Global Landmine Database (Non-Russian/Chinese/Iranian/DPRK)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT Created: 2026-03-28 Last Updated: 2026-03-28 Source Reliability: B-2 (Usually Reliable / Probably True) -- compiled from METIS (Fenix Insight), CAT-UXO, bulletpicker.com, nolandmines.com, Jane's, Wikipedia (cross-referenced), ODIN (TRADOC), FAS Military Analysis Network, HALO Trust, Landmine Monitor Purpose: Comprehensive EOD reference for global mine identification, hazard assessment, and clearance planning

SAFETY WARNING: This document is for IDENTIFICATION AND AWARENESS ONLY. It does NOT replace official EOD technical publications (60-series pubs, NAVEODFLTDIV, JODIC). Always refer to current TMs for render-safe procedures. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Yugoslav/Serbian Mines (Massively Proliferated)

1. PMA-1A
2. PMA-2
3. PMA-3
4. PROM-1
5. TMA-1 / TMA-1A
6. TMA-2
7. TMA-3
8. TMA-4
9. TMA-5 / TMA-5A
10. TMM-1
11. MRUD

Italian Mines (Widely Exported)

1. VS-50
2. VS-MK2
3. TS-50
4. SB-33
5. Valmara 69 (V-69)
6. TC/6

Belgian Mines

1. PRB M35
2. PRB M3 / M3A1
3. PRB M409 (NR409)

South African Mines

1. R2M2
2. No. 8 AT Mine
3. Ploughshare

Pakistani Mines

1. P4 Mk1/Mk2
2. P2 Mk2 (AT)

US Legacy Mines

1. M14 Toe Popper
2. M16 Bounding Mine
3. M18A1 Claymore
4. M15 AT Mine
5. M19 AT Mine
6. M21 AT Mine
7. FASCAM -- M73, M74
8. MOPMS -- M131

Egyptian Mines

1. Egyptian Mine Threat Summary

Myanmar Mines

1. Myanmar Mine Threat Summary

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YUGOSLAV/SERBIAN MINES

PROLIFERATION NOTE: Yugoslav mines are among the most widely encountered worldwide. Produced in massive quantities by SDPR (Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement) and Krusik, they were exported to 30+ countries and encountered in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The minimum-metal construction of most Yugoslav mines makes them extremely difficult to detect.

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PMA-1A

designation: "PMA-1A"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
manufacturer: "SDPR"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Out of production; widely encountered in Balkans, Africa"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: UPMAH-1 crush-type fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure on hinged lid crushes internal structure onto fuze, driving firing pin into stab detonator
• Arming: Safety pin removed; mine is immediately armed

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device
• Can be booby-trapped with pull/pressure-release devices underneath

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Olive green or brown rectangular plastic box
• Hinged lid with slightly raised edges
• Very low profile -- easily concealed under soil or vegetation

Commonly Confused With

• PMD-6/PMD-6M (Soviet) -- similar rectangular box concept but wooden construction
• PMA-2 -- same family but completely different shape (cylindrical)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Minimum metal -- extremely difficult to detect with metal detectors
• Plastic body degrades; explosive may be exposed and sensitized in aged mines
• Hinged lid mechanism can be extremely sensitive when corroded
• 200g TNT charge is powerful enough to cause traumatic amputation above the ankle

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Produced: Yugoslavia/Serbia
• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Angola, Mozambique, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea
• Massively produced and exported

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PMA-2

designation: "PMA-2"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Out of production; very widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Integral friction-initiated fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure on plunger forces it downward, igniting friction-sensitive pyrotechnic composition; flash fires detonator which initiates RDX booster, detonating main TNT charge
• Arming: Safety pin removal arms the mine

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device
• Frequently booby-trapped with UPR-2 anti-lift device in secondary fuze well at base

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Small cylindrical body, olive green or brown
• Distinctive protruding plunger/pressure cap on top
• Characteristic tapered lower body section
• Very compact -- one of the smallest mines in the Yugoslav arsenal

Commonly Confused With

• VS-50 (Italian) -- similar size but flat disc shape
• M14 (US) -- similar function/size but circular flat disc
• P4 Mk1 (Pakistan) -- similar small cylindrical profile

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal; difficult to detect
• Friction-initiated fuze can be extremely sensitive when degraded
• 100g TNT is sufficient for foot/lower leg amputation
• Very small size makes it easy to miss during clearance

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Iraq, Libya, Vietnam, Cambodia
• One of the most widely proliferated AP mines globally

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PMA-3

designation: "PMA-3"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Out of production; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: UPMAH-3 tilt/crush fuze
• Mechanism: Tilting or pressure drives a pin through friction-sensitive pyrotechnic compound; fires detonator which initiates main charge
• Arming: Pull-ring removal

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device
• Base has provision for placement of anti-lift device

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Flat, disc-shaped, low profile (looks like a shallow hockey puck)
• Olive green or black plastic
• Smooth or slightly textured top surface
• Very small fuze protrusion at center top

Commonly Confused With

• SB-33 (Italian) -- similar flat, disc-shaped minimum metal AP mine
• PFM-1 (Soviet) -- both are minimum metal but PFM-1 is butterfly/wing-shaped

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Virtually NO metal content -- undetectable by standard metal detectors
• Very low operating pressure (1.5 kg) -- extremely sensitive
• 35g charge is smaller but still capable of traumatic foot injuries
• Low profile makes visual detection extremely difficult
• Aged mines may be hypersensitive due to degraded pyrotechnic compound

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Libya
• Proliferated widely; found in minefields decades after emplacement

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PROM-1

designation: "PROM-1"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AP bounding fragmentation"
status: "Out of production; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure and/or tripwire activation
• Operating pressure: 9-15 kg on prongs
• Tripwire pull: 3-5 kg
• Mechanism: Activation releases striker; propellant charge launches inner body to 70-80 cm; tether wire pulls firing pin, detonating main charge at waist height
• Delay: ~0.5-1 second between trigger and main detonation

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• WARNING: Very commonly booby-trapped
• The four pronged fuze assembly makes field-expedient anti-handling easy
• Tripwire attachments standard; can be daisy-chained

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Cylindrical steel body, olive drab painted
• Four distinctive metal prongs extending upward from fuze cap (signature feature)
• Often deployed with tripwire to stakes
• Visible metal stake/pin assembly

Commonly Confused With

• OZM-72 (Soviet) -- similar bounding concept but cylindrical with different fuze arrangement
• M16 (US) -- similar bounding mine principle, different fuze prong arrangement
• Valmara 69 (Italian) -- similar bounding principle but different prong geometry

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREME HAZARD: 600+ steel balls at waist height
• Very commonly booby-trapped with secondary devices underneath
• Tripwires may be nearly invisible after years in the field
• Aged propellant may cause erratic bounce height or ground-level detonation (MORE lethal at close range)
• Metal body detectable but approach with extreme caution due to tripwires
• NEVER approach from directly above -- approach from maximum distance and trace all wires

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Libya
• Extremely lethal mine with extensive proliferation history

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TMA-1 / TMA-1A

designation: "TMA-1 / TMA-1A"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "Out of production; encountered in Balkans"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: UANU-1 pressure fuze (integral)
• Mechanism: Pressure shears four plastic retaining pins; pressure plate collapses onto mine body, actuating fuze
• Secondary fuze well: Base -- for anti-handling devices

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Secondary fuze well in base designed for anti-handling device
• Commonly deployed with UPMAH anti-lift fuze

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular disc shape, olive green or brown plastic
• Upper surface has eight triangular raised sectors radiating from center
• Central circular fuze cap on top
• Four plastic retaining pins visible at pressure plate edges

Commonly Confused With

• TMA-3 -- similar circular minimum-metal AT mine but different surface pattern
• TMA-4 -- similar concept but different fuze arrangement
• TM-62P (Soviet) -- similar circular plastic AT mine concept

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal -- difficult to detect
• 5.4 kg TNT is a massive charge -- lethal to vehicle occupants
• Always check for anti-lift devices in base fuze well before any attempt to move
• Plastic body degrades; approach aged mines with extreme caution

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo

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TMA-2

designation: "TMA-2"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "Out of production; encountered in Balkans and Africa"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Two UANU-1 pressure fuzes
• Mechanism: Pressure on ribbed plate actuates fuze(s)
• Secondary fuze well: Base -- anti-handling

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Secondary fuze well in base for anti-handling device
• Dual fuze design provides redundancy

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Rectangular plastic body, olive green or brown
• Upper ribbed pressure plate with two large circular fuze caps
• Carrying handle on side
• Distinctly rectangular (vs. circular TMA-1/3/4)

Commonly Confused With

• TMA-5 -- also rectangular but different fuze arrangement (single central fuze)
• M19 (US) -- also square/rectangular plastic AT mine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• 6.5 kg TNT -- extremely powerful
• Dual fuze provides redundancy; both must be considered
• Minimum metal; very difficult to detect
• Always check base for anti-handling device

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Africa (exported)

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TMA-3

designation: "TMA-3"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "Out of production; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Three UTMA-3 fuzes in top surface wells
• Mechanism: Pressure on any fuze actuates detonation
• Secondary fuze well: One in base for anti-handling device

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Fourth fuze well in base specifically designed for anti-handling device
• Very commonly deployed with anti-lift fuze

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular, dark olive/brown color
• Resin-reinforced fabric casing gives rough/textured surface
• Three fuze wells visible on top surface
• No pressure plate -- fuzes sit directly in cast explosive block

Commonly Confused With

• TMA-4 -- modernized version; similar but with plastic casing instead of resin fabric
• TMA-1 -- similar circular shape but different surface pattern

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Virtually no metal -- extremely difficult to detect even with advanced detectors
• 6.5 kg TNT charge -- catastrophic effects on vehicles and personnel
• Three fuze wells mean three separate initiation points
• Base fuze well almost certainly has anti-handling device if mine appears deliberately emplaced
• Resin/fabric casing degrades faster than plastic; explosive may be partially exposed

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya

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TMA-4

designation: "TMA-4"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "Out of production; encountered in Balkans"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Three UTMA-4 fuzes (black plastic)
• Mechanism: Modernized version of TMA-3 fuze system
• Secondary fuze well: Base

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Base fuze well for anti-handling device
• Same anti-handling doctrine as TMA-3

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular plastic body, olive green or brown
• Three black plastic UTMA-4 fuzes installed flush in top surface
• Smoother finish than TMA-3 (plastic vs resin fabric)
• Modernized appearance vs TMA-3

Commonly Confused With

• TMA-3 -- predecessor; nearly identical dimensions
• TMA-1 -- same circular concept but different fuze arrangement

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Same hazard profile as TMA-3
• Minimum metal; difficult to detect
• Three separate fuze initiation points
• Always check base for anti-handling

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo

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TMA-5 / TMA-5A

designation: "TMA-5 / TMA-5A"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "Out of production; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Single central threaded fuze cap with UTMA-5 fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure-actuated
• Arming: Threaded fuze cap unscrewed to install fuze

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Base fuze well for anti-handling device
• Commonly encountered with anti-lift devices

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Rectangular plastic body, dark olive or brown
• Single central circular threaded fuze cap on top surface
• TMA-5: Rope carry handle
• TMA-5A: Webbing carry handle (primary visual difference)
• Ribbed surface texture

Commonly Confused With

• TMA-2 -- also rectangular but has dual fuze caps
• M19 (US) -- also square/rectangular plastic AT mine but slightly different proportions

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Virtually metal-free -- extremely difficult to detect
• 5.5 kg TNT -- devastating blast effects
• Check for anti-handling device in base fuze well
• Plastic case can degrade; explosive may be compromised in aged mines

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Angola, Afghanistan, Iraq

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TMM-1

designation: "TMM-1"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "Out of production; encountered in Balkans"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: UTMM central pressure fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure on screw-on pressure plate actuates central fuze
• Secondary fuze wells: Side and bottom -- for anti-handling devices
• Note: Direct copy of German WWII Tellermine 43

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Two secondary fuze wells (side and bottom) for anti-handling devices
• Very commonly booby-trapped

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular sheet steel body, olive drab painted
• Screw-on pressure plate on top
• Steel carrying handle spot-welded to side
• Tellermine 43 profile -- distinctive classic AT mine shape

Commonly Confused With

• Tellermine 43 (German WWII) -- the TMM-1 is a direct copy
• TM-46 (Soviet) -- similar circular metallic AT mine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Heavy metallic mine -- easily detectable but approach cautiously
• Side and bottom fuze wells commonly contain anti-handling devices
• Steel carrying handle may be attached to pull-wire anti-handling device
• Tritonal fill provides enhanced blast effect over pure TNT

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo

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MRUD

designation: "MRUD"
full_name: "Mina Rasprskavajuca Usmerenog Dejstva (Directed Fragmentation Mine)"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
type: "AP directional fragmentation"
status: "In limited production; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Primarily command-detonated via electric detonator
• Alternative: Can be set for tripwire actuation
• Detonator wells: Two
• Body: Waterproof

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Not typically anti-handling configured
• Tripwire configuration inherently functions as anti-approach

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Light green convex rectangular plastic body
• Two detonator wells on rear face
• Three crude sight lines/aiming marks on top surface
• Embossed grid pattern on front of some early-production mines
• Two detachable metal scissor legs on bottom for ground mounting

Commonly Confused With

• M18A1 Claymore (US) -- similar shape and concept; MRUD is smaller with different markings
• MON-50 (Soviet) -- similar directional mine concept but curved body shape
• MM5 (Myanmar) -- Claymore-type copy

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Command-detonated mines may have live electrical circuits attached
• Tripwire variants require careful wire tracing
• 650 steel balls at high velocity in 60-degree arc
• "FRONT TOWARD ENEMY" equivalent markings may be in Cyrillic -- do not assume mine orientation based on English-language expectations

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, Syria
• Widely exported and copied

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ITALIAN MINES

PROLIFERATION NOTE: Italian mines, manufactured primarily by Valsella Meccanotecnica, Tecnovar Italiana, and Misar, were exported globally before Italy ratified the Ottawa Convention in 1999. Their sophisticated minimum-metal designs make them among the most difficult mines to detect. Valsella was bankrupted in 1997 but the mines remain in the ground worldwide.

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VS-50

designation: "VS-50"
country_of_origin: "Italy"
manufacturer: "Valsella Meccanotecnica SpA"
year_introduced: 1985
type: "AP blast"
status: "Out of production (1997); widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Integral mechanical pressure fuze
• Mechanism: Three-section design; pressure on top section activates fuze in middle section, initiating explosive in bottom section
• Blast resistant: Survives overpressure from nearby mine detonations

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device
• Blast-resistant design intended to survive mine-clearing charges

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Flat circular disc, olive green, sand, or brown
• Smooth top surface with central pressure plate
• Three concentric sections visible on cross-section
• Clean, modern appearance

Commonly Confused With

• TS-50 (Tecnovar) -- very similar dimensions and appearance; nearly identical profile
• VS-MK2 -- same family but smaller and lower profile
• PMA-2 (Yugoslav) -- similar size but cylindrical rather than disc-shaped

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal configuration makes detection extremely challenging
• Blast-resistant design means mine-clearing charges may not neutralize it
• 43g RDX is sufficient for foot/ankle destruction
• Widely scattered globally -- encountered in unexpected locations

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Exported to: 30+ countries across Middle East, Africa, Asia
• Encountered: Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Eritrea, Somalia, Cambodia, Libya
• One of the most exported Italian mines

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VS-MK2

designation: "VS-MK2"
country_of_origin: "Italy"
manufacturer: "Valsella Meccanotecnica SpA"
type: "AP blast (scatterable)"
status: "Out of production; encountered globally"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pneumatic pressure fuze with blast-resistance
• Mechanism: Pressure on neoprene plunger activates internal pneumatic fuze system
• Blast resistant: Pneumatic system prevents detonation from sudden overpressure

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device
• SB-33/AR electronic variant includes anti-disturbance features

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular, very flat/low profile (32 mm high)
• Olive green or sand body
• Black neoprene plunger/pressure plate on top resting on small spring
• Lower profile than VS-50

Commonly Confused With

• VS-50 -- same family, same diameter but taller
• SB-33 -- similar minimum metal scatterable concept but different shape
• PMA-3 (Yugoslav) -- similar flat disc profile

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Virtually undetectable by conventional metal detectors
• Blast-resistant fuze defeats mine-clearing explosive methods
• Designed as maiming mine -- 33g RDX destroys foot but may not kill
• Can function underwater -- check stream/river crossings
• Very low profile makes visual detection extremely difficult

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Widely exported pre-1997
• Encountered: Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Eritrea

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TS-50

designation: "TS-50"
country_of_origin: "Italy"
manufacturer: "Tecnovar Italiana SpA"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Out of production (1997); widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pneumatic diaphragm pressure fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure forces air through diaphragm into rubber air bag; bag inflates, pushes shutter, removes striker retaining lug; striker impacts detonator
• Blast resistant: Designed to survive overpressure

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular with ribbed plastic case (distinctive ribbing pattern)
• Olive green, brown, or sand colored
• Central pressure plate area
• Ribbed exterior distinguishes it from smooth-cased VS-50

Commonly Confused With

• VS-50 -- nearly identical dimensions but smooth case (vs ribbed)
• VS-MK2 -- same family of Italian mines
• TC/6 (Tecnovar) -- same manufacturer but much larger (AT mine)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Low metal content -- near-undetectable
• Blast-resistant pneumatic fuze defeats mine-clearing methods
• Waterproof and submersible -- check waterways
• 50g RDX slightly more powerful than VS-50

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Widely exported before 1997
• Encountered: Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Libya, Eritrea

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SB-33

designation: "SB-33"
country_of_origin: "Italy"
manufacturer: "Misar"
year_introduced: 1977
type: "AP blast (scatterable)"
status: "Out of production; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Mechanical rotating collar fuze
• Mechanism: Gradual pressure on central neoprene pad rotates locking collar until striker is released; striker flips into stab-detonator
• Blast resistant: Sudden overpressure (mine-clearing charge) causes striker to LOCK collar in place, preventing detonation
• Variant: SB-33/AR has electronic fuze actuated by pressure OR movement

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• SB-33/AR variant: Electronic fuze includes anti-disturbance (movement sensor)
• Standard SB-33 has no anti-handling device

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Irregular low-profile disc shape (not perfectly circular)
• Central black neoprene pressure pad on top
• Glass-reinforced polycarbonate body, olive green or sand
• Two-piece construction (upper/lower halves)
• "Butterfly" nickname due to shape

Commonly Confused With

• PFM-1 (Soviet) -- both called "butterfly mines" but completely different shape; PFM-1 has wing shape, SB-33 is disc-shaped
• VS-MK2 -- similar minimum metal scatterable concept
• PMA-3 (Yugoslav) -- similar flat disc minimum metal concept

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Blast-resistant fuze -- mine-clearing charges will NOT reliably detonate this mine
• SB-33/AR variant has anti-disturbance -- will detonate if moved
• Virtually no metal content -- undetectable by metal detectors
• Low profile (30 mm) makes visual detection extremely difficult
• May be scattered by vehicle-mounted SY-AT system across wide areas
• Cannot distinguish SB-33 from SB-33/AR without disassembly -- treat ALL as anti-disturbance

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Exported to: Iraq, Libya, numerous African and Middle Eastern countries
• Encountered: Iraq (Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War), Libya, Afghanistan, Angola

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Valmara 69

designation: "Valmara 69 (V-69)"
country_of_origin: "Italy"
manufacturer: "Valsella Meccanotecnica SpA"
type: "AP bounding fragmentation"
status: "Out of production; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Operating pressure: 10 kg on outer prongs
• Tripwire pull: 6 kg on central prong
• Mechanism: Fuze cap tilts from pressure on prongs or tripwire pull; this releases striker, igniting propellant; body is ejected ~50 cm; internal tether wire pulls firing pin at apex, detonating main charge

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device
• Prong/tripwire arrangement inherently difficult to approach safely

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Cylindrical body sitting in ground with prongs extending above surface
• Olive green or sand colored body
• Three outer prongs + one central prong extending upward (signature feature)
• Prongs are primary visual identifier

Commonly Confused With

• PROM-1 (Yugoslav) -- similar bounding concept with prongs but different prong arrangement (PROM-1 has four prongs in cross pattern)
• OZM-72 (Soviet) -- bounding mine but different fuze arrangement
• M16 (US) -- similar bounding concept

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREMELY LETHAL: 1,000 steel fragments at waist height in 360-degree pattern
• One of the most feared AP mines globally
• Combined pressure/tripwire activation makes approach hazardous from any direction
• 25 m lethal radius means large standoff required
• Detectable by metal detector but approach must account for tripwires
• Do NOT attempt to lift -- bounding mechanism may be primed
• If tripwire is spotted, DO NOT follow it -- withdraw and plan approach

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Exported to: Iraq, Libya, Egypt, numerous African countries
• Encountered: Iraq (massively used in Iran-Iraq War), Libya, Angola, Afghanistan, Eritrea
• Among the most lethal AP mines ever produced

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TC/6

designation: "TC/6"
country_of_origin: "Italy"
manufacturer: "Tecnovar Italiana SpA"
type: "AT blast"
status: "Out of production; encountered in Middle East and Africa"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pneumatic air-pressure fuze system
• Mechanism: Pressure on top plate forces air through small bleed valve; air inflates diaphragm; diaphragm pushes shutter, forcing steel retaining ball out of striker path; striker flips into detonator
• Blast resistant: Air-pressure system provides inherent resistance to sudden overpressure

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Secondary fuze well for anti-handling device (varies by deployment)

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Round deep ribbed plastic case (distinctive ribbing)
• Sand or olive green color
• Central fuze well on top
• Deep ribbing pattern is primary visual identifier (similar to TS-50 but much larger)
• Also produced as TC/3.6 (smaller, 3.6 kg explosive fill)

Commonly Confused With

• TC/3.6 -- smaller version of same mine; distinguish by size/weight
• TMA-3 (Yugoslav) -- similar round plastic AT mine concept
• TM-62P (Soviet) -- similar round plastic AT mine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal; difficult to detect
• 6 kg explosive -- devastating blast effects on vehicles
• Air-pressure fuze may survive mine-clearing overpressure
• Check for anti-handling in secondary fuze well

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Encountered: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Angola, various African countries

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BELGIAN MINES

PROLIFERATION NOTE: Belgian mines from Poudreries Reunies de Belgique (PRB) were widely exported during the Cold War, particularly the minimum-metal designs. PRB mines are notable for their very low metal content, making them extremely difficult to detect. Belgium ratified the Ottawa Convention in 1998.

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PRB M35

designation: "PRB M35"
country_of_origin: "Belgium"
manufacturer: "Poudreries Reunies de Belgique (PRB)"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Out of production; encountered in Africa and Middle East"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Double percussion fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure on small "nipple" protrusion on fuze top displaces sliding bolt; bolt has aperture holding two percussion caps; when bolt moves, two opposing spring steel firing pins are released and strike percussion caps, detonating mine
• Two firing pins: Redundant dual-striker design

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Small cylindrical PVC body, dark green or sand
• Distinctive small "nipple" protrusion on top center (pressure point)
• Very small and compact
• Smooth PVC finish

Commonly Confused With

• PMA-2 (Yugoslav) -- similar small cylindrical AP mine
• M14 (US) -- similar small AP blast mine concept
• P4 Mk1 (Pakistan) -- similar size and function

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal; very difficult to detect
• Dual firing pin provides redundancy -- if one fails, other may still fire
• 100g explosive charge is substantial for such a small mine
• PVC body degrades in tropical environments

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Exported to: Multiple African and Middle Eastern countries
• Encountered: Angola, Mozambique, Iraq, Libya, Eritrea/Ethiopia

---

PRB M3 / M3A1

designation: "PRB M3 / PRB M3A1"
country_of_origin: "Belgium"
manufacturer: "Poudreries Reunies de Belgique (PRB)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "Out of production; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Double percussion fuze (same principle as PRB M35)
• Mechanism: Pressure on cylindrical pressure plate shears plastic pins; internal plate moves to activate dual strikers onto percussion caps
• M3A1 variant: Has two secondary fuze wells for anti-handling

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• PRB M3: No secondary fuze wells; limited anti-handling capability
• PRB M3A1: Two secondary fuze wells; commonly deployed with M30 anti-lift device
• WARNING: M3A1 variant with M30 anti-lift will detonate if lifted

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Square polythene body, olive green or sand brown
• Webbing carrying handle on side
• Ammonia-free bakelite fuze seating on top
• Cylindrical pressure plate assembly screwed into top center
• Waterproof -- can be laid in shallow water

Commonly Confused With

• M19 (US) -- also square minimum metal AT mine
• TMA-5 (Yugoslav) -- rectangular minimum metal AT mine
• TC/6 (Italian) -- minimum metal AT mine but round

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: M3A1 variant commonly has M30 anti-lift -- DO NOT LIFT without confirming variant and checking for anti-handling devices
• Only two tiny metal components (wire strikers + aluminum caps) -- virtually undetectable by metal detector
• 6 kg Trialene (aluminum-enhanced) produces more powerful blast than equivalent weight of TNT
• Hexolite booster is sensitive -- handle with extreme care
• Can be laid underwater -- check stream beds and shallow water crossings

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Exported to: 30+ countries across Africa, Middle East, Asia
• Encountered: Angola, Mozambique, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Cambodia
• One of the most widely exported minimum-metal AT mines

---

PRB M409

designation: "PRB M409 (also NR409)"
country_of_origin: "Belgium"
manufacturer: "Poudreries Reunies de Belgique (PRB)"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Out of production; encountered in multiple countries"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Double percussion fuze with sliding bolt
• Mechanism: Pressure displaces sliding bolt attached to pressure plate; bolt aperture holds two percussion caps; when displaced, two opposing steel firing pins strike percussion caps and detonate mine
• Also produced as: M969 (licensed production in Portugal)

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular, very flat profile (28 mm high)
• Dark green or sand colored plastic body
• Smooth top surface with subtle pressure plate
• Low profile -- easily concealed

Commonly Confused With

• SB-33 (Italian) -- similar flat, low-profile minimum metal design
• PMA-3 (Yugoslav) -- similar flat disc mine
• VS-MK2 (Italian) -- similar minimum metal flat AP mine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal; very difficult to detect
• Very low profile (28 mm) -- easily missed visually
• 80g Trialene charge is potent for a small mine
• Low operating pressure (5 kg) -- can be activated by children

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Manufactured under license in Portugal as M969
• Encountered: Angola, Mozambique, Oman, Middle East, Africa

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SOUTH AFRICAN MINES

PROLIFERATION NOTE: South African mines were produced primarily by Mechem (later Denel) and used extensively in Southern African bush wars (Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia). The R2M2 is one of the most commonly encountered mines in Southern Africa due to massive deployment along border minefields. South Africa ratified the Ottawa Convention in 2004.

---

R2M2

designation: "R2M2"
country_of_origin: "South Africa"
manufacturer: "Mechem / Denel"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Out of production; massively encountered in Southern Africa"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Integral pressure fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure-actuated striker onto detonator
• Metal components: Firing pin and small spring only -- sealed in plastic

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Small cylindrical polycarbonate body
• Brown, olive, or sand colored
• Very small and compact -- slightly larger than a bottle cap
• Smooth plastic finish

Commonly Confused With

• R2M1 -- predecessor; similar design but slightly different fuze mechanism
• PMA-2 (Yugoslav) -- similar small cylindrical AP mine
• M14 (US) -- similar small minimum metal AP mine concept

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Virtually undetectable by metal detectors -- the pin and spring are sealed in plastic and provide negligible metal signature
• Millions deployed along Rhodesian/Zimbabwean, Mozambican, Angolan, and Namibian borders -- still active after 40+ years
• Small size makes manual probing extremely difficult
• Polycarbonate body is very durable -- these mines remain functional for decades
• 58g RDX/Tetryl is sufficient for traumatic foot amputation

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Massively deployed: Zimbabwe (Rhodesian border minefields), Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Zambia
• One of the primary mine threats in Southern African demining operations
• Millions estimated to remain in the ground

---

No. 8 AT Mine

designation: "No. 8"
country_of_origin: "South Africa"
manufacturer: "Mechem / Denel"
type: "AT blast"
status: "In limited service; encountered in Southern Africa"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Integral central pressure fuze (similar to R2M1/R2M2 fuze design, scaled up)
• Mechanism: Large plunger leads from pressure plate to centrally-located fuze in base
• Arming: Oversize arming lever on top; positions at "ARMED" or "SAFE" lugs
• Optional: Compatible with electronic anti-handling devices, seismic sensors, and magnetic influence devices

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• WARNING: Can be fitted with electronic anti-handling, seismic, and magnetic influence fuzes
• Multiple secondary fuze wells for various anti-handling configurations
• When fitted with electronic fuzes, presents extreme anti-handling hazard

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular plastic body, olive green or sand
• Large prominent arming lever on top surface -- visible "ARMED"/"SAFE" positions
• Central pressure plate with plunger
• Oversize arming lever is distinctive visual identifier

Commonly Confused With

• TMA-3/TMA-4 (Yugoslav) -- similar circular plastic AT mine
• TM-62P (Soviet) -- similar round plastic AT mine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Electronic anti-handling/seismic/magnetic fuze options mean the mine may detonate from vibration, proximity of metal, or any attempt to move
• 7 kg RDX/TNT is an extremely powerful charge
• Minimum metal construction complicates detection
• Arming lever position should be verified from a distance if visible
• DO NOT approach if electronic anti-handling is suspected -- use stand-off methods

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Deployed: Southern African border minefields, Angola
• South African Defence Forces standard AT mine during bush war era

---

Ploughshare

designation: "Ploughshare"
country_of_origin: "South Africa / Rhodesia"
type: "AP directional fragmentation"
status: "Legacy; encountered in Zimbabwe minefields"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Tripwire-actuated
• Mechanism: Tripwire triggers explosive charge behind metal plate; plate fragments into shrapnel projected in directed arc
• Deployment: Mounted on metal stakes in visible positions as deterrent

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Visible above-ground mounting means mines are visible as deterrent
• Protected by sub-surface AP mines (typically R2M2) around base of stakes

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Metal plate mounted on metal stake above ground
• Tripwire connections visible
• Often in rows of three within minefield
• Visible deterrent -- not concealed

Commonly Confused With

• M18A1 Claymore (US) -- similar directional concept but ground-mounted
• MON-50 (Soviet) -- similar concept but different construction
• MRUD (Yugoslav) -- similar directional fragmentation

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Above-ground mounting makes mines visible but tripwires may be difficult to see
• Ploughshare minefields are PROTECTED BY SUB-SURFACE AP MINES (R2M2) -- do not enter minefield to approach ploughshares
• Metal stakes and plate are easily detectable but sub-surface R2M2 mines in the area are NOT
• Typical deployment: 100 ploughshares + 300 sub-surface AP mines per km of frontage

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Deployed: Rhodesian/Zimbabwean border minefields (Mukumbura, eastern border)
• Still present in Zimbabwe; active demining operations ongoing by HALO Trust

---

PAKISTANI MINES

PROLIFERATION NOTE: Pakistani mines are produced by Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) in Wah Cantt. Limited export compared to other producers. Encountered primarily in Pakistan (FATA/tribal areas), Afghanistan, and the India-Pakistan border region.

---

P4 Mk1/Mk2

designation: "P4 Mk1 / P4 Mk2"
country_of_origin: "Pakistan"
manufacturer: "Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF)"
type: "AP blast"
status: "In production; encountered in South Asia"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure-actuated shear-wire fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure breaks thin shear wire, releasing spring-loaded firing pin into detonator
• Note: P4 Mk1 is also used as the FUZE/TRIGGER for the P2 Mk2 anti-tank mine

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Small disc-shaped plastic body
• Brown or olive green color
• Central pressure plate with small protrusion
• Compact -- similar profile to M14

Commonly Confused With

• M14 (US) -- similar small AP blast mine
• PMA-2 (Yugoslav) -- similar small AP mine
• PRB M35 (Belgian) -- similar size and concept

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal; difficult to detect
• 30g Tetryl is designed to maim rather than kill
• Very small size -- easily missed during clearance
• Can be used as fuze element in P2 Mk2 AT mine -- if found, AT mine may be nearby

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Deployed: Pakistan (FATA, Balochistan), Afghanistan, India-Pakistan border

---

P2 Mk2

designation: "P2 Mk2"
country_of_origin: "Pakistan"
manufacturer: "Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "In production; encountered in South Asia"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Uses P4 Mk1 anti-personnel mine as fuze/trigger mechanism
• Mechanism: P4 AP mine inserted into body; pressure on cover plate activates P4, which initiates main AT charge

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Secondary fuze well for anti-handling device

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Brown plastic rectangular body
• Large pressure plate/cover
• P4 AP mine visible when cover plate removed

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Contains a live P4 AP mine as its fuze -- two explosive devices in one
• Brown plastic body with moderate metal content
• Check for anti-handling device in secondary fuze well

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Pakistan, Afghanistan, India-Pakistan border region

---

US LEGACY MINES

PROLIFERATION NOTE: US mines are encountered globally due to massive Cold War-era exports and use in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf Wars. The US has not ratified the Ottawa Convention. US mine designs have been copied by numerous countries (particularly the M14, M16, and M18A1 Claymore). FASCAM and MOPMS systems feature self-destruct mechanisms but dud rates mean unexploded submunitions persist.

---

M14

designation: "M14"
nickname: "Toe Popper"
country_of_origin: "United States"
year_introduced: ~1955
type: "AP blast"
status: "Withdrawn from US service (1974); widely encountered globally"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Integral Belleville spring fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure on pressure plate flexes Belleville spring, flipping firing pin downward into stab detonator
• Arming: Slotted screw on side turned from "S" (Safe) to "A" (Armed) with pointed object

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device
• Sometimes placed on wooden board with pressure-release device underneath

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Small olive drab circular disc
• External ribs on body (distinctive)
• Flat pressure plate on top
• Arming slot ("S" / "A") on side
• Extremely small -- easily concealed

Commonly Confused With

• MM6 (Myanmar) -- direct copy of M14
• P4 Mk1 (Pakistan) -- similar concept and size
• PRB M35 (Belgian) -- similar size class

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal; steel firing pin is tiny -- extremely difficult to detect
• 29g Tetryl designed as maiming charge -- destroys foot but usually not fatal
• Millions deployed globally since 1955 -- encountered in Vietnam, Korea, Middle East
• Ribbed bakelite body degrades over time; explosive may be exposed
• Copies (MM6 Myanmar, others) may have varying quality and sensitivity

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Massively produced and exported to 40+ countries
• Encountered: Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, Africa
• Copied by: Myanmar (MM6), others

---

M16

designation: "M16 / M16A1 / M16A2"
country_of_origin: "United States"
type: "AP bounding fragmentation"
status: "Withdrawn from US service; encountered globally"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: M605 pronged pressure/tension fuze (standard)
• Operating pressure: 3.6-9 kg on prongs
• Tripwire pull: 1.4-4.5 kg
• Mechanism: Activation releases striker; delay burns; 4.5g black powder propellant launches inner iron body; pyrotechnic delay detonates main charge at height
• M16A2: Offset fuze well, single delay element (redesigned)

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device
• Very commonly booby-trapped with anti-lift devices underneath

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Cylindrical, olive drab, yellow stenciled markings
• M605 fuze with pronged cap visible above ground
• Based on German S-mine (Bouncing Betty) design
• M16A2 has offset fuze well (distinguishing from M16/M16A1)

Commonly Confused With

• PROM-1 (Yugoslav) -- similar bounding mine with prongs
• OZM-72 (Soviet) -- similar bounding mine
• MM3 (Myanmar) -- copy/derivative of bounding mine concept
• Valmara 69 (Italian) -- similar bounding mine concept

EOD Hazard Warnings

• High metal content -- detectable but approach carefully for tripwires
• Variable bounce height (0.3-1.7 m) means lethal fragmentation at various heights
• Very commonly booby-trapped with secondary devices underneath
• Fuze prongs may be obscured by vegetation -- extremely dangerous in overgrown areas
• Based on German S-mine which is a proven, highly effective design

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Widely exported during Cold War
• Encountered: Vietnam, Korea, Middle East, Africa, South America

---

M18A1

designation: "M18A1"
nickname: "Claymore"
country_of_origin: "United States"
type: "AP directional fragmentation"
status: "In active US service; globally proliferated"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Command-detonated via M57 firing device ("clacker") and electric blasting cap
• Primary: Electrical detonation via 30 m command wire
• Can also be: Tripwire-actuated using M142 multipurpose firing device (victim-activated -- prohibited by Ottawa Convention)
• Detonator wells: Two

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Not typically configured with anti-handling
• Command detonation is primary method

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• "FRONT TOWARD ENEMY" embossed on front face (CRITICAL recognition feature)
• Simple open sight on top for aiming
• Two pairs of scissor legs on bottom
• Gray-green plastic case with peep-sight on top
• Inert training versions: light blue or green with light blue band

Commonly Confused With

• MRUD (Yugoslav) -- Claymore-type copy
• MON-50 (Soviet) -- similar directional mine concept but curved body
• MM5 (Myanmar) -- Claymore-type copy

EOD Hazard Warnings

• WARNING: Command-detonated mines may have live electrical circuits -- check for command wires
• If tripwire-actuated, approach from BEHIND the mine (away from "FRONT TOWARD ENEMY" face)
• 700 steel balls at 1,200 m/s in 60-degree arc -- devastating at close range
• Back-blast hazard: fragments can travel backward up to 16 m
• "FRONT TOWARD ENEMY" marking confirms orientation but copies/adversary use may have mine reversed deliberately

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• In active US service since 1960
• Massively exported globally; copied by numerous countries
• Encountered: Vietnam, Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and virtually every global conflict zone
• Copies/variants: MRUD (Yugoslav), MON-50/90/100 (Soviet), MM5 (Myanmar), Claymore copies produced in 20+ countries

---

M15

designation: "M15"
country_of_origin: "United States"
year_introduced: ~1953 (Korean War era)
type: "AT blast"
status: "In limited service; widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: M603 pressure fuze (primary); secondary fuze wells in side and bottom
• Mechanism: Pressure on top plate actuates M603 fuze
• Secondary wells: Side and bottom -- for anti-handling and anti-tilt devices

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Side fuze well for anti-tilt device
• Bottom fuze well for anti-lift device
• Commonly deployed with anti-handling fuzes in both secondary wells

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Large circular steel body, olive drab with yellow markings
• Classic "dinner plate" AT mine profile
• Central fuze well on top with threaded cap
• Visible carrying handle

Commonly Confused With

• TMM-1 (Yugoslav) -- similar large circular metallic AT mine
• TM-46 (Soviet) -- similar profile and era

EOD Hazard Warnings

• 10.35 kg Comp B is an enormous charge -- lethal to vehicle occupants and nearby personnel
• High metal content makes it easy to detect
• Side and bottom fuze wells commonly contain anti-handling -- DO NOT LIFT without confirming
• Track-breaker primarily; may not destroy tank but creates catastrophic mobility kill

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Used: Korea, Vietnam, globally exported
• Standard US heavy AT mine for decades

---

M19

designation: "M19"
country_of_origin: "United States"
year_introduced: ~1966
type: "AT blast"
status: "In active US service; widely proliferated"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: M606 integral pressure fuze
• Secondary fuze wells: Side and bottom (for anti-handling)
• Mechanism: Pressure on top plate shears internal pins, driving striker into detonator

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Side fuze well for anti-tilt
• Bottom fuze well for anti-lift
• Very commonly deployed with anti-handling fuzes

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Square olive drab plastic body
• Flat top surface with central fuze area
• Distinctly square shape
• Carrying handle/grip on one side
• Very clean modern design

Commonly Confused With

• PRB M3 (Belgian) -- also square minimum metal AT mine; very similar concept
• TMA-5 (Yugoslav) -- rectangular minimum metal AT mine
• TMA-2 (Yugoslav) -- rectangular minimum metal AT mine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Only 4.13 grams of metal total -- one of the hardest AT mines in the world to detect
• 9.45 kg Comp B is devastating -- kills vehicle occupants
• Two secondary fuze wells commonly used with anti-handling -- NEVER lift without checking
• Square shape helps distinguish from round Soviet/Yugoslav mines
• Recently supplied to Ukraine -- will be encountered in current conflict areas

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Active US service since 1966
• Widely exported; currently in use in Ukraine (2024-present)
• Encountered: Vietnam, Gulf War, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine
• One of the most produced US AT mines

---

M21

designation: "M21"
country_of_origin: "United States"
type: "AT shaped charge (belly attack)"
status: "Withdrawn from primary service; encountered globally"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: M607 pressure/tilt rod fuze
• Tilt rod activation: 1.7 kg force at 20+ degrees from vertical
• Pressure activation: 290 lbs (131 kg) without tilt rod
• Mechanism: Miznay-Schardin effect -- shaped charge drives steel plate upward into vehicle belly

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Secondary fuze wells for anti-handling devices

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Circular steel body, olive drab
• Prominent tilt rod extending upward (21 inches)
• Tilt rod is primary visual identifier -- extends well above ground surface
• Can also be surface-laid without tilt rod

Commonly Confused With

• TMK-2 (Soviet) -- similar tilt-rod AT mine concept
• TM-72 (Soviet) -- shaped charge AT mine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Shaped charge penetrates 76 mm armor -- lethal to vehicle occupants from belly attack
• Tilt rod activation at only 1.7 kg -- extremely sensitive
• When tilt rod is visible, do NOT approach the mine directly
• H6 explosive is more powerful than TNT equivalent
• If tilt rod is missing, mine may still function via direct pressure

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Used: Vietnam, Gulf War
• Exported to multiple countries

---

FASCAM M73 M74

designation: "M73 (AT) / M74 (AP)"
system: "Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM)"
country_of_origin: "United States"
type: "M73: AT shaped charge (scatterable); M74: AP bounding fragmentation (scatterable)"
status: "In active US service"

M73 (Remote Anti-Armor Mine - RAAM)

M74 (ADAM - Area Denial Artillery Munition)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Scatterable mines may land in unpredictable patterns
• M73: ~20% have ANTI-DISTURBANCE -- will detonate if moved; no external indicator of which have it
• M74: Four 40-foot tripwires deploy automatically -- extremely hazardous approach in any direction
• Self-destruct mechanisms have FAILURE RATES -- treat all as live regardless of self-destruct timer
• Dud rate means unexploded mines persist in minefield after self-destruct period expires
• Magnetic fuze (M73) means nearby metal tools/equipment can trigger detonation

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• US standard scatterable mine system
• Used: Gulf War (1991), Iraq, Afghanistan
• Recently supplied/authorized for Ukraine

---

MOPMS M131

designation: "M131 MOPMS (Modular Pack Mine System)"
country_of_origin: "United States"
type: "Combined AT/AP mine dispensing system"
status: "In active US service; recently supplied to Ukraine"

System Specifications

M78 AT Mine Component

M77 AP Mine Component

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Mines are command-armed and have limited self-destruct timer
• Self-destruct FAILURE RATE means mines may persist as UXO
• M78 magnetic sensor may be triggered by nearby metal -- maintain standoff
• Container itself is not explosive but mines dispersed around it ARE
• Multiple mines in 180-degree arc around each container -- approach from rear only
• RCU can recycle self-destruct timer remotely -- mines may reactivate
• Recently supplied to Ukraine -- will be encountered in current conflict

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Active US service
• Supplied to Ukraine (2024-present)
• Used: Gulf War era development, Iraq/Afghanistan

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EGYPTIAN MINES

Egyptian Mine Threat Summary

designation: "Egyptian Mine Threat (composite)"
country_of_origin: "Egypt (primarily Soviet/WWII-era foreign mines)"
type: "Mixed AP and AT, primarily Soviet-origin"
status: "Active demining operations ongoing"

Threat Overview

Egypt faces one of the world's largest landmine contamination problems from two distinct periods:

1. Western Desert (WWII, 1940-1943)

• Approximately 17 million mines and UXO items from British/Commonwealth, German, and Italian forces
• Types encountered: British Mk V AT mine, German Tellermine 35/42/43, Italian B-2 mine, British Hawkins grenade mine, German S-mine (Bouncing Betty), German Schu-mine 42 (wooden AP)
• Degraded and unstable after 80+ years

2. Sinai Peninsula and Suez Canal (1956-1973)

• Approximately 5.5 million mines from Egyptian-Israeli wars
• Soviet-origin types encountered: PMN, PMD-6/PMD-7, TM-46, TM-57, POMZ-2
• Western types encountered: US M14, M15, M16 (Israeli-employed US mines)
• Israeli bar mines and locally manufactured copies

Egyptian-Produced Mines

• Egypt has produced copies of Soviet mine designs under license
• Local production details are limited in open-source literature
• Primary threat remains from imported Soviet and WWII-era mines

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREME: 80+ year old WWII-era mines with degraded fuzes, exposed explosives, corroded metal casings
• Soviet mines in Sinai are 50+ years old -- treat all as maximum sensitivity
• Desert environment preserves mines but UV radiation degrades plastic components
• Sand shifting can expose buried mines unexpectedly
• Mixed minefields contain AP and AT mines from multiple nations -- expect diverse fuze types
• Egyptian army demining uses Fisher 65 and Fisher Plus metal detectors -- minimum metal mines remain extremely challenging

Scale

• Government estimate: 16.7 million explosive items remaining
• ~480 army troops trained in mine clearance
• Demining ongoing in both Western Desert and Sinai

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MYANMAR MINES

Myanmar Mine Threat Summary

designation: "Myanmar Mine Threat (composite)"
country_of_origin: "Myanmar (KaPaSa state production + Chinese copies + improvised)"
type: "Mixed AP types; copies of Chinese and US designs"
status: "Active use in ongoing civil conflict"

KaPaSa (Myanmar Defense Products Industries) Mine Types

Resistance/Non-State Actor Improvised Mines

• Widespread use of improvised mines by both Tatmadaw and resistance forces
• Improvised devices using locally available materials with unpredictable fuzing
• Chinese-supplied components incorporated into locally made devices

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Active conflict zone -- mines are currently being emplaced
• KaPaSa mines are copies with potentially LOWER quality control than originals
• MM2 is reported as particularly powerful -- severe blast injuries common
• MM6 (M14 copy) is minimum metal and extremely difficult to detect
• Improvised mines have NO standardization -- approach all suspect items as maximum hazard
• Minefields are UNMARKED and records are UNRELIABLE or nonexistent
• Both government and resistance forces employ mines without mapping
• Chinese mine components (Type 58, Type 59) encountered as direct imports and local copies

Scale

• Since February 2021 coup, mine use has dramatically increased
• Between January 2022 and September 2025: 60+ instances of mine seizures from Tatmadaw forces, totaling hundreds of mines
• Myanmar is one of the world's worst-affected countries for new mine contamination
• No mine action organizations permitted to operate in most conflict areas

Countries/Regions Affected

• Primarily internal: Kayah (Karenni), Karen, Shan, Chin, Kachin, Sagaing states
• Border areas with Thailand, China, India, Bangladesh at risk of contamination spillover

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CROSS-REFERENCE: VISUAL IDENTIFICATION COMPARISON MATRIX

See companion document: /visual-id/feature-profiles/global-mines.md

---

SOURCES

• METIS Munition Database (Fenix Insight): https://metis.fenixinsight.com
• CAT-UXO Database: https://cat-uxo.com
• Bulletpicker.com: https://www.bulletpicker.com
• NoLandMines.com: https://nolandmines.com
• ODIN (TRADOC Worldwide Equipment Guide): https://odin.tradoc.army.mil
• FAS Military Analysis Network: https://man.fas.org
• HALO Trust: https://www.halotrust.org
• Landmine Monitor / ICBL: https://the-monitor.org
• Human Rights Watch Landmine Reports: https://www.hrw.org
• Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance (referenced, subscription)
• Wikipedia (cross-referenced with primary sources)
• Imperial War Museums collection records: https://www.iwm.org.uk
• Inert Products LLC (training mine reference): https://inertproducts.com
• GlobalSecurity.org: https://www.globalsecurity.org
• JMU Center for International Stabilization and Recovery: https://www.jmu.edu/cisr