (Korean DMZ -- primary deployment area)
• Possibly exported to allied states (documentation limited)

Sources

• lexpev.nl (B-2), bulletpicker.com (B-2), CAT-UXO (B-2), Mine Action Review (B-2)

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NK-PFM "Leaf Mine"

designation: "NK-PFM (provisional -- CAT-UXO designation)"
common_name: "Leaf Mine"
country_of_origin: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)"
manufacturer: "DPRK state arsenals"
year_introduced: Unknown (first documented ~2015, heavily deployed 2023-2025)
type: "AP blast, scatterable (minimum metal)"
status: "In active production and deployment; confirmed laid in DMZ 2023-2025"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure-actuated mechanical fuze
• Mechanism: Direct pressure on plastic body triggers detonation
• Note: Visual similarity to Russian PFM-1 "butterfly mine" suggests possible design lineage, but the NK-PFM has a distinct leaf shape rather than the PFM-1's butterfly/petal shape

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Unknown -- treat as potentially anti-handling equipped

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• Unknown -- assume NO self-destruct capability

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Leaf-green or brown plastic
• Shape: Flat, leaf-shaped -- designed to blend with natural leaf litter
• Size: Roughly the size of a mobile phone
• Markings: None reported

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: NEAR-ZERO METAL CONTENT -- virtually undetectable by conventional metal detectors
• DESIGNED FOR CAMOUFLAGE -- extremely difficult to visually identify among natural debris
• 40g explosive fill comparable to Type 72 AP mine -- sufficient to destroy foot/lower leg
• MONSOON/FLOOD HAZARD: These mines have been confirmed washing across the DMZ into South Korean territory during monsoon rains -- contamination area may extend well beyond original emplacement zone
• DPRK soldiers laying these mines suffered "multiple casualties" from accidental detonations during emplacement (at least 10 incidents reported 2024)
• Assume all are LIVE and ARMED -- no self-destruct mechanism confirmed
• Classification still provisional; full technical data limited

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• DPRK (Korean DMZ -- primary deployment area, 2023-present)
• Tens of thousands laid along the border, 2024 estimate

Sources

• CAT-UXO NK-PFM entry (B-2), Inert Products LLC (C-3), ICBL-CMC (B-2), Korea Herald (C-2), Defense Post (C-2)

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NK Box Mine

designation: "NK Box Mine / NK Wooden Box Mine"
country_of_origin: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)"
manufacturer: "DPRK state arsenals / field-manufactured"
year_introduced: Korean War era (~1950s, continuous production)
type: "AP blast (wooden body, zero metal detectable)"
status: "In service; found in DMZ and surrounding areas"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Mechanical pressure -- wooden lid/hinge system
• Mechanism: Slot cut into hinged lid presses against retaining pin; sufficient downward force displaces pin, releasing striker onto detonator
• Construction: Simple enough for field fabrication

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• None inherent but field modification is common and unpredictable

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• None -- however, wooden construction degrades over time
• Rotting/splitting of wood can render mine inoperable OR can make it more sensitive (unpredictable)

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Natural unfinished pine wood; weathers to grey/brown
• Shape: Small rectangular box with hinged lid
• Markings: None
• Distinctive: Crude construction; visible wood grain; may show signs of water damage/rot

EOD Hazard Warnings

• ZERO METAL SIGNATURE -- completely undetectable by metal detectors
• Wooden construction degrades unpredictably -- old mines may be MORE dangerous than new ones (partially rotted lids may require less force to trigger)
• MONSOON HAZARD: Wooden box mines have been documented washing out of minefields during summer monsoon rains and traveling downstream into South Korean territory, causing civilian casualties
• No standardized dimensions -- each mine may be slightly different
• Aged explosive fill may be degraded or sensitized
• Approach: Manual probing and visual search ONLY; dual-sensor (GPR + metal) unreliable due to wood/organic composition

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• DPRK (Korean DMZ)
• North Korean special operations forces

Sources

• NamuWiki (D-3), Inert Products LLC (C-3), Deadliest Warrior Wiki (E-4 -- cross-referenced), Mine Action Review (B-2)

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ANTI-TANK MINES

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ATM-72

designation: "ATM-72"
country_of_origin: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)"
manufacturer: "DPRK state arsenals"
year_introduced: ~1972
type: "AT blast (metallic)"
comparable_to: "Soviet TM-46"
status: "In service"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Four-pronged pressure fuze -- distinctive feature
• Mechanism: Downward pressure on any of the four prongs triggers detonation
• Note: Lever action design makes mine resistant to overpressure and blast clearance methods

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Unknown -- treat as potentially booby-trapped; secondary fuze well may be present (consistent with Soviet AT mine design practice)

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Steel, olive drab or unpainted
• Shape: Circular disc with prominent four-pronged fuze assembly on top
• Distinctive: Thick wire carrying handle; filling plug visible
• Similar to: Soviet TM-46 in overall layout

EOD Hazard Warnings

• FOUR-PRONGED FUZE is a distinctive recognition feature but also means mine can be activated from multiple angles
• Lever action design is RESISTANT to blast overpressure clearance -- mine may survive detonation of nearby charges
• Treat bottom/side fuze wells as potentially armed with anti-handling devices
• Steel case produces significant fragmentation upon detonation

Sources

• Wikipedia ATM-72 (D-3 -- cross-referenced), METIS/Fenix Insight (B-2)

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ATM-74

designation: "ATM-74"
country_of_origin: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)"
manufacturer: "DPRK state arsenals"
year_introduced: ~1974
type: "AT blast (wooden body)"
comparable_to: "Soviet TMD-B"
status: "In service; encountered in DMZ"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: MV-5 pattern pressure fuze (Soviet-design mechanical)
• Mechanism: Three wooden planks form the top; the central plank sits above the pressure fuze; vehicle weight depresses plank, triggering fuze
• Construction: Wooden box packed with TNT blocks around central fuze well

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• None documented in base configuration
• WARNING: Field modifications possible

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• None -- wooden construction degrades over time (decades in DMZ environment)

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Unfinished pine wood box
• Shape: Rectangular wooden box with three-plank top
• Distinctive: Central plank is slightly narrower; sits over the fuze well
• Markings: None standard

EOD Hazard Warnings

• NEAR-ZERO METAL SIGNATURE -- extremely difficult to detect with metal detectors
• 6 kg TNT is a full anti-vehicle charge -- lethal blast radius significant
• Wooden construction degrades unpredictably over 50+ years in DMZ soil conditions
• Wood swelling/contracting with moisture cycles can affect fuze sensitivity
• MV-5 pattern fuze is robust but may corrode unpredictably
• DO NOT PROBE -- wooden lid may transmit probing force directly to fuze

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• DPRK (Korean DMZ)

Sources

• Wikipedia ATM-74 (D-3 -- cross-referenced with METIS), METIS/Fenix Insight (B-2), Military Wiki (D-3)

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NAVAL MINES

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DPRK Naval Mine Inventory

designation: "DPRK Naval Mine Inventory (Soviet-Origin)"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union (supplied to DPRK)"
estimated_stockpile: "50,000+ mines"
status: "In service; DPRK maintains active mine warfare capability"

Overview

North Korea possesses one of the largest naval mine inventories in the world, estimated at over 50,000 ex-Soviet sea mines. The DPRK demonstrated effective mine warfare during the Korean War, most notably at Wonsan, where over 3,000 Soviet-supplied contact and magnetic mines delayed a major amphibious operation for weeks and sank/damaged multiple UN vessels.

Known Mine Types in DPRK Inventory

MKB Moored Contact Mine

M-26 Moored Contact Mine

Myam (Small Anti-Boat Mine)

Magnetic/Influence Bottom Mines

DPRK Mine Warfare Doctrine

• Defensive: Protect strategic ports, defend against amphibious assault, provide seaward flank protection for land forces
• Offensive: Interdict shipping lanes, blockade ROK ports
• Delivery: Small surface ships (patrol boats, fishing vessels), possibly submarines and aircraft
• Monitoring: Coastal observation teams and radar-supported defensive minefields
• Supporting fires: Minefields integrated with coastal artillery and missile batteries -- mine clearance operations will be contested

Historical Precedent: Wonsan (1950)

• 3,000+ Soviet contact and magnetic mines laid in 400 sq mi
• Delayed UN amphibious landing by weeks
• Sank minesweepers USS Pledge (AM-277) and USS Pirate (AM-275)
• Demonstrated that even "unsophisticated" mines can achieve strategic effects

EOD/MCM Hazard Warnings

• 50,000+ mine inventory represents a massive area denial capability
• Mines may be laid by non-traditional platforms (fishing boats, barges) making pre-conflict detection difficult
• Korean War-era mines may still be encountered -- moored mines can remain viable for decades
• Contact horn fuzes on Soviet-pattern mines are EXTREMELY SENSITIVE to physical contact
• Influence mines will target acoustic/magnetic signatures of MCM vessels
• ASSUME MIXED MINEFIELDS -- contact, magnetic, and pressure mines laid together
• Coastal defense integration means MCM operations will occur under artillery fire

Sources

• DTIC ADA539219 "North Korean Protective Mine Warfare" (A-2), navweaps.com (B-2), USNI Proceedings (B-2), National Interest (C-3), KIMS (C-2)

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ARTILLERY PROJECTILES

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170mm HE-FRAG (Koksan)

designation: "170mm HE-FRAG / 170mm RAP"
platform: "M1978 Koksan / M1989 Koksan (SPG)"
country_of_origin: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)"
manufacturer: "DPRK state arsenals (2nd Machine Industry Bureau)"
year_introduced: M1978 (~1978), M1989 (~1989)
type: "HE-FRAG artillery projectile (170mm rifled)"
status: "In service; confirmed supplied to Russia for use in Ukraine (2024-2025)"

Specifications

Unique Characteristics

• 170mm is a UNIQUE DPRK CALIBER -- not standard Soviet, Chinese, or Western
• The gun may derive from Japanese/Soviet coastal defense gun designs
• This is the DPRK's longest-range non-rocket artillery system
• Approximately 500-600 Koksan systems estimated in DPRK inventory
• ~162 positioned within range of Seoul metropolitan area (northern districts)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• LARGE PROJECTILE -- 170mm HE-FRAG will produce extensive blast and fragmentation
• Dud rate estimated 20-25% based on Yeonpyeong data extrapolation
• RAP variants contain rocket motor -- additional hazard from unexpended propellant
• Chemical round capability assessed as possible -- approach all UXO with chemical detection equipment in a Korean Peninsula scenario
• IN UKRAINE CONTEXT: DPRK 170mm ammunition confirmed in transit to Russia; may be encountered as UXO in Ukrainian territory

Sources

• Wikipedia M-1978 Koksan (D-3 -- cross-referenced), ODIN/TRADOC (A-2), CSIS Missile Threat (B-2), GlobalSecurity.org (C-2), Army Recognition (C-2), Defense Express (C-3)

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122mm HE-FRAG

designation: "122mm HE-FRAG (Soviet-pattern)"
platform: "D-30 howitzer, D-74 gun, and variants"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet-pattern production)"
type: "HE-FRAG artillery projectile"
status: "In mass production; millions supplied to Russia (2023-present)"

Specifications

Production Scale and Quality

• DPRK has supplied millions of 122mm rounds to Russia since mid-2023
• Estimated 80-95% of DPRK container shipments to Russia are 122mm and 152mm ammunition
• Quality concerns: Reports of rounds breaking in barrels, causing weapon/crew losses
• Poor quality control evident; lubricant markings on shell bases noted
• Estimated dud rate significantly higher than Russian or Western production

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Standard 122mm HE-FRAG hazards apply
• DPRK rounds may have HIGHER THAN NORMAL DUD RATES -- expect more UXO per rounds fired
• Fuze quality concerns mean detonation may be unreliable -- UXO may be in a partially armed/sensitized state
• Inconsistent explosive fill quality may result in partial detonations or low-order functioning

Sources

• 38 North (B-2), RUSI (B-2), Kyiv Independent (C-2), NPR (C-2), Military Watch Magazine (C-3)

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130mm HE-FRAG

designation: "130mm HE-FRAG (Soviet M-46 pattern)"
platform: "M-46 field gun and DPRK variants"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet-pattern production)"
type: "HE-FRAG artillery projectile"
status: "In production; supplied to Russia"

Specifications

Notes

• 130mm is a significant DPRK caliber used in coastal defense and field artillery
• Same quality concerns as 122mm/152mm DPRK production

Sources

• 38 North (B-2), Kyiv Independent (C-2)

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152mm HE-FRAG

designation: "152mm HE-FRAG (Soviet-pattern)"
platform: "D-20 gun-howitzer, 2S3 Akatsiya, and variants"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet-pattern production)"
type: "HE-FRAG artillery projectile"
status: "In mass production; largest volume of DPRK ammunition supplied to Russia"

Specifications

Production Scale

• Largest single category of DPRK ammunition exported to Russia
• Estimates range from 5.2 million to 12+ million 152mm rounds shipped since August 2023
• May represent 40% of Russia's ammunition consumption in Ukraine
• DPRK factories producing 152mm shells reported "operating at full capacity"

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Same quality/dud rate concerns as 122mm
• 152mm is a large-caliber round -- UXO poses significant blast and fragmentation hazard
• Reports of inconsistent quality mean some rounds may be in unpredictable states
• Treat all DPRK-marked 152mm UXO as EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS

Sources

• 38 North (B-2), RUSI (B-2), Kyiv Post (C-2), Military Watch Magazine (C-3), CNN (C-2)

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ROCKETS

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240mm MLRS Rocket

designation: "240mm Unguided Rocket"
platform: "M1985 (12-tube) / M1991 (22-tube) MLRS"
country_of_origin: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)"
manufacturer: "DPRK state arsenals"
year_introduced: M1985 (~1985), M1991 (~1991)
type: "Unguided, spin-stabilized HE-FRAG / smoke / incendiary / chemical rocket"
status: "In service; confirmed supplied to Russia for use in Ukraine (2024-2025)"

Specifications

Platform Variants

• M1985: 12 tubes (2 rows x 6), mounted on Isuzu 6x6 truck chassis
• M1991: 22 tubes (2 rows of 8, 1 row of 6), mounted on 6x6 truck chassis
• M1991 modernized variants also reported

EOD Hazard Warnings

• LARGE ROCKET -- 497 kg total weight with 90 kg warhead
• 45 kg explosive fill produces MASSIVE blast and fragmentation effects
• Rocket motor may contain unexpended propellant -- fire/explosion hazard
• Chemical warhead variants are ASSESSED AS POSSIBLE -- approach with chemical detection
• Fin assembly and motor casing produce heavy fragmentation
• HIGH DUD RATE expected based on DPRK quality history
• In Ukraine, first confirmed footage of M1991 MLRS deployed by Russia (2024)

Countries in Service / Exports

• DPRK, Russia (confirmed 2024), Iran (assessed), Syria (assessed)

Sources

• CSIS Missile Threat (B-2), ODIN/TRADOC (A-2), GlobalSecurity.org (C-2), Army Recognition (C-2), Militarnyi (C-3)

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122mm BM-21 Rocket

designation: "122mm Unguided Rocket (Grad-pattern)"
platform: "BM-21 Grad-type MLRS (DPRK M2008 variant and others)"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet BM-21 Grad pattern)"
type: "Unguided, spin-stabilized HE-FRAG rocket"
status: "In service; mass produced"

Specifications

DPRK Variants

• DPRK operates multiple 122mm MRL platforms with 18, 24, and 40 tubes
• Mounted on tracked VTT-323 APC chassis or wheeled M1992 vehicles
• DPRK assessed to possess up to 5,000+ rocket artillery pieces across all calibers

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Unexploded 122mm rockets will have ARMED IMPACT FUZE -- extremely sensitive to disturbance
• Rocket motor may contain unexpended propellant
• Aluminum-containing TGAF-5 explosive is INCENDIARY as well as blast/fragmentation
• Wraparound fins deploy after launch -- partial deployment means rocket tumbled and may be unstable
• MRV fuze settings (SQ/delay) are not visible on UXO -- treat all as armed
• DPRK quality issues apply -- expect elevated dud rates

Sources

• GICHD Explosive Weapons Study (B-2), BM-21 Grad Wikipedia (D-3 -- cross-referenced), FAS (B-2), ODIN/TRADOC (A-2)

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107mm Type 63 Rocket

designation: "107mm Unguided Rocket (Type 63 pattern)"
platform: "Type 63-pattern 12-tube MRL (DPRK variants with 18/24 tubes)"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Chinese Type 63 pattern)"
type: "Unguided, spin-stabilized HE rocket"
status: "In service; widely proliferated"

Specifications

Notes

• 107mm is one of the most proliferated rocket calibers globally due to Chinese/DPRK exports
• DPRK variants are mounted on tracked and wheeled vehicles
• Commonly encountered in conflict zones where DPRK has exported (Middle East, Africa)
• Also encountered used by non-state actors (Hamas, Hezbollah, various African armed groups)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Small rocket but ARMED FUZE is primary hazard
• MJ-1 fuze arms at only 15 m -- rockets that failed to clear launch area may be armed
• Short range means these may be found close to firing positions as well as target areas
• TNT fill; standard HE hazards

Sources

• bulletpicker.com (B-2), CAT-UXO (B-2), FAS (B-2), Type 63 Wikipedia (D-3 -- cross-referenced)

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MORTAR ROUNDS

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60mm Mortar

designation: "60mm HE Mortar Bomb (Soviet/Chinese pattern)"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet/Chinese pattern production)"
type: "HE mortar bomb"
status: "In production; confirmed supplied to Russia for use in Ukraine (2024)"

Specifications

Notes

• DPRK 60mm mortars confirmed supplied to Russia and photographed in Ukrainian theater (2024)
• Lightweight ammunition that can be transported in large quantities
• DPRK estimated to possess ~7,500 mortars across all calibers

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Small round but PD fuze is ARMED on impact -- sensitive to movement/disturbance
• Tail fin assembly may be separated from body -- both components hazardous
• DPRK quality issues mean elevated dud rates expected

Sources

• Defense Express (C-2), Military Watch Magazine (C-3), List of KPA equipment Wikipedia (D-3)

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82mm Mortar

designation: "82mm HE Mortar Bomb (Soviet pattern)"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet pattern production)"
type: "HE-FRAG mortar bomb"
status: "In production; standard DPRK infantry support weapon ammunition"

Specifications

Notes

• 82mm is a standard Soviet-bloc mortar caliber (vs. Western 81mm)
• DPRK uses Soviet-pattern 82mm mortars including the 2B14 Podnos equivalent
• Ammunition is interchangeable with Soviet/Chinese/other Eastern Bloc 82mm systems

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Cast iron body produces significant fragmentation
• PD fuze is armed on firing -- UXO fuze is in ARMED state
• Increment charges may be partially burned -- propellant residue is a fire/burn hazard
• Standard mortar UXO approach procedures apply

Sources

• Arcon Partners (B-2), CAT-UXO (B-2), Bulcomersks (C-3)

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120mm Mortar

designation: "120mm HE Mortar Bomb (Soviet pattern)"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet pattern production)"
type: "HE-FRAG mortar bomb"
status: "In production; DPRK standard heavy mortar ammunition"

Specifications

Notes

• 120mm is the heaviest mortar caliber in standard DPRK infantry/battalion use
• Produces significantly more fragmentation and blast than 60mm/82mm
• DPRK also operates 160mm mortars (less common)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• LARGE mortar round -- significant blast and fragmentation hazard
• Heavy cast iron/steel body produces LETHAL fragmentation at considerable distance
• 120mm UXO should be treated with same caution as artillery UXO
• DO NOT APPROACH without confirmed identification and current RSP

Sources

• GICHD (B-2), General mortar specifications cross-referenced with DPRK equipment lists

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GRENADES

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DPRK Hand Grenades

designation: "DPRK Hand Grenades (multiple types)"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet and Chinese pattern copies)"
status: "In service; widely proliferated"

Known Types

Soviet-Pattern Grenades (DPRK-Produced Copies)

Chinese-Pattern Grenades (DPRK-Produced Copies)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Fuze mechanisms on DPRK copies may be of POOR QUALITY -- unpredictable delay times
• Aged grenades may have corroded fuze bodies -- handle with extreme caution
• Cast iron bodies (F-1, RGD-33) produce heavy fragmentation
• All DPRK grenades should be treated as ARMED until confirmed safe

Sources

• koreanwaronline.com (C-3), Military Factory (C-3), KPA equipment list Wikipedia (D-3)

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DPRK Anti-Tank Grenades

designation: "DPRK Anti-Tank Grenades (Soviet pattern copies)"
country_of_origin: "DPRK (Soviet pattern production)"
status: "In service"

Known Types

RPG-43 Pattern

RKG-3 Pattern

EOD Hazard Warnings

• SHAPED CHARGE -- directional blast hazard; explosive jet from open end of cone
• Inertia fuze is armed by drogue deployment -- if drogue is extended, fuze may be ARMED
• RPG-43 and RKG-3 patterns are commonly found as UXO in DPRK-export conflict zones
• RKG-3 has been documented in use by Iraqi insurgents, Hamas, and other non-state actors using DPRK-exported stocks
• DO NOT HANDLE if drogue/streamer is deployed -- fuze is likely in armed state
• Impact fuzes on anti-tank grenades are EXTREMELY SENSITIVE when armed

Sources

• Wikipedia RPG-43 (D-3 -- cross-referenced), koreanwaronline.com (C-3), military references

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EXPORT AND PROLIFERATION

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DPRK Arms Export Map

Overview

North Korea has been one of the world's most prolific illicit arms exporters for decades. KOMID (Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation) is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and is sanctioned by the UN. The DPRK uses front companies, falsified documents, sealed diplomatic shipments, and covert ship-to-ship transfers to evade sanctions.

Documented Export Recipients and Ordnance Types

Key Interdiction Events

1. Jie Shun (August 2016): Largest DPRK sanctions seizure -- 132 tons of arms cargo including ~30,000 RPGs, hidden under iron ore, destined for Egypt via Suez Canal
2. Multiple Syrian shipments (2012-2017): 39 documented shipments, some using sealed diplomatic pouches
3. Ongoing Russia shipments (2023-present): Millions of rounds of ammunition via container ships from DPRK ports

EOD Implications of DPRK Exports

• DPRK ordnance may be encountered in ANY conflict zone where DPRK has exported
• Markings will be in Korean (Hangul) characters; may also lack markings entirely
• Quality is consistently poor -- expect high dud rates wherever DPRK ammunition is used
• DPRK copies of Soviet/Chinese ordnance may not be dimensionally identical -- tools/fuze wrenches designed for the original may not fit
• Always consider DPRK origin when encountering Soviet-pattern ordnance with unusual markings or poor quality finish

Sources

• UN Panel of Experts reports (A-2), RUSI (B-2), 38 North (B-2), Foreign Affairs (B-2), Heritage Foundation (C-2), Small Arms Survey (B-2), Brookings Institution (B-2), ISIS Online (B-2), The Diplomat (C-2)

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KOREAN PENINSULA CONFLICT SCENARIO

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Seoul Bombardment Risk

scenario: "North Korean Artillery/Rocket Attack on Seoul Metropolitan Area"
population_at_risk: "~25 million (Seoul metro area)"
primary_threat_systems: "170mm Koksan SPG, 240mm MLRS"
estimated_systems_in_range: "~324 (162 Koksans + 162 MRLs)"

Threat Assessment

Systems Capable of Reaching Seoul

First-Hour Bombardment Estimate

• Total rounds in first hour: 10,000-12,000 (combined artillery and rockets)
• Rounds reaching Seoul proper: Estimated ~43 artillery rounds + ~1,870 rockets
• Estimated dud rate: ~25% (based on Yeonpyeong data)
• UXO generated in Seoul: Potentially 450-500 unexploded rounds in the first hour alone
• Affected area: ~29.12 sq km of Seoul's 605 sq km total (4.8%)

Casualty Estimates (Modern Analysis)

• Most likely scenario: ~2,600 fatalities (initial bombardment)
• Range: 700-4,500 fatalities depending on time of day and warning
• Mitigating factors: Concrete structures reduce lethality by ~60%; extensive subway system provides shelter; most citizens within steps of cover

UXO Contamination Scenario

• 25% dud rate means Seoul would face MASSIVE UXO contamination from the first hour of a conflict
• Chemical rounds possible -- any Seoul UXO clearance operation requires chemical detection capability
• Combined hazards: HE-FRAG, incendiary, smoke, and potentially chemical UXO mixed together
• Urban environment makes clearance extremely complex -- UXO in buildings, rubble, underground
• 25 million civilians in contamination zone -- largest potential UXO-affected population center in modern history

Sources

• RAND PE262 (A-2), West Point Modern War Institute (B-2), Texas National Security Review (B-2), 38 North nuclear study (B-2), National Interest (C-3), debuglies.com analysis (D-3)

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DMZ Mine Contamination

area: "Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)"
length: "250 km (155 miles)"
width: "4 km (2.5 miles)"
total_area: "~1,000 sq km"
mine_contamination_period: "1950-present (70+ years)"
status: "One of the most heavily mined areas on Earth"

Mine Density Estimates

Mine Types Present in DMZ

From North Korean Side

• APP M-57 (plastic blast AP mine)
• NK-PFM "Leaf Mine" (scatterable, plastic, near-zero metal)
• NK Box Mine (wooden, zero metal)
• ATM-72 (metallic AT mine)
• ATM-74 (wooden AT mine)
• PMN/PMN-2 copies (assessed)
• Type 72 copies (assessed, from Chinese supply)
• Improvised/field-manufactured wooden mines

From South Korean/US Side

• M14 (AP blast, minimum metal)
• M16 (AP bounding fragmentation)
• M4 (AP blast)
• M15/M19 (AT blast)
• Various Korean-manufactured mines

Clearance Challenges

Clearance Rate Data

• 2018 pilot clearance operation: ~240 mines removed
• At that rate: centuries to clear even a fraction of the DMZ
• South Korea alone has 380,000 AP mines requiring removal -- estimated 15+ years minimum
• Full DMZ clearance estimated at 200-489 years at current resources

EOD/Demining Implications

• DUAL-SENSOR DETECTION MANDATORY -- GPR + metal detector required for minimum-metal mines
• MANUAL PROBING required for wooden/plastic mines undetectable by any sensor
• MIXED HAZARD FIELDS -- AP mines, AT mines, UXO, and potentially chemical contamination coexist
• MONSOON SEASON creates annual mine migration events -- cleared areas can be re-contaminated
• Any future conflict will add MASSIVE additional UXO contamination to an already impossibly complex environment
• Practical reality: Full clearance of the Korean DMZ is among the most daunting demining challenges in human history, comparable only to post-WWII European clearance in scale

Sources

• Korea Herald (C-2), NPR (C-2), Military Times (C-2), Mine Action Review (B-2), CBS News (C-2), ICBL-CMC (A-2), banminesusa.org (C-2), Cultural Anthropology journal (C-2), Defense Post (C-2)

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APPENDIX: DPRK ORDNANCE IDENTIFICATION TIPS

How to Identify DPRK-Origin Ordnance

1. Markings: Korean Hangul characters (not Chinese hanzi or Cyrillic); may include date stamps in Juche calendar (add 1911 to get Gregorian year -- e.g., Juche 113 = 2024)
2. Quality: Rough machining, visible tooling marks, inconsistent finish, lubricant residue on shell bases
3. Packaging: DPRK ammunition crates often differ from Soviet/Chinese standard dimensions
4. Paint: Olive drab green is standard; paint quality is generally poor with drips, uneven coverage
5. Caliber anomalies: 170mm is UNIQUE to DPRK (no other country manufactures this caliber as standard)

Juche Calendar Conversion

Cross-Reference

• For visual identification profiles, see: /visual-id/feature-profiles/dprk-ordnance.md
• For Chinese mines (frequently co-located with DPRK ordnance): /osint/ordnance-categories/chinese-mines.md
• For Russian mines (Soviet-origin, same as DPRK patterns): /osint/ordnance-categories/russian-mines.md