Global Improvised and Field-Modified Ordnance Database

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT Created: 2026-03-28 Last Updated: 2026-03-28 Source Reliability: B-2 to D-4 (Usually Reliable to Not Usually Reliable) -- compiled from UNMAS IED Lexicon, USMC TBS/FMTB IED publications, CAT-UXO, Conflict Armament Research (CAR), Bellingcat, ARES (Armament Research Services), CTC West Point, Hugo Kaaman (MEI), Human Rights Watch, Defence Express, Militarnyi, DHS CIED publications, bulletpicker.com, Wikipedia (cross-referenced) Purpose: Comprehensive EOD reference for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), field-modified ordnance, homemade explosives, improvised delivery systems, and emerging improvised threats across global conflict zones. Identification, hazard assessment, and clearance planning.

SAFETY WARNING: This document is for IDENTIFICATION AND AWARENESS ONLY. It does NOT replace official EOD technical publications (60-series pubs, NAVEODFLTDIV, JODIC, NAVEOD TechDiv). Always refer to current TMs for render-safe procedures. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher.

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: Improvised ordnance represents the single largest killer of EOD technicians and civilians in contemporary conflict. IED design evolves rapidly through conflict-zone knowledge transfer, social media dissemination, and captured military materiel. Designs from Iraq/Afghanistan have migrated to Syria, Yemen, West Africa, and Southeast Asia. Ukraine has introduced a new paradigm of drone-delivered improvised munitions and 3D-printed components that is being studied and replicated globally.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part 1: IED Fundamentals

1. IED Components (SIMPCE)
2. IED Classification by Initiation

Part 2: Victim-Operated IEDs (VOIED)

1. Pressure Plate VOIED
2. Trip Wire VOIED
3. Pull-Switch VOIED
4. Pressure-Release VOIED

Part 3: Command-Initiated IEDs

1. Command-Wire IED (CWIED)
2. Radio-Controlled IED (RCIED)

Part 4: Suicide/Person-Borne IEDs

1. Person-Borne IED (PBIED)

Part 5: Vehicle and Platform-Borne IEDs

1. Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED)
2. Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED)
3. Waterborne IED (WBIED)

Part 6: Time-Delayed IEDs

1. Time-Based IED (TBIED)

Part 7: Main Charges -- Homemade Explosives (HME)

1. ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate / Fuel Oil)
2. Potassium Chlorate Mixtures
3. TATP (Triacetone Triperoxide)
4. HMTD (Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine)
5. Urea Nitrate

Part 8: Main Charges -- Repurposed Military and Commercial Explosives

1. Repurposed Military Ordnance
2. Commercial Explosives in IEDs
3. Propane Bombs (BLEVE Devices)

Part 9: Switch/Trigger Types

1. Clothespin Switch
2. Spring-Loaded Striker
3. Crush Wire Switch
4. Tilt Rod / Mercury Tilt Switch
5. Passive Infrared (PIR) Sensor
6. IR Beam-Break Switch
7. Magnetic Reed Switch
8. Vibration / Seismic Sensor
9. Light-Sensitive / Photocell Switch

Part 10: Syrian Barrel Bombs

1. Standard HE Barrel Bomb
2. Chemical (Chlorine) Barrel Bomb

Part 11: ISIS/ISIL Improvised Weapons

1. ISIS Up-Armored SVBIED
2. ISIS Drone-Dropped Munitions
3. Hell Cannon (Improvised Mortar)
4. ISIS Booby-Trapped Buildings (HBIED)
5. Improvised Rockets / IRAM / Lob Bombs

Part 12: Ukraine Improvised Ordnance

1. FPV Drone Warheads (PG-7V, VOG-17M, Shaped Charges)
2. Dragon Drone (Thermite/Incendiary FPV)
3. 3D-Printed Components and Mines
4. Modified Commercial Drones (Mavic Bombers)
5. TM-62 Drone-Delivered Mines
6. Improvised Mines and Booby Traps (Ukraine)

Part 13: Myanmar Improvised Ordnance

1. PDF Resistance IEDs and Mines
2. Tatmadaw Improvised Air-Dropped Munitions

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PART 1: IED FUNDAMENTALS

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IED Components (SIMPCE)

framework: "SIMPCE -- Six IED Components"
source: "USMC TBS B3L0487XQ; UNMAS IED Lexicon; DHS AWR-358"
source_rating: "A-1"

All IEDs, regardless of type or complexity, share a common set of components:

EOD Significance

• Identifying individual SIMPCE components is the foundation of all IED threat assessment
• Any combination of these components constitutes a potential IED -- even if incomplete, treat as hazardous
• Missing components may indicate an interrupted construction, a decoy, or a partially functioning device

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IED Classification by Initiation

classification_system: "IED Initiation Taxonomy"
source: "UNMAS IED Lexicon; USMC FMTB; SafeLane Global"
source_rating: "A-1"

IED terminology describes one or both of two attributes: containment method and means of initiation.

By Initiation Method

By Containment/Delivery

Combination Nomenclature

A device can combine both attributes: e.g., an RCIED-VBIED is a radio-controlled car bomb; a VOIED-UVIED is a victim-operated under-vehicle device.

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PART 2: VICTIM-OPERATED IEDs (VOIED)

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Pressure Plate VOIED

designation: "Pressure Plate VOIED"
also_known_as: "PP-IED, Improvised Pressure Mine, Step-On IED"
type: "Victim-operated IED -- pressure-initiated"
prevalence: "Extremely common -- #1 cause of IED casualties in Afghanistan"
theaters: "Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, West Africa, Colombia"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

The pressure plate IED is the most common VOIED type worldwide. The device is buried at or just below ground level along expected foot or vehicle paths. When a victim steps on or drives over the pressure plate, two separated conductive surfaces are forced together, completing an electrical circuit that fires the initiator and detonates the main charge.

Construction Variants

Recognition Features

• Disturbed earth or freshly dug soil along paths, roads, chokepoints
• Wires or string protruding from ground surface
• Unusual debris patterns -- rocks, trash placed to channel foot traffic
• Slight depression or raised area in road/path surface
• Low metallic signature variants are extremely difficult to detect

Common Explosives

• HME: Ammonium nitrate-based (ANFO, ammonium nitrate + aluminum), potassium chlorate mixtures, urea nitrate
• Repurposed military: Artillery shells, mortar rounds, anti-tank mines daisy-chained
• Commercial: Dynamite, detonating cord wrapped bundles

Trigger Mechanism

• Electrical circuit: Pressure forces two separated conductive surfaces together, completing circuit
• Power source: Usually 9V battery, AA batteries, or car battery for larger devices
• Wire run: Typically short (device is self-contained) but may connect to remote main charge

Countermeasures

• Dual-sensor mine detectors (metal + ground-penetrating radar) for low-metal variants
• Route clearance operations with visual search, mine rollers, and counter-mine vehicles
• Ground sign awareness: track and disturbed-earth indicators
• Avoid chokepoints, predictable paths, and channelized terrain
• K-9 detection (explosive-detection dogs) effective against HME

EOD Approach

• 5/25/200m checks at halt positions
• Confirm with standoff detection before approach
• RSP per current TMs -- do NOT attempt manual disassembly in field unless authorized
• Low-metal variants may require prodding with non-metallic probes
• Assume anti-lift / secondary devices underneath

Examples

• Afghanistan: Carbon rod PP-IED was the dominant threat 2009-2014; estimated 60%+ of all IED casualties
• Iraq: Saw-blade PP-IEDs targeting dismounted patrols in Anbar Province
• Myanmar: PDF resistance forces deploy PP-VOIEDs with perishable materials (bamboo separators)
• Source: JIEDDO VOIED Recognition Guide; CAT-UXO; CISR Journal 23.2 [B-1]

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Trip Wire VOIED

designation: "Trip Wire VOIED"
also_known_as: "TW-IED, Wire-Initiated IED"
type: "Victim-operated IED -- trip wire initiated"
prevalence: "Common in wooded/urban terrain"
theaters: "Global -- all conflict zones"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A trip wire VOIED uses a wire or line stretched across a likely path of movement. When a victim contacts the wire, it activates a pull switch, spring-loaded striker, or clothespin switch, completing the firing circuit. Trip wire devices are commonly employed in dense vegetation, doorways, stairwells, and along footpaths.

Construction

• Wire or monofilament fishing line stretched at ankle-to-knee height
• One end anchored to fixed object (tree, stake, wall)
• Other end connected to switch mechanism (pull-pin striker, clothespin, spring release)
• Switch connected via wire to initiator in main charge

Recognition Features

• Fine wire or monofilament across path (may be nearly invisible)
• Anchor points on trees, posts, doorframes, rubble
• Disturbed vegetation or soil at anchor points
• Associated main charge may be visible (shell, container) offset from trip line

Common Explosives

• Repurposed grenades (with spoon held by trip wire)
• Artillery/mortar shells with improvised detonator
• HME charges in containers
• Claymore-type directional fragmentation devices

Trigger Mechanism

• Pull switch: Wire tension pulls a pin, releasing a spring-loaded striker to hit a percussion cap or stab detonator
• Clothespin switch: Wire pulls insulator from between clothespin jaws, completing electrical circuit
• Grenade fuze: Wire pulls grenade pin; spoon releases, initiating fuze train

Countermeasures

• Slow deliberate movement with visual scanning at ankle-to-knee height
• Use of trip wire feelers (bent wire probes extended ahead of operator)
• Night vision / IR illumination (monofilament reflects IR)
• Never step over obstacles without checking for wires on far side

EOD Approach

• Do NOT cut trip wire -- may be under tension and connected to release switch
• Trace wire to both ends before any action
• Identify switch type and main charge before determining RSP
• Assume additional devices in area (trip wire IEDs are frequently employed in clusters)

Examples

• Viet Cong: Extensive use of trip wire grenades and directional mines along jungle trails
• ISIS: Trip wire devices in cleared buildings in Mosul/Raqqa -- connected to concealed charges in walls/floors
• Colombia: FARC/ELN trip wire AP mines on rural trails
• Source: USMC TBS IED Manual; UNMAS Handbook; CAT-UXO [B-2]

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Pull-Switch VOIED

designation: "Pull-Switch VOIED"
also_known_as: "Pull-Pin IED, Door-Pull IED"
type: "Victim-operated IED -- pull initiated"
prevalence: "Common in urban and building clearance"
theaters: "Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Ukraine"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Pull-switch VOIEDs function when a victim pulls on an object (door handle, drawer, loose item, body/casualty), which activates a pull-type switch or removes a safety pin from a spring-loaded striker. These devices are the classic "booby trap" and are encountered extensively in building clearance operations.

Construction

• Pull wire/cord attached to door, drawer, body, loose object, or attractive item
• Wire connected to spring-loaded striker assembly (e.g., M1 Firing Device Pull type, or improvised equivalent)
• Striker impacts percussion cap or stab detonator
• Alternatively: wire holds clothespin jaws apart; pulling wire allows jaws to close on electrical contacts

Recognition Features

• Objects that appear out of place or deliberately positioned to attract attention
• Fine wire or cord attached to movable objects
• Doors or drawers that resist opening or feel spring-loaded
• Bodies or casualties with wire attached (anti-recovery trap)
• "Bait" items: weapons, equipment, food, religious items left in conspicuous locations

Common Explosives

• Repurposed grenades, mortar rounds, artillery shells
• C4/PE4/Semtex charges with detonator
• HME charges

Trigger Mechanism

• Spring-loaded striker held by pull pin or retaining wire
• Clothespin with insulator removed by pull wire
• Grenade pin connected to pull wire

Countermeasures

• Never move objects, open doors, or disturb bodies without prior inspection
• Use grappling hooks or rope pulls from standoff distance
• Clear rooms with visual inspection before entry
• Check door frames, hinges, and handles for attached wires before opening

EOD Approach

• Identify pull wire routing and switch location from standoff
• Use remote pull (rope/grapple) from protected position to initiate if RSP dictates
• Never approach from direction of main charge fragmentation pattern
• Source: USMC IED Manual; UNMAS; bulletpicker.com [B-2]

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Pressure-Release VOIED

designation: "Pressure-Release VOIED"
also_known_as: "Release Switch IED, Anti-Lift Device, Anti-Handling IED"
type: "Victim-operated IED -- pressure release initiated"
prevalence: "Common as secondary/anti-handling device"
theaters: "All conflict zones"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Pressure-release VOIEDs function when a weight or restraining force is removed from the switch mechanism. These are the most dangerous anti-handling devices because they trigger when EOD technicians or clearance teams attempt to move, lift, or disassemble a primary device. They are frequently placed underneath other IEDs, mines, or beneath heavy objects.

Construction

• Spring-loaded striker held compressed by weight of overlying object
• When object is lifted, spring expands, striker impacts detonator
• Alternatively: electrical contacts held apart by weight; removing weight allows contacts to close

Recognition Features

• Object resting on ground with no apparent reason (rock on flat surface, heavy item in doorway)
• Primary IED or mine that appears easy to access -- suspect anti-lift underneath
• Wires visible beneath objects
• Deliberate stacking of items (mine on top of mine)

Common Explosives

• Secondary charge beneath primary device
• Grenade with spoon held by weight
• Explosive charge with spring-loaded striker detonator

Trigger Mechanism

• Spring-loaded striker compressed by overlying weight
• Electrical contacts separated by weight; closing when weight removed
• Grenade spoon held by weight; release arms grenade fuze

Countermeasures

• NEVER lift, move, or roll any object without checking underneath first
• Assume all primary IEDs have anti-lift secondary devices
• Use remote methods (robot, line pull) to move suspect items
• X-ray or ground-penetrating radar to check beneath objects

EOD Approach

• CRITICAL ANTI-HANDLING HAZARD -- this is the IED most likely to kill an EOD tech
• Remote investigation only -- robot, remote pull, or standoff X-ray
• RSP per current TMs -- many pressure-release devices require blow-in-place
• Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon; USMC TBS; JIEDDO [B-2]

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PART 3: COMMAND-INITIATED IEDs

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Command-Wire IED (CWIED)

designation: "Command-Wire IED (CWIED)"
type: "Command-initiated IED -- wire detonated"
prevalence: "Common -- preferred where RF jamming is present"
theaters: "Northern Ireland (IRA), Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

A CWIED is detonated by an operator who sends an electrical signal through a physical wire from an observation/firing position to the device. The wire gives the operator complete control over timing, allowing precise targeting of specific vehicles or personnel. CWIEDs are preferred in environments where electronic countermeasures (ECM/jammers) prevent RCIED use.

Construction

• Two-conductor wire (commonly lamp cord, telephone wire, speaker wire, or comms wire) running from operator firing position to device
• Operator end: Battery or generator connected to firing switch (button, toggle, bare wire touch)
• Device end: Wire connects to electric blasting cap or detonator inserted in main charge
• Wire may be buried, run through drainage culverts, or laid along walls/fences
• Wire lengths range from 50m to 2+ km

Recognition Features

• Wire visible along roads, walls, drainage channels, or protruding from ground
• Wire traces in dust/dirt leading from road to elevated observation point
• Observation position (building, hilltop, tree line) with line of sight to kill zone
• Wire splices, junction boxes, or tape at connection points
• Disturbed earth over buried wire runs

Common Explosives

• Any -- CWIEDs can use any main charge type
• Large CWIEDs frequently use daisy-chained artillery shells or bulk HME

Trigger Mechanism

• Operator physically closes circuit by connecting battery to wire (touch wires together, press switch, or use clacker-type generator)
• Some use capacitor discharge for reliable long-distance initiation
• IRA developed sophisticated CWIEDs with anti-jamming and multiple redundant firing circuits

Countermeasures

• Route clearance: visual search for exposed wire along routes
• Counter-observation: identify and neutralize firing points
• Wire-cutting: sever command wire before main body reaches kill zone (DANGEROUS -- wire may be under tension or booby-trapped)
• Not affected by ECM/RF jamming -- this is its primary advantage for the attacker

EOD Approach

• Trace wire to identify operator position AND device location
• Isolate wire (cut at multiple points to prevent remote initiation)
• Confirm no secondary RF or VOIED backup initiation system
• RSP per current TMs
• Source: USMC TBS; UNMAS IED Lexicon; Wikipedia (IED article) [B-1]

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Radio-Controlled IED (RCIED)

designation: "Radio-Controlled IED (RCIED)"
type: "Command-initiated IED -- radio frequency triggered"
prevalence: "Extremely common globally"
theaters: "Iraq, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Syria, Pakistan, Philippines, West Africa"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

An RCIED is triggered by an RF signal sent from a transmitter operated by the attacker to a receiver connected to the device's firing circuit. The receiver decodes the signal and generates an electrical pulse to fire the initiator. RCIEDs allow the operator to detonate from a safe distance without physical wire connection.

Common RF Trigger Platforms

Recognition Features

• Electronic components visible: circuit boards, receivers, antennas, wires to detonator
• Cell phone or radio handset wired to firing circuit near main charge
• Antenna wire extending from buried device or container
• Cell phone with modified wiring (vibrator motor leads connected to detonator)

Trigger Mechanism

• Incoming RF signal activates receiver circuit
• Receiver generates electrical pulse (via relay, transistor, or modified vibrator motor)
• Pulse fires electric blasting cap/detonator
• Cell phone variant: incoming call/text activates vibrator motor; vibrator leads wired to detonator circuit

Countermeasures

• Electronic Countermeasures (ECM): Vehicle-mounted or portable RF jammers that block trigger frequencies (e.g., Warlock, CREW systems, Scorpion)
• Jamming creates protective bubble around convoy/patrol
• Cell phone network denial in operational areas
• SIGINT/spectrum monitoring to detect trigger signals
• Counter-IED intelligence to identify bomb-maker signatures

EOD Approach

• Maintain ECM/jammer coverage during approach
• Remote investigation first (robot)
• Identify receiver and power source; attempt to isolate/disable
• CRITICAL: Cell phone RCIEDs may have backup timer or VOIED switch -- never assume single initiation method
• RSP per current TMs
• Source: CAT-UXO; UNMAS IED Lexicon; bombjammer.com; DHS CIED [B-1]

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PART 4: SUICIDE/PERSON-BORNE IEDs

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Person-Borne IED (PBIED)

designation: "Person-Borne IED (PBIED)"
also_known_as: "Suicide Vest, Suicide Belt, Body-Borne IED"
type: "Person-borne -- suicide or coerced delivery"
prevalence: "Common in terrorism and insurgency"
theaters: "Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia (Al-Shabaab), Sri Lanka (LTTE historical)"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A PBIED is an explosive device worn on the body or carried in a bag/backpack by an individual, typically a suicide bomber. The device is initiated by the wearer using a hand-held switch ("dead man's switch"), button, or pull cord. PBIEDs can also be command-detonated by a remote handler using an RF trigger.

Construction

• Suicide Vest: Explosive charge (typically 2-5 kg, up to 20 kg) sewn into garment vest with pockets for explosive blocks and fragmentation material
• Suicide Belt: Narrower profile; explosive tubes or blocks arranged around waist
• Backpack/Bag: Charge concealed in ordinary backpack, shopping bag, or suitcase
• Fragmentation enhancers: ball bearings, nails, screws, bolts packed around charge
• Initiation: Handheld plunger/button switch with wire to detonator; or dead man's switch (release triggers detonation)

Specifications

Recognition Features / Behavioral Indicators

• Bulky or ill-fitting clothing inappropriate for weather/season
• Visible bulges under clothing (especially torso/waist area)
• Unusual stiffness in gait (heavy vest restricts movement)
• Individual clutching hand switch, wire, or actuator
• Sweating, nervousness, tunnel-vision focus
• Deliberate movement toward crowd, checkpoint, or high-value target
• Ignoring commands to stop or attempts to bypass security
• Wire or cord visible at collar, sleeve, or waistband

Common Explosives

• TATP and HMTD (peroxide-based -- preferred by many groups due to precursor availability)
• C4, PE4, Semtex (if available -- military/commercial theft)
• TNT, RDX, PETN
• HME potassium chlorate mixtures

Trigger Mechanism

• Active switch: Thumb button, toggle switch, or pull cord held by bomber; pressed/pulled to detonate
• Dead man's switch: Spring-loaded switch held closed by bomber's hand; releasing switch (e.g., if shot) triggers detonation
• Remote backup: Handler holds RF transmitter to detonate if bomber hesitates or is disabled
• Timer backup: Some devices incorporate timer as fail-safe

Countermeasures

• Security checkpoints with standoff screening (magnetometers, behavior detection)
• Controlled access points with serpentine barriers to slow approach
• Trained behavioral detection officers
• Designated marksmen to engage at standoff distance (head shot to prevent dead man's switch activation)
• Blast-resistant barriers around high-value targets
• Intelligence-driven interdiction of bomb-making networks

EOD Approach

• EXTREME HAZARD -- PBIED with dead man's switch may detonate if bomber is incapacitated
• If bomber is neutralized and device has not detonated, assume anti-handling features
• Remote approach only (robot)
• Establish cordon at maximum fragmentation radius (minimum 100m for typical vest)
• RSP per current TMs -- typically blow-in-place (BIP)
• Source: UNMAS; USMC TBS; AOAV Suicide Bomber Types [B-2]

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PART 5: VEHICLE AND PLATFORM-BORNE IEDs

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Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED)

designation: "Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED)"
also_known_as: "Car Bomb, Truck Bomb"
type: "Vehicle-borne IED"
prevalence: "Common globally"
theaters: "Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Colombia, Turkey, Somalia, Nigeria"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

A VBIED uses a vehicle (car, truck, motorcycle, bicycle, cart) as the container and delivery platform for an explosive charge. VBIEDs can carry substantially larger payloads than PBIEDs -- from tens of kilograms in a car to thousands of kilograms in a large truck. The vehicle may be parked and detonated remotely, by timer, or by suicide driver (SVBIED).

Construction

• Vehicle interior stripped and rebuilt to accommodate explosive payload
• Charge placed in trunk, under seats, or in cargo bed
• Fragmentation material packed around charge
• Initiation by command wire, RCIED, timer, or driver-operated switch
• Some VBIEDs use compressed gas cylinders (propane, oxygen) as enhancers

Specifications

Recognition Features / Vehicle Indicators

• Vehicle riding low on suspension (heavy load)
• Only one occupant (driver only)
• Vehicle interior appears stripped or rebuilt
• Unusual wiring or antennas visible
• Vehicle does not match neighborhood (stolen, rental, recently purchased)
• Erratic driving behavior, driver appears nervous
• Vehicle parked in unusual location near high-value target
• Windows obscured or newly tinted
• Excessive rust-proofing or welding marks on body panels
• License plates missing, obscured, or from different region

Common Explosives

• Bulk HME (ANFO, ammonium nitrate mixtures) -- most common for large VBIEDs
• Military ordnance: artillery shells, mortar rounds, anti-tank mines daisy-chained
• Commercial explosives: dynamite, emulsion explosives
• Propane/oxygen cylinders as blast enhancers
• Gasoline/fuel oil for incendiary effect

Trigger Mechanism

• RCIED: Cell phone or radio trigger for parked VBIED
• Command wire: Wire from observation point
• Timer: Mechanical or electronic timer
• SVBIED: Driver-operated switch (see SVBIED section below)

Countermeasures

• Vehicle checkpoints with standoff screening
• Barriers and serpentine approaches to slow vehicles
• Jersey barriers and bollards around critical infrastructure
• Vehicle exclusion zones around high-value targets
• Undercarriage inspection mirrors/cameras
• Explosive-detection K-9 teams at checkpoints

EOD Approach

• Maximum standoff cordon (see charge-size/standoff tables in current TMs)
• Remote approach and investigation (robot with X-ray, disruptor)
• RSP per current TMs -- large VBIEDs almost always BIP
• Evacuate buildings within blast radius
• Source: Wikipedia (Car Bomb); USMC TBS; DHS IED SmartCard [B-1]

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Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED)

designation: "Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED)"
also_known_as: "Suicide Car Bomb, Suicide Truck Bomb"
type: "Suicide vehicle-borne IED"
prevalence: "Widespread -- signature weapon of ISIS"
theaters: "Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Nigeria"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

An SVBIED is a VBIED driven by a suicide operator who intentionally drives the vehicle into a target and detonates the charge. SVBIEDs are particularly dangerous because the driver can adjust approach to defeat defensive measures. ISIS industrialized SVBIED production to near-factory levels during 2014-2019, producing hundreds of up-armored variants.

Construction (ISIS Standard)

See also: ISIS Up-Armored SVBIED for detailed ISIS variants.

• Vehicle selection: Sedan, SUV, pickup truck, dump truck, armored vehicle
• Explosive payload: 200-2,000+ kg of mixed explosives (ANFO, TNT, artillery shells, anti-tank mines)
• Driver compartment: Minimal space for driver with detonation switch
• Detonation switch: Typically a simple push-button or toggle switch within driver's reach

Recognition Features

• All VBIED indicators above, PLUS:
• Single occupant vehicle approaching at high speed
• Vehicle not responding to signals or warnings to stop
• Vehicle attempting to bypass checkpoints or barriers
• Welding marks or added metal plating visible on exterior
• Vision slits cut in added armor plating (ISIS pattern)

Trigger Mechanism

• Driver-operated push-button or toggle switch
• Dead man's switch (releases if driver incapacitated)
• Remote backup held by handler (RF-triggered)

Countermeasures

• Anti-vehicle barriers rated for vehicle speed and weight
• Active vehicle barriers (rising bollards, drop arms)
• Overwatch positions with anti-materiel weapons (.50 cal, AT weapons)
• Accurate direct fire to disable engine block at standoff
• Anti-tank guided missiles for up-armored variants
• Source: Hugo Kaaman (MEI) SVBIED study; CTC West Point Mosul analysis; National Interest [B-1]

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Waterborne IED (WBIED)

designation: "Waterborne IED (WBIED)"
also_known_as: "Boat Bomb, Maritime IED, Drone Boat, Unmanned Surface Vessel IED"
type: "Waterborne improvised explosive device"
prevalence: "Increasing -- Houthi, LTTE (historical), ISIS"
theaters: "Yemen/Red Sea, Sri Lanka (historical), Persian Gulf, Iraq"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A WBIED is an improvised explosive device deployed on or in water. Types include explosive-laden manned boats (suicide), remote-controlled unmanned surface vessels (USVs / "drone boats"), floating improvised mines, and swimmer-delivered charges. The Houthi movement in Yemen has significantly advanced WBIED technology using remote-controlled drone boats against coalition naval vessels and commercial shipping.

Types

Construction (Remote-Controlled Drone Boat -- Houthi Pattern)

• Modified 7-10m fiberglass patrol boat or skiff
• Hydraulic autopilot and RC control system with artisanal control box
• Throttle controlled by mechanical armature connected to RC receiver
• Explosive payload: 200-500+ kg of TNT, PETN, or HME in bow or distributed
• GPS waypoint navigation with manual override capability
• Warhead positioned in bow for maximum effect on impact

Recognition Features

• Small vessel operating without visible crew
• Low profile in water (may be painted blue/grey for camouflage)
• Antenna or RC equipment visible
• Operating erratically or on direct collision course
• Vessel does not respond to radio hails or visual signals
• Unusual bow configuration or added structure

Common Explosives

• TNT, PETN, RDX blocks
• HME charges
• Shaped charge liner in bow for hull penetration (advanced variants)

Trigger Mechanism

• Contact fuze on impact with target
• Remote command detonation via RF link
• Timer backup
• Proximity fuze (advanced variants)

Countermeasures

• Small-boat defense weapons (.50 cal, 25mm, Mk38)
• Counter-UAS/counter-USV electronic warfare
• Maritime domain awareness (radar, EO/IR surveillance)
• Waterside security patrols
• Hull-mounted sonar for swimmer detection
• Physical barriers (booms, nets) around moored vessels

EOD Approach

• Do NOT approach suspect vessel -- assume contact fuze
• Remote neutralization (EOD diver/robot if feasible, or destruction by gunfire/demolition charge from standoff)
• If vessel is beached or captured intact, treat as massive IED with anti-handling potential
• Clear blast radius for marine and shoreside personnel
• Source: DHS WBIED Detection paper; Conflict Armament Research "Anatomy of a Drone Boat"; Solace Global WBIED report; DTIC Maritime IED study [B-2]

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PART 6: TIME-DELAYED IEDs

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Time-Based IED (TBIED)

designation: "Time-Based IED (TBIED)"
also_known_as: "Time Bomb, Timer IED, Delayed IED"
type: "Time-initiated IED"
prevalence: "Common -- used in terrorist attacks worldwide"
theaters: "Global"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A TBIED uses a timing mechanism to initiate detonation after a pre-set delay. This allows the operator to emplace the device and withdraw to safety before detonation. TBIEDs are commonly used in package bombs, parcel bombs, and pre-positioned car bombs.

Timer Types

Construction

• Timer mechanism connected to electrical firing circuit
• Timer contact closure or alarm trigger fires electric detonator
• Electronic variants may use cell phone alarm function to trigger vibrator motor relay
• Chemical delays use acid or solvent to dissolve wire/membrane holding striker in cocked position

Recognition Features

• Ticking, buzzing, or humming from package or container
• Electronic display visible (digital timer countdown)
• Chemical odor (acid-based chemical delays)
• Wires protruding from clock, timer, or electronic device
• Package that is heavier than expected for its apparent contents

Countermeasures

• Package screening at mail facilities and building entrances
• X-ray inspection of suspicious packages
• Explosive-detection K-9
• "If you see something, say something" public awareness
• Evacuation protocols for suspect packages

EOD Approach

• TIME CRITICAL -- device may detonate at any moment
• Maximum standoff; remote approach only
• X-ray to identify timer state and components
• Disruptor to sever timer-to-detonator connection
• BIP if timer state cannot be determined
• Source: UNMAS; CAT-UXO; DHS Introduction to Explosives [B-2]

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PART 7: MAIN CHARGES -- HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES (HME)

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ANFO

designation: "ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate / Fuel Oil)"
type: "Homemade explosive -- oxidizer/fuel mixture"
classification: "Blasting agent (not technically a high explosive without confinement/booster)"
prevalence: "Most common HME worldwide"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

ANFO is a mixture of ammonium nitrate (AN) fertilizer prills and fuel oil (typically diesel) in approximately a 94:6 ratio by weight. ANFO is the most commonly used HME globally due to the widespread availability of agricultural ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel. ANFO requires a booster charge (typically a detonator and booster explosive) to reliably detonate. ANFO was the primary explosive in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (~2,300 kg) and the 2011 Oslo bombing.

Specifications

Recognition Features

• White or off-white granular material (fertilizer prills) with oily sheen
• Strong ammonia and diesel fuel odor
• Often stored in agricultural fertilizer bags, drums, or plastic containers
• May be found in large quantities (tens to thousands of kg)
• Associated items: bags of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, diesel fuel containers, mixing implements

EOD Hazard Warnings

• ANFO is INSENSITIVE without booster -- will not detonate from bullet impact, fire, or shock alone
• However: contaminated or improperly mixed ANFO with aluminum powder (ANNM/ANAL) is significantly more sensitive and more powerful
• Ammonium nitrate alone is an oxidizer that can detonate in large quantities when confined and heated (e.g., Beirut 2020)
• Bulk ANFO spills should be treated as explosive hazard
• Source: National Academies HME Report; DHS Introduction to Explosives [B-1]

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Potassium Chlorate Mixtures

designation: "Potassium Chlorate (KClO3) Mixtures"
type: "Homemade explosive -- oxidizer/fuel mixture"
prevalence: "Common in South/Southeast Asia, Africa"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Potassium chlorate is a powerful oxidizer that, when mixed with various fuels (sugar, sulfur, petroleum jelly, aluminum powder), produces a sensitive and powerful improvised explosive. Potassium chlorate mixtures are significantly more sensitive than ANFO -- they can be detonated by friction, impact, or flame, making them both effective and extremely hazardous to the bomb-maker.

Specifications

Recognition Features

• White crystalline powder mixed with sugar (granular) or sulfur (yellow)
• Strong oxidizer odor
• May be found with match heads (source of KClO3 in improvised settings)
• Commonly encountered in pipe bombs and small IEDs
• Associated items: match boxes (stripped heads), fertilizer-grade KClO3, mixing bowls

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREME SENSITIVITY -- friction and impact sensitive; may detonate during handling
• Do NOT attempt to move, sample, or disturb
• BIP is the safest disposal method
• Bomb-makers frequently injured/killed during manufacture
• Source: National Academies; DHS HME publications [B-2]

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TATP

designation: "TATP (Triacetone Triperoxide)"
also_known_as: "Mother of Satan, Acetone Peroxide"
type: "Homemade explosive -- peroxide-based primary/secondary"
prevalence: "Common in terrorist attacks -- Europe, Middle East"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

TATP is a peroxide-based explosive synthesized from acetone, hydrogen peroxide, and a strong acid catalyst (typically sulfuric or hydrochloric acid). TATP is extremely dangerous due to its high sensitivity to friction, impact, heat, and static electricity. It produces no nitrogen-based signature, making it difficult to detect with some explosive trace detectors. TATP has been used in numerous high-profile terrorist attacks including the 2005 London bombings, 2015 Paris attacks, and 2016 Brussels bombings.

Specifications

Recognition Features

• White crystalline powder resembling sugar or salt
• Distinctive sharp/fruity chemical odor (acetone/peroxide)
• May be found in crystalline chunks or pressed pellets
• Associated lab equipment: beakers, thermometers, ice baths, acid bottles, acetone containers, hydrogen peroxide bottles
• Improvised lab with chemical staining on surfaces

EOD Hazard Warnings

• MOST DANGEROUS HME TO HANDLE -- extreme sensitivity to friction, impact, heat, static
• Sublimes at room temperature -- charge mass decreases over time; degradation products may be MORE sensitive
• Do NOT move, touch, or attempt to sample
• Any TATP find requires maximum standoff and BIP
• Dry TATP is significantly more sensitive than wet -- but wet TATP is still dangerous
• Source: National Academies; URI Dissertation (McLennan); DHS HME publications [B-1]

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HMTD

designation: "HMTD (Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine)"
also_known_as: "HMTD"
type: "Homemade explosive -- peroxide-based primary"
prevalence: "Less common than TATP but encountered in terrorism"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

HMTD is a peroxide-based primary explosive synthesized from hexamine (fuel tablets), hydrogen peroxide, and citric acid. Like TATP, HMTD is extremely sensitive but is more commonly used as an initiator/detonator charge rather than a main charge due to its lower yield. HMTD was notably used in the detonators for the 2005 London bombings.

Specifications

Recognition Features

• White powdery substance in small quantities (grams, not kilograms)
• Found with hexamine fuel tablets, hydrogen peroxide, citric acid
• May be pressed into small tubes or capsules as improvised detonators
• Associated with TATP labs (often manufactured together)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Same extreme sensitivity hazards as TATP
• Reacts with metals -- copper or zinc contact may cause spontaneous detonation
• Do NOT store in or near metallic containers
• BIP -- do not attempt to move or handle
• Source: National Academies; DHS HME publications [B-2]

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Urea Nitrate

designation: "Urea Nitrate"
type: "Homemade explosive -- acid/urea reaction product"
prevalence: "Encountered in Middle East and South Asian IEDs"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Urea nitrate is an improvised explosive produced by reacting urea (from fertilizer or urine) with nitric acid. It was notably used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Urea nitrate is moderately sensitive and produces reasonable blast effects when confined.

Specifications

Recognition Features

• White crystalline powder
• Acid odor
• Found with urea fertilizer bags and acid containers
• Hygroscopic -- may appear damp or clumped

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Moderate sensitivity -- handle with caution
• Hygroscopic -- wet urea nitrate may fail to detonate but should still be treated as explosive
• Confined urea nitrate (in pipe, container) is significantly more powerful
• Source: National Academies; DHS publications; 1993 WTC bombing forensics [B-2]

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PART 8: MAIN CHARGES -- REPURPOSED MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL EXPLOSIVES

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Repurposed Military Ordnance

designation: "Repurposed Military Ordnance as IED Main Charge"
type: "Military munitions diverted or captured for IED use"
prevalence: "Extremely common in all conflict zones"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

Military ordnance -- artillery shells, mortar rounds, aircraft bombs, rockets, grenades, anti-tank mines, and demolition charges -- is frequently repurposed as IED main charges. This is the most common IED main charge type in active conflict zones where military stockpiles have been looted, captured, or poorly secured. Multiple munitions may be daisy-chained together for increased blast effect.

Common Repurposed Munitions

Recognition Features

• Military ordnance casings visible (distinctive shapes, markings, colors)
• Lot numbers, date stamps, country-of-origin markings on casings
• Multiple rounds wired together with det cord or electrical wire
• Improvised detonator inserted into fuze well or taped to body
• Ordnance may be concealed in containers, buried, or hidden in debris

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Repurposed ordnance retains all original hazards PLUS improvised initiation hazards
• Fuze wells may contain improvised detonators with unknown sensitivity
• Daisy-chained munitions may have sympathetic detonation risk
• Original fuze may still be armed -- dual-hazard device
• Deeply buried aircraft bombs are extremely difficult to detect and neutralize
• Source: CAT-UXO; USMC TBS; JIEDDO [B-1]

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Commercial Explosives in IEDs

designation: "Commercial Explosives Diverted to IED Use"
type: "Diverted commercial explosives"
prevalence: "Common where mining/construction industries operate"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Commercial explosives (dynamite, emulsion explosives, water gels, PETN detonating cord, electric and non-electric blasting caps) stolen or diverted from mining, quarrying, and construction operations are used as IED main charges and initiation components. Commercial detonating cord (det cord) is frequently used to link multiple charges.

Common Commercial Explosives in IEDs

Recognition Features

• Manufacturer labels, lot numbers, and commercial markings on packaging
• Dynamite: characteristic cylindrical paper-wrapped sticks
• Det cord: flexible plastic-sheathed cord with PETN fill
• C4/PE4/Semtex: off-white to light orange putty-like material; moldable
• TNT: yellow-brown cast blocks with stamped markings
• Blasting caps: small metallic cylinders with wire or shock tube leads

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Old dynamite may exude nitroglycerin crystals -- EXTREME sensitivity to shock/friction
• Commercial blasting caps contain primary explosives -- handle as hazardous items
• Det cord detonates at ~6,500 m/s -- will initiate most secondary explosives
• C4/PE4 and Semtex are very stable but will detonate reliably with proper initiation
• Source: DHS Introduction to Explosives; Wikipedia (Semtex); DSA Detection training materials [B-2]

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Propane Bombs

designation: "Propane Bomb (BLEVE Device)"
also_known_as: "Propane Tank Bomb, Gas Cylinder IED"
type: "Improvised incendiary/explosive device"
prevalence: "Encountered in terrorism and insurgency"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A propane bomb exploits commercially available bottled propane gas cylinders to produce a blast and fireball through a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). The device may use the propane cylinder as-is (heated to induce BLEVE) or may be filled with additional explosives or incendiary material. Propane cylinders are also used as containers for barrel bomb warheads and IRAM projectiles.

Construction

• Standard commercial propane cylinder (various sizes: 1 lb camping to 100+ lb bulk)
• May be heated externally (fire, incendiary charge) to induce BLEVE
• May be modified: valve removed, filled with explosive (ANFO, TNT), valve replaced or sealed
• Fragmentation enhancers (nails, ball bearings) may be taped or welded to exterior
• Often used as IRAM warhead (propane tank welded to rocket motor)

Specifications

Recognition Features

• Standard commercial propane cylinder (green, white, blue, or grey steel)
• Modified valve or sealed valve opening
• Additional material (tape, wire, metal fragments) attached to exterior
• Wires or initiation system attached
• Cylinder in unusual location or context
• Welded modifications to cylinder body

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Pressurized gas cylinder is a projectile hazard even without explosive fill
• BLEVE produces massive fireball -- significant thermal hazard radius
• Explosive-filled cylinder behaves as a conventional IED
• Source: Wikipedia (Propane Bomb); CAT-UXO; Fire Engineering BLEVE article [B-2]

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PART 9: SWITCH/TRIGGER TYPES

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Clothespin Switch

designation: "Clothespin Switch"
also_known_as: "Peg Switch, Spring-Jaw Switch"
type: "Improvised electrical switch -- victim-operated (pull, trip, pressure)"
prevalence: "Extremely common -- one of the most basic IED switches"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A clothespin switch uses a standard wooden or plastic spring-loaded clothespin with metal contacts (tacks, screws, wire) attached to each jaw. An insulator (plastic, cardboard, rubber) is inserted between the jaws to keep contacts separated. The device functions when the insulator is pulled out (by trip wire or pull cord) or pushed out (by pressure), allowing the spring to close the jaws and complete the electrical circuit.

Construction

• Wooden or plastic clothespin with spring
• Metal contacts (thumbtacks, screws, small metal plates) on inner faces of each jaw
• Wire leads soldered or wrapped to each contact, running to battery and detonator
• Insulator (cardboard, plastic strip) inserted between jaws
• Trip wire or pull cord attached to insulator

Recognition Features

• Clothespin with wires attached
• Metal contacts visible on inner jaw surfaces
• Insulator strip visible between jaws (may have cord/wire attached)
• Wire leads running to battery and/or charge

Trigger Mechanism

• Pull/Trip: Wire pulls insulator from between jaws; spring closes jaws; contacts meet; circuit completes
• Pressure: Direct compression forces jaws past insulator; contacts meet
• Release: Insulator held in place by weight; removing weight allows insulator to slide out

EOD Significance

• Extremely simple to construct from commonly available materials
• Reliable and effective
• Nearly universal in IED instruction -- found in virtually all conflict zones
• May be concealed in very small spaces
• Source: USMC TBS IED Manual; DSA Detection training aids; CAT-UXO [B-2]

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Spring-Loaded Striker

designation: "Spring-Loaded Striker"
also_known_as: "Striker-Fired Switch, Pull-Pin Striker, Percussion Cap Striker"
type: "Improvised mechanical initiation -- direct percussion"
prevalence: "Common -- used in military and improvised firing devices"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A spring-loaded striker uses a compressed spring held in the cocked position by a retaining pin, latch, or wire. When the retaining element is removed (by pull, pressure release, or trip wire), the spring propels a striker (firing pin) into a percussion cap, stab detonator, or primer, initiating the explosive train. This is the operating principle of military firing devices (M1 Pull, M3 Pressure-Release, M5 Pressure) adapted to improvised construction.

Construction

• Tube or body housing (metal pipe, pen body, wooden block)
• Compressed spring behind striker (nail, pin, bolt)
• Retaining pin/wire holding striker in cocked position
• Pull wire, trip wire, or pressure plate connected to retaining pin
• Percussion cap, primer, or stab detonator at striker impact point
• Detonator connected to main charge via det cord or directly inserted

Recognition Features

• Small tube or cylindrical device with protruding pin or wire
• Spring visible or implied by device construction
• Wire or cord attached to retaining pin
• Similar in concept to military M1/M3/M5 firing devices

Trigger Mechanism

• Pin pulled by wire (pull/trip activation) -- striker released -- impacts cap -- fires detonator
• Weight removed (pressure-release) -- pin released by spring -- same effect
• Weight applied (pressure) -- pin pushed into cap -- same effect

EOD Significance

• Mechanical system -- NOT defeated by electronic countermeasures
• Simple but extremely reliable
• Used as primary switch or anti-handling backup in more complex devices
• Source: bulletpicker.com (M1 Firing Device Pull); USMC TBS; CAT-UXO [B-2]

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Crush Wire Switch

designation: "Crush Wire Switch"
also_known_as: "Crush Switch, Pressure Strip"
type: "Improvised electrical switch -- pressure-operated"
prevalence: "Common in roadside IEDs"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A crush wire switch consists of two parallel conductors separated by a crushable insulating material (corrugated cardboard, foam, rubber tubing). When a vehicle or person exerts sufficient pressure on the switch, the insulator crushes, bringing the two conductors into contact and completing the firing circuit. Crush wire switches can be made as long pressure strips to cover an entire lane of road.

Construction

• Two parallel wires or conductive strips (bare copper wire, metal strips)
• Separated by crushable insulating material (corrugated cardboard, foam rubber, rubber tubing around wires)
• Entire assembly may be wrapped in tape or plastic for waterproofing
• Can be constructed as a linear strip (1-5+ meters long) to cover vehicle lane width

Recognition Features

• Linear construction -- strip or line shape, often parallel to road
• Wire or cable visible at ends, leading to charge and power source
• May be concealed under road surface, dirt, or debris
• Road surface may show linear depression or irregularity where strip is buried

Trigger Mechanism

• Vehicle or foot pressure crushes insulating separator
• Two conductors make contact
• Electrical circuit completes
• Current flows from battery through switch to detonator

EOD Significance

• Long linear coverage -- difficult to avoid if road cannot be bypassed
• Low profile when buried -- challenging to detect
• Reliable under both vehicle and foot pressure depending on construction
• Source: USMC TBS; JIEDDO VOIED Recognition Guide; CAT-UXO [B-2]

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Tilt Rod / Mercury Tilt Switch

designation: "Tilt Rod / Mercury Tilt Switch"
also_known_as: "Anti-Disturbance Switch, Tilt Fuze, Mercury Switch"
type: "Improvised switch -- movement/disturbance-operated"
prevalence: "Common as anti-handling device"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Tilt switches function when the device is moved, tilted, or disturbed. Two main types exist: (1) a mechanical tilt rod that, when displaced from vertical, contacts a ring or collar completing a circuit; and (2) a mercury tilt switch containing liquid mercury in a glass tube with electrical contacts -- when tilted, the mercury flows to bridge the contacts.

Types

Recognition Features

• Mercury tilt: Small glass tube with silver liquid (mercury) visible; two wire contacts at one end
• Tilt rod: Vertical metal rod in collar/ring, wires attached
• Both types are small and easily concealed within larger device
• IRA specifically used mercury tilt switches as anti-handling devices in sophisticated IEDs

Trigger Mechanism

• Any movement, tilt, vibration, or lifting of the device causes the conductive element (mercury or ball) to shift and bridge electrical contacts
• Functions as an anti-disturbance/anti-handling switch to prevent device movement or disassembly

EOD Significance

• CRITICAL ANTI-HANDLING HAZARD
• Device will detonate if moved, tilted, lifted, or significantly vibrated
• Renders manual approach and handling extremely dangerous
• May be combined with other switches (pressure plate as primary, tilt as anti-handling backup)
• Mercury tilt switches are commercially available (thermostat components) and difficult to interdict
• RSP typically requires in-situ neutralization or BIP
• Source: USMC TBS; Wikipedia (IED article -- IRA mercury tilt); DSA Detection [B-2]

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Passive Infrared (PIR) Sensor

designation: "Passive Infrared (PIR) Sensor Switch"
also_known_as: "PIR Switch, Motion Sensor IED, Body-Heat Trigger"
type: "Improvised switch -- passive infrared (body heat) detection"
prevalence: "Encountered in sophisticated IEDs -- Iran-supplied EFPs (Iraq)"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

A PIR sensor detects the infrared radiation (body heat) emitted by a person or vehicle engine and triggers the firing circuit when a target enters the sensor's detection zone. PIR-triggered IEDs were notably used in Iranian-supplied EFPs in Iraq, where the sensor automatically fired the EFP when a vehicle or dismounted patrol passed through the kill zone.

Construction

• Commercial PIR motion sensor (security/lighting type) modified for IED use
• PIR sensor element (pyroelectric detector) connected to firing circuit
• Detection range: typically 5-15 meters
• Detection angle: 90-180 degrees depending on lens
• Connected to battery, relay, and detonator

Recognition Features

• Small white or black sensor housing (resembles home security motion detector)
• Fresnel lens cover visible (white translucent plastic dome or window)
• Associated with directional charges (EFPs, Claymore-type)
• Aimed at kill zone from concealed position

Trigger Mechanism

• PIR element detects temperature differential (body/vehicle heat vs. background)
• Detection signal activates relay in firing circuit
• Relay closes, completing circuit to detonator
• Fully automatic -- no operator required after emplacement

Countermeasures

• ECM does NOT defeat PIR switches (passive sensor, no RF component)
• IR screening/masking (heat-reducing covers) may reduce detection
• Visual detection of sensor housing during route search
• Thermal decoys may trigger device at standoff (deliberate initiation from safe distance)

EOD Significance

• AUTOMATICALLY TRIGGERED -- device is "always on" and will function without operator
• Approach from outside detection cone if possible (sensor is directional)
• May have battery life limitation -- old PIR devices may have dead batteries (but do NOT assume this)
• Robot approach preferred (metal robot body may not trigger PIR tuned for body heat, but assume it will)
• Source: CAT-UXO; USMC TBS; Iranian EFP pattern (Iraq theater) [B-2]

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IR Beam-Break Switch

designation: "IR Beam-Break Switch"
also_known_as: "Photoelectric Beam Switch, IR Tripwire"
type: "Improvised switch -- active infrared beam interruption"
prevalence: "Encountered in sophisticated IEDs"
source_rating: "C-3"

Description

An IR beam-break switch uses an infrared emitter on one side of a path and a receiver/detector on the other side. An invisible IR beam is projected across the path. When a vehicle or person breaks the beam, the receiver detects the loss of signal and triggers the firing circuit. This is essentially an electronic trip wire that is invisible to the naked eye.

Construction

• IR LED emitter (from TV remotes, security systems) aimed across kill zone
• IR photodiode or phototransistor receiver aligned with emitter
• Receiver connected to detection circuit and relay
• Breaking beam causes receiver output to change, activating relay and firing circuit
• Requires clear line-of-sight between emitter and receiver (5-30m spacing)

Recognition Features

• Small electronic components visible on both sides of path/road
• LED emitter and detector may be concealed in debris, walls, or stakes
• Wires running from components to main charge
• Requires battery power for both emitter and receiver

Trigger Mechanism

• IR beam continuously projects across kill zone
• Vehicle/person interrupts beam
• Receiver detects loss of IR signal
• Detection circuit activates relay
• Relay fires detonator

EOD Significance

• Invisible to naked eye -- cannot be seen like physical trip wire
• Can be detected with IR-sensitive cameras or night vision devices
• ECM does NOT defeat (passive optical system)
• Source: CAT-UXO; Iranian EFP pattern; DSA Detection [C-3]

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Magnetic Reed Switch

designation: "Magnetic Reed Switch"
also_known_as: "Magnetic Sensor Switch, Reed Contact Switch"
type: "Improvised switch -- magnetic field detection"
prevalence: "Encountered in UVIEDs and vehicle-targeting IEDs"
source_rating: "C-3"

Description

A magnetic reed switch uses the magnetic field of a passing vehicle to close electrical contacts and trigger the firing circuit. The reed switch is a sealed glass tube containing two ferrous metal contacts that are drawn together by a magnetic field. When a vehicle's steel mass passes near the switch, the magnetic disturbance closes the contacts.

Construction

• Glass-enclosed reed switch (commercial component from security/alarm systems)
• Wired into firing circuit between battery and detonator
• Positioned at roadside at vehicle-passing height
• May be used in conjunction with permanent magnets for calibration/sensitivity adjustment

Recognition Features

• Small glass tube component (25-50mm long) with wire leads
• Associated with vehicle-targeting IEDs
• May be concealed in roadside debris, inside containers, or on bridge/culvert undersides
• Sometimes combined with other switches as a vehicle-discrimination filter

Trigger Mechanism

• Ferromagnetic mass of passing vehicle creates magnetic field disturbance
• Reed contacts close
• Circuit completes, firing detonator
• No operator required -- fully automatic

EOD Significance

• Automatic trigger -- device is always armed
• NOT defeated by ECM (magnetic, not RF)
• Low-metal vehicles may not trigger; heavy armored vehicles more likely to trigger
• Source: DSA Detection; CAT-UXO; improvised electronics references [C-3]

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Vibration / Seismic Sensor

designation: "Vibration / Seismic Sensor Switch"
also_known_as: "Trembler Switch, Vibration Trigger"
type: "Improvised switch -- vibration/seismic detection"
prevalence: "Encountered as anti-handling and vehicle-sensing"
source_rating: "C-3"

Description

Vibration or seismic sensors detect ground vibrations from approaching vehicles, footsteps, or physical disturbance of the device. A simple trembler switch consists of a weight suspended on a spring within a ring contact -- vibration causes the weight to oscillate and contact the ring, completing the circuit.

Construction

• Trembler: Weight on spring inside ring contact
• Piezoelectric sensor: Crystal element generates voltage when vibrated
• Geophone: Coil/magnet sensor detects ground vibration
• Connected to threshold circuit and relay/firing circuit
• May include time delay to allow vehicle to reach optimal position over charge

Recognition Features

• Small cylindrical device or sensor with wire leads
• May be buried in or near road surface
• Associated wires to main charge
• Similar in concept to seismic intrusion detection systems

Trigger Mechanism

• Ground vibration from vehicle/footsteps detected by sensor
• Sensor output exceeds threshold
• Relay activates, firing detonator
• More sophisticated versions incorporate discrimination circuitry to differentiate vehicles from foot traffic

EOD Significance

• Anti-handling trembler switches will trigger if device is moved or vibrated
• Vehicle-sensing variants may trigger on approach vibration
• Robot approach may trigger trembler-type switches due to motor vibration
• Source: DSA Detection; USMC references; CAT-UXO [C-3]

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Light-Sensitive / Photocell Switch

designation: "Light-Sensitive / Photocell Switch"
also_known_as: "Photocell Trigger, Light-Activated Switch, LDR Switch"
type: "Improvised switch -- light-level change detection"
prevalence: "Encountered as anti-tamper and booby trap"
source_rating: "C-3"

Description

A light-sensitive switch uses a photoresistor (LDR -- light-dependent resistor), photodiode, or photocell to detect changes in light level. The device triggers when light is introduced (opening a box, lifting a cover, entering a dark room with a flashlight) or when light is removed (shadow passing over sensor). Used primarily as an anti-tamper switch on concealed IEDs.

Construction

• Photoresistor or photodiode sensor element
• Voltage divider or comparator circuit with threshold adjustment
• Relay connected to firing circuit
• Sensor positioned to detect light change when device is accessed or disturbed

Recognition Features

• Small electronic sensor element (photoresistor: disc with serpentine trace; photodiode: small clear/tinted LED-like component)
• Wired into circuit board inside device container
• Positioned to detect lid opening or cover removal
• May be found in package bombs, concealed containers, or under covers

Trigger Mechanism

• Light-activated: Device in dark container; opening lid exposes sensor to light; resistance drops; circuit activates
• Shadow-activated: Device in ambient light; passing shadow changes sensor reading; circuit activates
• Both variants use threshold circuit to distinguish genuine trigger from gradual ambient changes

EOD Significance

• ANTI-TAMPER HAZARD -- opening container lid may trigger detonation
• X-ray inspection critical before opening any suspect container
• If photocell detected, approach must prevent light change at sensor
• Robot with X-ray capability preferred
• Source: DSA Detection; EOD Gear training aids; CAT-UXO [C-3]

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PART 10: SYRIAN BARREL BOMBS

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Standard HE Barrel Bomb

designation: "Standard HE Barrel Bomb"
also_known_as: "Barrel Bomb, Oil Drum Bomb, Improvised Aerial Bomb"
type: "Improvised air-delivered high explosive bomb"
country_of_origin: "Syria (Syrian Arab Air Force)"
prevalence: "Widespread 2012-2019 -- estimated thousands dropped"
theaters: "Syria"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Barrel bombs are large improvised aerial bombs made from welded steel containers (oil drums, pipe sections, gas cylinders, or water tanks) filled with high explosives, scrap metal fragmentation, and sometimes incendiary material. They are rolled out of helicopter cargo doors (primarily Mi-8/Mi-17) from altitudes of 1,000-4,000m over populated areas. Despite initial reports describing oil barrel construction, many documented examples use sections of welded steel pipe or purpose-built cylindrical housings rather than actual oil barrels.

Construction

• Container: Welded steel cylinder (oil drum, pipe section, or purpose-built housing); diameters 30-60cm, lengths 60-150cm
• Explosive fill: TNT, RDX, ANFO, or mixed military explosives; 50-200+ kg per bomb
• Fragmentation: Scrap metal, rebar, nuts, bolts, ball bearings packed around or mixed with explosive
• Fuzing: Impact fuze (simple contact detonator), burning fuze (lit before drop), or rudimentary tail fuze assembly
• Tail fins: Some variants have welded sheet-metal fins for stabilization; many lack any stabilization
• Weight: 100-500+ kg total

Specifications

Recognition Features

• Large cylindrical steel container, heavily rusted
• Crudely welded construction with visible weld seams
• Sheet-metal tail fins (if present) bent or absent
• Impact craters with large steel fragments
• Massive blast damage inconsistent with conventional guided munitions
• Unexploded examples: large rusted cylinder in crater or embedded in rubble

Common Explosives

• TNT blocks packed inside
• RDX/Comp B
• ANFO (bulk fill)
• Mixed military explosives (scavenged from other munitions)
• Incendiary variants add fuel oil or napalm-like mixture

Fuzing/Trigger

• Impact fuze (simple mechanical contact detonator at nose)
• Burning fuze (pyrotechnic time fuze lit before rolling out of helicopter; highly unreliable)
• Some have no fuze and fail to detonate (unexploded barrel bombs are EXTREMELY DANGEROUS)

Countermeasures

• Air defense (anti-helicopter weapons)
• Early warning (helicopter approach audible at distance)
• Shelter in reinforced structures
• No countermeasure against bomb itself once dropped

EOD Approach

• EXTREME HAZARD -- unexploded barrel bombs contain massive explosive fill with unreliable fuzing
• Suspect barrel bomb may have burning fuze still active (time-critical)
• Impact fuze may be partially armed -- any movement may trigger
• Maximum standoff cordon (200m+ minimum for large barrel bombs)
• Remote investigation and BIP strongly recommended
• Do NOT attempt manual RSP on barrel bombs -- explosive fill is too large and fuzing too unpredictable
• Source: Bellingcat "Brief History of Syrian Barrel Bomb"; GPPi Munitions Typology; Wikipedia (Barrel Bomb) [B-2]

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Chemical (Chlorine) Barrel Bomb

designation: "Chemical (Chlorine) Barrel Bomb"
also_known_as: "Chlorine Barrel Bomb, Chemical Barrel Bomb"
type: "Improvised air-delivered chemical weapon"
country_of_origin: "Syria (Syrian Arab Air Force)"
prevalence: "Widespread 2014-2018 -- estimated ~90% of all Syrian chemical attacks used chlorine"
theaters: "Syria"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

Chemical barrel bombs are improvised aerial munitions designed to disperse industrial chlorine gas upon impact. The most common configuration consists of a standard industrial yellow chlorine gas cylinder welded into a steel cradle or frame with an explosive bursting charge. On impact, the explosive ruptures the chlorine cylinder, releasing the gas as a toxic cloud. Chemical barrel bombs account for an estimated 90% of all chemical weapons use throughout the Syrian conflict.

Construction

• Chlorine cylinder: Standard industrial compressed chlorine gas cylinder (typically yellow); 50-100 kg
• Cradle/Frame: Welded steel frame around chlorine cylinder with handling lugs and (sometimes) stabilizing fins
• Bursting charge: Small HE charge positioned to rupture cylinder on impact
• Total assembly: Chlorine cylinder + frame + bursting charge; 100-200 kg total

Recognition Features

• Standard industrial chlorine cylinder visible in wreckage (yellow cylinder with chemical markings including Cl₂ symbol)
• Steel cradle/frame welded around cylinder
• Chemical smell: Strong bleach/pool chlorine odor at impact site
• Yellow-green gas cloud visible on impact (chlorine gas is pale yellowish-green)
• Victims report choking, burning eyes, difficulty breathing
• Impact site: steel frame wreckage + ruptured cylinder + chemical residue

Chemical Hazard -- Chlorine

EOD Approach

• DUAL HAZARD: EXPLOSIVE + CHEMICAL
• Full MOPP/CBRN PPE required for approach
• Unexploded chemical barrel bomb: treat as both explosive and chemical hazard
• Maximum standoff; upwind approach only
• Coordinate with CBRN unit
• BIP may disperse chemical -- consider downwind civilian population
• Source: HRW "Death by Chemicals" report; Bellingcat "All the Pieces Matter"; OPCW investigations [B-1]

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PART 11: ISIS/ISIL IMPROVISED WEAPONS

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ISIS Up-Armored SVBIED

designation: "ISIS Up-Armored SVBIED"
also_known_as: "Armored Car Bomb, ISIS Suicide Vehicle"
type: "Up-armored suicide vehicle-borne IED"
country_of_origin: "ISIS/ISIL -- Iraq and Syria"
prevalence: "Mass-produced 2014-2019 -- hundreds documented"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

ISIS industrialized the production of SVBIEDs at a near-factory level, creating underground manufacturing facilities that continuously produced up-armored suicide vehicles. These vehicles were modified with welded steel armor plating on the body, protected vision slits for the driver, armor over the wheels to resist gunfire, and sometimes metal grating over the front designed to prematurely detonate incoming shaped charges (RPGs). SVBIEDs served as ISIS's primary offensive weapon, used as armored breaching vehicles against defensive positions.

Construction

• Vehicle selection: Sedans, SUVs, pickup trucks, dump trucks, construction equipment, captured armored vehicles (Humvees, M113s, BMP-1s)
• Armor plating: 6-25mm steel plates welded to body panels, doors, hood, trunk; multiple layers on front
• Vision slits: Narrow horizontal cuts in armor for driver visibility (2-5cm wide)
• Wheel protection: Armor skirts covering tires to prevent mobility kills
• Cage armor: Some have metal grating/cage armor designed to prematurely detonate shaped-charge warheads
• Explosive payload: 200-2,000+ kg; mix of IEDs, anti-tank mines, artillery shells, bulk ANFO
• Composition: TNT, ammonium nitrate, gasoline, oxygen bottles, rocket propellants, and artillery shells wired together
• Detonation: Driver-operated push-button switch; sometimes dead man's switch backup

Specifications

Recognition Features

• Irregular welded steel plates on vehicle exterior (crude but functional)
• Narrow horizontal vision slits (2-5cm) cut in front/side armor
• Armor skirts over wheels and wheel wells
• Vehicle riding extremely low due to armor + explosive weight
• Cage armor or metal grating on front
• Single occupant
• Vehicle approaching at high speed toward defensive position
• Painted or camouflaged to match local vehicles
• Some disguised as civilian vehicles (ambulances, taxis, police vehicles)

Countermeasures

• Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) -- most effective against up-armored variants
• .50 caliber / 12.7mm AP ammunition to penetrate armor
• Anti-tank ditches and berms to channel/stop vehicle
• Concrete barriers strong enough to stop heavy vehicle
• IED/mines on approach routes
• Engagement at maximum range before vehicle reaches target
• Coalition airstrikes on SVBIED factories disrupted production

EOD Approach

• If SVBIED fails to detonate or driver is neutralized before initiation:
• MAXIMUM HAZARD -- 500+ kg explosive with unknown switch/anti-handling status
• Assume dead man's switch and anti-handling features
• Maximum cordon (300m+ for large payloads)
• Robot approach for initial assessment
• RSP per current TMs -- typically requires deliberate BIP with additional explosive
• Source: Hugo Kaaman "Car Bombs as Weapons of War" (MEI); CTC West Point "Defeat by Annihilation"; Armoured Warfare of IS (Wikipedia) [B-1]

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ISIS Drone-Dropped Munitions

designation: "ISIS Drone-Dropped Munitions"
also_known_as: "ISIS UAS Bombs, Drone Grenades, Drone IEDs"
type: "Drone-delivered improvised munitions"
country_of_origin: "ISIS/ISIL"
prevalence: "Widespread 2016-2019 during Mosul/Raqqa campaigns"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

ISIS adapted commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones -- primarily DJI Phantom and Skywalker X8 fixed-wing models -- to carry and drop improvised munitions. These ranged from modified 40mm grenades to purpose-manufactured munitions with 3D-printed tail fins and improvised fuzes. ISIS standardized production of a 46mm fuze specifically designed for drone-dropped munitions, indicating an organized manufacturing capability.

Types

Construction (Purpose-Built Munition)

• Munition body: Metal tube or cast body (~40-50mm diameter, 100-200mm long)
• Explosive fill: RDX, TNT, or HME (potassium chlorate mixture)
• Fuze: Standardized 46mm impact fuze (ISIS-manufactured)
• Tail fins: 3D-printed or sheet-metal fins for in-flight stabilization
• Drop mechanism: Plastic tube or mechanical release under drone body; released by servo command from operator

Recognition Features

• Small cylindrical munitions (40-50mm diameter) with tail fins
• 3D-printed plastic tail fin assemblies (visible layer lines from FDM printing)
• ISIS markings or lot numbers on manufactured munitions
• Found near crashed/recovered drones
• Drop tubes visible on captured drone airframes
• Small impact craters (~30cm diameter) consistent with grenade-sized munitions

Common Explosives

• Modified 40mm HE grenade fill (RDX, Comp B)
• Potassium chlorate mixtures (purpose-built munitions)
• TNT
• Small amounts of C4/PE4

Trigger/Fuze

• Impact fuze (functions on hitting ground/target)
• 46mm standardized fuze with striker and creep spring -- functions like conventional mortar fuze
• Modified 40mm grenade fuze retained from original munition

Countermeasures

• Counter-UAS systems (RF jammers, interceptor drones, directed energy)
• Anti-drone weapons (shotgun, net guns, electronic warfare)
• Overhead cover (hard-top structures, vehicles)
• Air sentries with visual/acoustic drone detection

EOD Approach

• Small but still lethal -- fragmentation hazard
• Impact fuze may be armed but failed to function (dud) -- treat as armed
• Small standoff cordon (50m minimum)
• Remote investigation if possible
• BIP for duds
• Source: Bellingcat "Types of Islamic State Drone Bombs"; CTC West Point "Islamic State and Drones" [B-2]

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Hell Cannon

designation: "Hell Cannon (Jahannam)"
also_known_as: "Jahannam Cannon, Improvised Mortar, Rebel Mortar"
type: "Improvised mortar / cannon"
country_of_origin: "Syria (rebel manufacture -- Ahrar al-Shamal Brigade, later widespread)"
year_introduced: 2012
prevalence: "Widespread 2012-2018 in Syrian Civil War"
theaters: "Syria (Aleppo, Idlib, Damascus suburbs)"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

The Hell Cannon (Jahannam) is an improvised mortar system first manufactured in 2012 in Idlib province by the Ahrar al-Shamal Brigade. The cannon fires repurposed propane gas cylinders filled with explosives and scrap metal. It was specifically designed for urban siege warfare in Aleppo and became one of the most widely used improvised artillery systems in the Syrian Civil War.

Construction

Launcher:

• Steel pipe barrel approximately 3 feet (90cm) long, smooth bore
• Mounted on steel frame with wheels for mobility (towed)
• Muzzle-loaded
• Propellant: ANFO or similar HME charge dropped into muzzle first and tamped with wooden stick
• Elevation adjusted by manual frame angle

Projectile:

• Repurposed propane gas cylinder (drained and refilled with explosives and shrapnel)
• Total weight: up to ~40 kg (88 lbs), with approximately 75% of weight as explosives (~30 kg explosive fill)
• Welded steel tail tube (~60cm / 2 feet long) approximately same diameter as cannon muzzle
• Tail tube inserted fully into muzzle; warhead (gas cylinder) remains outside above muzzle
• No stabilization fins (some later variants added crude fins)

Specifications

Recognition Features

• Short steel pipe barrel on wheeled frame
• Gas cylinder projectiles (distinctive green/white/silver propane tank shape)
• Welded tail tubes on projectiles
• Impact craters with gas cylinder fragments
• Propane cylinder end-caps found at impact sites
• Crude construction -- visible weld beads, unfinished metal

EOD Approach (Unexploded Projectiles)

• Gas cylinder with improvised fuze -- treat as armed IED
• HME fill may be highly sensitive (potassium chlorate mixtures documented)
• Maximum standoff; BIP recommended
• Impact fuze may be partially armed -- do not move
• Source: Bellingcat; Grey Dynamics "Hell Cannon Confessions"; Wikipedia (Improvised Artillery in Syria) [B-2]

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ISIS Booby-Trapped Buildings (HBIED)

designation: "ISIS Booby-Trapped Buildings (HBIED)"
also_known_as: "House-Borne IED, Booby-Trapped Structure"
type: "Structure-borne improvised explosive device"
prevalence: "Extremely widespread -- Mosul, Raqqa, Fallujah, Tikrit"
theaters: "Iraq, Syria"
source_rating: "B-1"

Description

ISIS systematically booby-trapped entire buildings, neighborhoods, and urban infrastructure during defensive operations in Mosul, Raqqa, Fallujah, and other cities. The scale was industrial -- ISIS manufactured IEDs in factories and rigged thousands of structures with explosive devices hidden in everyday objects. House-borne IEDs (HBIEDs) were designed to detonate and collapse entire buildings when clearing squads entered, causing mass casualties among military personnel and civilians alike.

Types of Building IEDs

Construction

• Bulk explosive charges (artillery shells, mortar rounds, ANFO, TNT blocks) placed in walls, floors, ceilings, and structural elements
• Connected to various switches (trip wire, pressure plate, pull, PIR, command wire, RCIED)
• Multiple devices in single building (redundant initiation)
• Anti-handling devices on discoverable items to kill EOD/engineers
• Daisy-chained charges throughout building for maximum structural damage

Recognition Features

• Buildings in formerly ISIS-held territory -- ASSUME BOOBY-TRAPPED until cleared
• Wires visible along walls, through doorframes, or in rubble
• Disturbed walls, floors, or structural elements (fresh plaster, mortar, paint)
• Objects that appear deliberately placed or out of context
• Mouseholes between buildings with debris on edges
• Freshly sealed wall cavities
• Explosive residue or det cord visible
• Strong chemical odors (TNT, ANFO, adhesives)

Common Explosives

• Artillery and mortar shells (embedded in walls and floors)
• ANFO bulk charges
• TNT blocks
• C4/PE4 (less common)
• Det cord linking multiple charges
• Anti-tank mines (under floors)

Countermeasures

• Assume ALL buildings in formerly ISIS-held areas are booby-trapped
• Systematic building clearance by trained engineers/EOD
• Robot reconnaissance before human entry
• Remote breaching to trigger victim-operated devices
• K-9 explosive detection
• Extensive visual and physical search before any object is touched or moved
• Source: HRW Raqqa report; PBS Frontline Iraq reporting; Newsweek "How ISIS Booby-Trapped Raqqa"; CISR Journal 23.2 (Mosul) [B-1]

EOD Approach

• HIGHEST COMPLEXITY -- multiple interconnected devices with multiple switch types
• Systematic room-by-room clearance with remote investigation capability
• Map and document all identified devices before attempting any RSP
• Expect anti-handling on every device
• Coordinate explosive clearance with structural engineering assessment (building may collapse)
• Multi-day clearance timelines for large structures
• Source: PBS Frontline; CISR Journal [B-1]

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Improvised Rockets / IRAM / Lob Bombs

designation: "Improvised Rockets / IRAM / Lob Bombs"
also_known_as: "Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munition, Lob Bomb, Volcano Rocket, Elephant Rocket"
type: "Improvised rocket-propelled munition"
prevalence: "Common in Iraq (2007+) and Syria (2012+)"
theaters: "Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

IRAMs (Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions), commonly called "lob bombs," are improvised munitions consisting of a large explosive warhead (typically a repurposed propane gas tank) attached to a rocket motor (commonly 107mm or 122mm). Early lob bombs in Iraq were propelled by 107mm rockets and launched from truck-mounted rails. In Syria, the concept evolved into the Volcano IRAM and Elephant Rocket variants capable of carrying massive warheads that could destroy entire housing blocks.

Types

Construction

• Warhead: Propane gas tank or welded steel container drained and filled with explosives (ANFO, TNT, potassium chlorate + fuel), scrap metal, and ball bearings
• Motor: Original warhead removed from conventional rocket (107mm, 122mm Grad, Falaq-1, Falaq-2); improvised warhead bolted or welded to motor
• Launcher: Truck-bed rails (multiple round launcher), ground-based inclined rail, or improvised tube
• Fuzing: Impact fuze (crude contact detonator) or burning fuze

Recognition Features

• Gas cylinder or welded tank with rocket motor attached
• Warhead significantly larger diameter than rocket motor (distinctive "lollipop" shape)
• Truck-mounted rail launchers with multiple rounds
• Impact craters with gas cylinder fragments and rocket motor debris
• Distinctive launch noise described as "whooshing" or "elephant" sound
• Very poor accuracy -- area weapon

EOD Approach (Unexploded / Dud)

• Impact fuze may be partially armed -- do not move
• Rocket motor propellant may still be burning or partially consumed
• Large explosive fill requires maximum standoff
• BIP recommended
• Source: Wikipedia (Lob Bomb); ARES (Armament Research Services) Falaq IRAM report; Bellingcat; Al Jazeera "Elephant Rockets" [B-2]

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PART 12: UKRAINE IMPROVISED ORDNANCE

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FPV Drone Warheads

designation: "FPV Drone Warheads"
also_known_as: "FPV Munitions, Drone-Delivered Warheads, Kamikaze Drone Payloads"
type: "Drone-delivered improvised warhead"
country_of_origin: "Ukraine / Russia (both sides)"
prevalence: "Dominant weapon system 2023-present -- hundreds used daily"
theaters: "Ukraine"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

First-person-view (FPV) drones have become the dominant precision-strike weapon in the Ukraine conflict. Standard 5-inch racing-class FPV drones are modified to carry warheads ranging from repurposed RPG rounds to purpose-built shaped charges. Ukrainian forces have developed increasingly sophisticated warhead designs including cumulative (shaped charge), fragmentation, thermobaric, and thermite variants. Heavy FPV drones with 6 motors can carry warheads up to 5 kg.

Common Warhead Types

Construction

• Standard 5-inch FPV racing drone frame (typically 4 motors, ~800g frame weight)
• Warhead attached via 3D-printed adapter, zip ties, tape, or custom mount
• RPG warhead: PG-7V nose cone and booster removed; warhead body attached to drone underside
• VOG grenades: Fuze modified for impact initiation on drone impact
• Custom shaped charges: 3D-printed ogive with copper liner, filled with RDX or PE4
• Arming: Fuze arms in flight or on impact; some use electronic arming with altitude/acceleration sensor
• FPV video link for precision guidance by operator

Recognition Features

• Small racing-style drone airframe (25-50cm diagonal) with cylindrical or conical warhead attached
• RPG warhead visible (distinctive ogive shape, copper liner)
• 3D-printed components (visible layer lines)
• Wires from warhead to electronic arming circuit
• Crashed/recovered drones: battery, flight controller, video transmitter, motor/prop remnants + warhead debris
• Impact: small crater with shaped charge jet hole or fragmentation pattern

Trigger/Fuze

• Impact fuze (piezoelectric or inertial): functions on drone impact with target
• Electronic arming: accelerometer or altitude sensor arms warhead in flight; disarmed on ground
• Modified military fuze: existing RPG/grenade fuze adapted for drone-impact initiation
• Contact fuze: simple mechanical contact closes circuit on impact

Countermeasures

• Electronic warfare / RF jamming to sever FPV video/control link
• Counter-UAS systems (detection, tracking, engagement)
• Anti-drone nets and cage armor on vehicles
• Acoustic/radar detection systems
• Camouflage and concealment to prevent visual acquisition
• Decoys and thermal masking

EOD Approach

• Crashed/failed FPV drone: warhead may be armed but failed to detonate -- treat as armed munition
• RPG warheads retain original explosive hazard (shaped charge jet hazard)
• 3D-printed components may be fragile; warhead may have shifted
• Standard UXO approach: standoff, remote assessment, BIP if fuze status unknown
• Source: Defence Express; Militarnyi; CTC West Point "Moving Targets"; DronXL; DefenceUkraine [B-2]

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Dragon Drone

designation: "Dragon Drone (Dracarys)"
also_known_as: "Thermite FPV, Dragon FPV, Incendiary Drone"
type: "Drone-delivered incendiary/thermite weapon"
country_of_origin: "Ukraine"
year_introduced: 2024
prevalence: "Increasing -- regular operational use since August 2024"
theaters: "Ukraine"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Dragon drones (also called "Dracarys") are standard FPV drones modified to carry and disperse thermite mixture containers over enemy positions. The FPV drone lifts a container of thermite mixture, flies over the target area (typically forested positions, trenches, or vehicle concentrations), ignites the mixture, and pours molten thermite (2,000°C / 3,630°F) through the opening as it overflies the target. The drone ideally returns to base after dispensing. First documented in operational use in August-September 2024.

Construction

• Standard FPV drone (5-7 inch class or larger hexacopter)
• Thermite container: metal housing containing 500-530g of thermite mixture
• Thermite composition: powdered aluminum + powdered iron oxide (Fe₂O₃)
• Ignition system: electronic igniter (nichrome wire or electric match) triggered by operator command
• Aluminum pipe, circuit board, and ignition components integrated into container
• Container attached to drone underside with quick-release mechanism

Specifications

Recognition Features

• FPV drone with elongated container attached underneath
• Bright white/orange dripping stream of molten material during use
• Burned/melted areas on ground, vehicles, or structures after use
• Metal container remnants with thermite residue
• Video evidence shows distinctive molten dripping pattern

EOD Approach

• Post-strike: residual thermite may continue burning; do NOT approach active thermite
• Thermite residue: hot metal slag; burn hazard but not explosive
• Unexpended thermite containers from crashed drones: treat as incendiary hazard
• No explosive hazard from thermite itself (thermite is not an explosive -- it is a vigorous exothermic reaction)
• HOWEVER: thermite containers may be attached to drones with explosive warheads -- check for both
• Source: CNN dragon drone reporting; Al Jazeera; Defence Express; Militarnyi; Wikipedia (Dragon Drone) [B-2]

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3D-Printed Components and Mines

designation: "3D-Printed Components and Improvised Mines"
also_known_as: "Additive-Manufactured IED Components, 3D-Printed Mines"
type: "3D-printed improvised munition components and complete mines"
country_of_origin: "Ukraine (both sides)"
prevalence: "Increasing rapidly -- documented since 2024"
theaters: "Ukraine"
source_rating: "C-2"

Description

The Ukraine conflict has introduced widespread use of 3D printing (additive manufacturing) for producing IED and munition components. Applications range from tail fin assemblies for drone-dropped munitions to complete anti-personnel mine casings. The TM-2025 anti-tank mine features a 3D-printed electromechanical fuze (MPEM-1). Since approximately November 2024, miniature improvised scatterable anti-personnel mines with 3D-printed plastic casings have been documented, deployed by UAVs.

Types

Recognition Features

• Visible FDM (Fused Deposition Modeling) layer lines on plastic components
• PLA, ABS, PETG, or nylon plastic materials (various colors)
• Geometric precision but surface texture distinct from injection-molded parts
• Miniature AP mines: very small plastic devices (thumbnail to palm-sized) with minimal metal content
• Components may be unmarked or have unit-specific markings

EOD Significance

• DETECTION CHALLENGE: 3D-printed plastic casings have near-zero metallic signature
• Standard metal detectors will NOT reliably detect 3D-printed mines
• Requires dual-sensor (metal + GPR) or non-metallic detection methods
• Plastic casings degrade in UV/weather over time -- explosive fill may become exposed
• 3D-printed components may be fragile; mechanical fuzes may have different sensitivity than machined equivalents
• PROLIFERATION CONCERN: 3D printing files can be shared digitally; capability transfers instantly to any conflict zone with access to consumer 3D printers
• Source: Army Recognition (TM-2025); United24 Media; Defence Express; Terrogence Mobius Report 19/2025 [C-2]

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Modified Commercial Drones

designation: "Modified Commercial Drones (Mavic Bombers)"
also_known_as: "Mavic Bomber, Modified Quadcopter, Drop Drone"
type: "Modified commercial drone for munition delivery"
prevalence: "Ubiquitous in Ukraine conflict -- both sides"
theaters: "Ukraine; concept spreading to Myanmar, Middle East, Africa"
source_rating: "B-2"

Description

Standard DJI Mavic-series quadcopters and similar commercial drones are modified with improvised bomb-release mechanisms to drop small munitions (typically modified VOG-17M, VOG-25, or RKG-3 grenades, or purpose-built HE/fragmentation bombs). The Mavic's onboard camera provides targeting capability. These "bomber" drones typically carry 1-3 small munitions and drop them from altitudes of 50-200m.

Construction

• DJI Mavic 3/Mavic Pro or similar commercial quadcopter
• 3D-printed bomb-release mechanism attached to drone underside
• Servo actuator to open release mechanism, controlled by operator via auxiliary channel
• Payload: VOG-17M grenade with modified fuze (impact-armed), RKG-3 anti-tank grenade with drogue parachute, or custom-manufactured HE munition
• Tail fins or drogue added to munitions for stabilization during drop

Recognition Features

• Standard DJI Mavic drone profile (foldable arms, grey body)
• Aftermarket attachment visible on underside (3D-printed bracket, tube, or cradle)
• Small munitions (grenade-sized) visible in release mechanism
• Recovered munitions: small cylindrical or conical body with tail fins or drogue remains

EOD Approach

• Dud dropped munitions: modified grenade fuze may be partially armed
• Small but lethal -- maintain standoff
• Impact fuze duds: do NOT move; BIP
• Source: Defence Express; Militarnyi; CTC West Point [B-2]

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TM-62 Drone-Delivered Mines

designation: "TM-62 Drone-Delivered Mines"
also_known_as: "Aerial Mine Delivery, Drone Mine-Laying"
type: "Anti-tank mine delivered/deployed by heavy drone"
country_of_origin: "Ukraine / Russia"
prevalence: "Documented 2023-present"
theaters: "Ukraine"
source_rating: "C-2"

Description

Heavy-lift drones (including modified Molniya and purpose-built hexacopter/octocopter platforms) are used to deliver TM-62 anti-tank mines as aerial bombs or to remotely emplace mines in areas inaccessible to ground forces. When used as aerial bombs, the mine's explosive fill (7.5 kg TNT or Comp B) provides significant blast effect on impact. When emplaced remotely, the mine functions in its conventional anti-vehicle role. The TM-2025, a modernized derivative, is specifically designed for dual anti-tank and drone-delivery roles.

Construction

• TM-62 anti-tank mine (standard or modified with improvised fuze)
• Attached to heavy-lift drone via 3D-printed adapter or metal bracket
• Release mechanism: servo-actuated or mechanical release
• When used as aerial bomb: impact-armed improvised fuze replaces standard pressure fuze
• When used for mine emplacement: standard MVCh-62 pressure fuze retained; mine dropped from low altitude

Specifications

Recognition Features

• Standard TM-62 mine profile: large flat disc, olive green or black
• May have improvised fuze (non-standard fuze well components)
• Found in unusual locations (away from roads, in open fields -- inconsistent with conventional mine emplacement)
• Associated heavy-lift drone wreckage nearby

EOD Approach

• Treat as armed TM-62 mine -- standard AT mine procedures
• If improvised fuze: unknown sensitivity; increased caution
• If found as aerial bomb dud: impact may have partially armed fuze
• Standard mine clearance per TMs
• Source: Defence Express; Army Recognition; Militarnyi [C-2]

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Improvised Mines and Booby Traps (Ukraine)

designation: "Improvised Mines and Booby Traps -- Ukraine"
type: "Improvised mines and booby trap devices"
prevalence: "Widespread on both sides of front line"
theaters: "Ukraine"
source_rating: "C-2"

Description

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces employ improvised mines and booby traps extensively along the front line and in contested areas. These range from modified conventional mines (e.g., anti-handling fuzes added to standard mines) to fully improvised devices using available materials. Common patterns include trip-wire grenades in tree lines, pressure-plate IEDs on tracks, and anti-handling devices on abandoned equipment and positions.

Common Types (Ukraine Theater)

• Trip wire grenades (F-1, RGD-5) in tree lines and trenches
• Modified TM-62 and MON-50 mines with anti-handling fuzes
• Claymore-pattern directional mines (improvised or MON-50/MON-90)
• Abandoned equipment (weapons, radios, food) rigged with pull switches
• Positions/trenches rigged with pressure-release devices before withdrawal
• Modified POM-3 type scatterable mines with seismic fuzes (Russian)
• Improvised anti-personnel mines from mortar rounds or grenades buried with pressure plates

EOD Significance

• Mine contamination in Ukraine is already among the worst in the world
• Decades of clearance work expected post-conflict
• Mix of conventional and improvised devices complicates clearance
• Dense vegetation and disturbed terrain make detection extremely challenging
• Source: Defence Express; Terrogence; HALO Trust; UN reporting [C-2]

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PART 13: MYANMAR IMPROVISED ORDNANCE

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PDF Resistance IEDs and Mines

designation: "PDF Resistance IEDs and Mines"
also_known_as: "People's Defence Force Mines, Resistance IEDs"
type: "Improvised mines and IEDs -- resistance/guerrilla"
country_of_origin: "Myanmar (resistance forces)"
prevalence: "Widespread since mid-2021"
theaters: "Myanmar (Sagaing, Chin, Kayah, Karenni, Karen, Shan states)"
source_rating: "C-3"

Description

The People's Defence Forces (PDF) and allied ethnic resistance organizations (EAOs) have manufactured a wide variety of improvised weapons since mid-2021 to fight the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) following the February 2021 coup. IEDs are a primary weapon due to the resistance's lack of conventional arms. Devices include remote-controlled roadside bombs, improvised landmines, booby traps, improvised mortars and rockets, and bomb-carrying drones. Most mines used by resistance groups are improvised explosive devices often deployed to defend territory or interdict military road movements.

Types

Construction Characteristics

• Materials: PVC pipe, bamboo, recycled timber, locally sourced metal
• Explosives: Homemade mixtures (potassium chlorate from match heads, ammonium nitrate fertilizer, charcoal); some captured military ordnance
• Switches: Bamboo-separated pressure plates, clothespin switches, cell phone RCIED
• Power: AA/9V batteries
• KEY CHARACTERISTIC: Many devices use perishable local materials (bamboo, untreated wood) and battery power, giving them a finite active life span -- unlike factory-produced mines

Recognition Features

• Crude construction from locally available materials
• PVC pipe or bamboo casings
• Visible wire runs (command wire or electrical connections)
• Bamboo or wooden pressure plates near roads/trails
• Disturbed earth on paths used by military patrols
• Match heads or match boxes (potassium chlorate source) found in manufacturing sites

EOD Significance

• Generally crude construction but still lethal
• Lower reliability than factory-produced mines but unpredictable
• Perishable materials mean some devices will self-neutralize over time (bamboo rots, batteries die)
• However: explosive fill remains hazardous even after switch/battery failure
• Mix of resistance and Tatmadaw mines in same areas complicates clearance
• Source: Military Matters Online; Counter-IED Report; MAG Policy Brief; Landmine Monitor [C-3]

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Tatmadaw Improvised Air-Dropped Munitions

designation: "Tatmadaw Improvised Air-Dropped Munitions"
also_known_as: "Junta Barrel Bombs, Tatmadaw Improvised Aerial Bombs"
type: "Improvised air-delivered ordnance"
country_of_origin: "Myanmar (Tatmadaw / Myanmar military)"
prevalence: "Increasing since 2023 -- significant escalation in 2024"
theaters: "Myanmar (Sagaing, Mandalay, Chin, Shan, Karenni states)"
source_rating: "C-2"

Description

The Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) has increasingly resorted to improvised aerial bombing methods due to attrition of dedicated attack aircraft, munitions shortages, maintenance constraints, and sanctions-driven procurement failures. Y-12 transport aircraft have been modified to drop munitions manually from rear doors, and paramotors (powered paragliders) have been used to drop bombs across multiple townships. The Tatmadaw has also been documented using cluster munitions. Civilian casualties from airstrikes nearly doubled in 2024 compared to 2023, with nearly half of all verified civilian deaths between April 2024 and May 2025 resulting from aerial attacks.

Construction

• Y-12 transport modification: Standard Y-12 twin-turboprop transport aircraft with improvised bomb racks or manual release from rear cargo door
• Paramotor bombing: Powered paraglider with improvised bomb carried by pilot; dropped manually
• Improvised munitions: Conventional bombs, improvised barrel bombs (similar to Syrian pattern), and possibly cluster munitions dropped from improvised platforms
• Accuracy: Extremely low -- slow aircraft, manual release, no targeting systems
• Altitude: Variable -- Y-12 operates at 1,000-3,000m; paramotors at lower altitudes

Recognition Features

• Y-12 transport aircraft in ground-attack role (highly unusual -- normally a light transport)
• Paramotors (powered paragliders) operating over conflict zones
• Crude aerial munitions: cylindrical containers, repurposed ordnance, barrel-type bombs
• Impact craters inconsistent with precision munitions
• Civilian casualties in areas without ground combat (indicating aerial attack)

EOD Approach

• Unexploded aerial munitions: same hazards as Syrian barrel bombs -- unreliable fuzing, massive fill
• Maximum standoff; BIP recommended
• May encounter cluster submunitions -- standard CMR clearance procedures
• Tatmadaw mines (factory-produced): remain active indefinitely (unlike resistance improvised mines)
• Source: Fortify Rights; HRW; Amnesty International; Bangladesh Defence Journal; UN News [C-2]

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APPENDIX: SOURCES AND REFERENCES

Primary Sources (A-1 to B-2)

• UNMAS IED Lexicon (unmas.org)
• USMC TBS B3L0487XQ IED Manual (trngcmd.marines.mil)
• USMC FMTB IED publications (trngcmd.marines.mil)
• JIEDDO VOIED Recognition Guide (publicintelligence.net)
• DHS Introduction to Explosives (publicintelligence.net)
• National Academies "Reducing the Threat of IED Attacks" (nationalacademies.org)
• CAT-UXO IED database (cat-uxo.com)
• CTC West Point publications (ctc.westpoint.edu)
• Hugo Kaaman "Car Bombs as Weapons of War" (MEI, 2019)
• Conflict Armament Research "Anatomy of a Drone Boat" (conflictarm.com)
• ARES (Armament Research Services) publications (armamentresearch.com)

Secondary Sources (B-2 to C-3)

• Bellingcat investigations (bellingcat.com)
• Human Rights Watch Syria/Myanmar reports (hrw.org)
• Defence Express Ukraine reporting (defence-ua.com)
• Militarnyi Ukraine reporting (militarnyi.com)
• Army Recognition (armyrecognition.com)
• DHS AWR-358 IED Awareness (cdp.dhs.gov)
• DSA Detection training materials (dsadetection.com)
• EOD Gear training aids (eod-gear.com)
• Solace Global WBIED report (solaceglobal.com)
• DHS WBIED Detection paper (dhs.gov)
• DTIC Maritime IED Study (dtic.mil)
• Military Matters Online -- Myanmar PDFs (militarymatters.online)
• Terrogence Mobius Report 19/2025 (terrogence.com)
• Grey Dynamics -- Hell Cannon (greydynamics.com)
• GPPi Chemical Weapons Munitions Typology (chemicalweapons.gppi.net)
• Wikipedia -- cross-referenced with primary sources
• Fortify Rights -- Myanmar (fortifyrights.org)
• Amnesty International -- Myanmar (amnesty.org)

Tertiary/News Sources (C-3 to D-4)

• CNN, Al Jazeera, PBS Frontline, Newsweek, NPR -- conflict reporting
• Popular Front -- SVBIED cultural analysis
• DronXL -- drone technology reporting
• Counter-IED Report (counteriedreport.com)