Iranian Mines, IEDs, and Improvised Ordnance Database

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT Created: 2026-03-28 Last Updated: 2026-03-28 Source Reliability: B-2 to C-3 (Usually Reliable to Fairly Reliable) -- compiled from ODIN (TRADOC), CAT-UXO, ARES (Armament Research Services), Conflict Armament Research (CAR), Jane's, CENTCOM briefings, Covert Shores (Hisutton), bulletpicker.com, Mindex (Iranian Defense Export), Washington Institute, IMAS technical notes, Wikipedia (cross-referenced) Purpose: Comprehensive EOD reference for Iranian-manufactured and Iranian-supplied mines, IEDs, EFPs, IRAMs, naval mines, and proxy IED patterns. Identification, hazard assessment, and clearance planning.

SAFETY WARNING: This document is for IDENTIFICATION AND AWARENESS ONLY. It does NOT replace official EOD technical publications (60-series pubs, NAVEODFLTDIV, JODIC). Always refer to current TMs for render-safe procedures. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher.

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: Iranian ordnance is manufactured primarily by the Defense Industries Organization (DIO / DIOMIL) under the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and by Iran Ammunition Industries Group. The IRGC Quds Force is the primary external proliferation vector. Iranian ordnance is frequently encountered in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, and the Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz. Forensic tracing by Conflict Armament Research has confirmed shared component DNA across multiple theaters.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Anti-Personnel Mines

1. YM-I (AP Blast -- TS-50/VS-50 Copy)
2. YM-I-B / YM-I-S (AP Blast -- Smoke Variant)
3. Pedal Mine No. 4 (AP Blast)
4. YM-IV (AP Bounding Fragmentation)
5. YM-IV-F (AP Bounding Fragmentation -- Fuzed Variant)
6. M18-1 (Directional AP -- Claymore Copy)
7. M18A2 (Directional AP -- Large Claymore Variant)

Anti-Tank / Anti-Vehicle Mines

1. YM-II (AT Blast -- SB-81 Copy)
2. YM-III (AT Blast -- Type 72 Copy)

Naval Mines

1. SADAF-01 (Moored Contact -- MYAM Copy)
2. SADAF-02 (Moored Contact -- Anchored)
3. Maham-2 (Bottom Influence Mine)
4. Maham-3 (Moored Influence Mine)
5. Maham-7 (Bottom Influence -- Limpet Variant)
6. EM-52 (Rocket-Propelled Rising Mine -- Chinese Copy)
7. Iranian Limpet Mine (Magnetic Attachment)

Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs)

1. Standard EFP (Single Copper Liner)
2. Multi-Array EFP (MEFP)
3. PIR-Triggered EFP
4. Command-Wire EFP
5. IR Beam-Break Triggered EFP
6. Magnetic Influence EFP

Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions (IRAM)

1. Standard IRAM (Propane Tank / 107mm Booster)
2. Falaq-1 Based IRAM (240mm)
3. Falaq-2 Based IRAM (333mm)

Proxy IED Patterns by Theater

1. Iraq -- Underbody EFP / Roadside Shaped Charge
2. Afghanistan -- Pressure-Plate / VOIED / RCIED
3. Yemen/Houthi -- WBIED / Sea Mines / EFP
4. Syria -- Barrel Bombs / VBIED / Directional Mines

Iranian Components and Forensic Indicators

1. Component Identification and Forensic Tracing

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ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

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YM-I

designation: "YM-I"
also_known_as: "YM-1"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Defense Industries Organization (DIO / DIOMIL)"
based_on: "Italian TS-50 / VS-50 (Valsella Meccanotecnica / Tecnovar)"
year_introduced: ~1990s
type: "AP blast"
status: "In production / actively exported"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure-actuated mechanical fuze with pneumatic delay
• Mechanism: Pressure on central raised pad forces air through diaphragm into small rubber air bag; inflating bag pushes shutter, removes striker retaining lug; striker impacts stab-detonator
• Blast resistance: Pneumatic system prevents initiation from short-duration shock/blast overpressure -- designed to survive nearby detonations
• Orientation: Functions even if mine is upside down

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device in base variant
• Commonly booby-trapped with pressure-release devices placed underneath in field

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• None -- remains active indefinitely

Forensic Indicators of Iranian Manufacture

• Farsi date stamps (Iranian Solar Hijri calendar) -- specimens date-stamped 1375-1379 SH (1996-2000 CE)
• DIO lot markings in Farsi script
• Slight dimensional and molding differences from Italian TS-50 original
• Plastic color and texture variations from Italian production

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Minimum-metal construction -- extremely difficult to detect with standard metallic detectors; requires dual-sensor (metal + GPR) detector
• Blast-resistant fuze complicates clearance by detonation -- may survive nearby blasts
• May be scattered by vehicle or helicopter dispenser -- expect pattern minefields
• Plastic body degrades over time in UV exposure; explosive may become exposed

Countries in Service / Theaters Encountered

• Manufactured: Iran
• Encountered: Afghanistan (Northern Alliance frontlines -- hundreds removed by deminers), Iran (Iran-Iraq War legacy), Iraq
• Source: IMAS TN 09.30/05; The Monitor; CAT-UXO [B-2]

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YM-I-B / YM-I-S

designation: "YM-I-B / YM-I-S"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Defense Industries Organization (DIO)"
based_on: "YM-I with smoke/marking variant"
type: "AP blast (with smoke signaling capability)"
status: "In production"
source_rating: "C-3"

Specifications

• Same physical dimensions and explosive characteristics as YM-I
• YM-I-S variant incorporates a smoke signaling element for training/marking purposes
• YM-I-B is the standard production variant with minor casing changes from original YM-I

Forensic Indicators

• Same Farsi date stamps and DIO markings as YM-I
• Should be considered minimum-metal for detection purposes

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Same hazards as YM-I
• Smoke variant may contain additional pyrotechnic composition -- treat as dual-hazard

Theaters Encountered

• Afghanistan (date stamps 1999-2000), Iran

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Pedal Mine No. 4

designation: "Pedal Mine No. 4"
also_known_as: "No. 4 AP Mine"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Defense Industries Organization (DIO)"
based_on: "Israeli No. 4 mine design"
type: "AP blast"
status: "In production / exported"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure-actuated ("pedal" style)
• Mechanism: Direct pressure on top plate drives striker into detonator

Forensic Indicators of Iranian Manufacture

• DIO markings; Farsi script and date codes
• Listed in official DIO product catalog alongside YM-I

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Low-metal content complicates detection
• Simple mechanism but may be booby-trapped with anti-lift devices underneath

Countries in Service / Theaters Encountered

• Manufactured: Iran
• Encountered: Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda
• Source: HRW Landmine Monitor 1999; The Monitor; DIO catalog [B-2]

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YM-IV

designation: "YM-IV"
also_known_as: "Anti-Personnel Jumping Mine"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Defense Industries Organization (DIO) / Mindex"
type: "AP bounding fragmentation"
status: "In production / actively advertised for export (as of 2025)"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Removable fuze -- pressure and traction (tripwire) activated
• Mechanism: Fuze activation ignites propelling charge; mine body is launched ~50 cm into the air; body detonates at chest height producing omnidirectional fragmentation
• Dual activation: Pressure load 7-15 kg OR traction (pull) load 3-8 kg

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Bounding mine -- detonates at ~50 cm height for maximum lethality
• Removable fuze means mine body may be encountered separately from fuze -- both components are hazardous
• Cast-iron fragmentation is lethal to 25+ meters
• Tripwire attachment means area around mine is also hazardous

Countries in Service / Theaters Encountered

• Manufactured: Iran
• Encountered: Advertised for international export; specific theater data limited in OSINT
• Source: Mindex (Iranian Defense Export Center); CAT-UXO; The Monitor [B-2]

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YM-IV-F

designation: "YM-IV-F"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "AP bounding fragmentation (fuzed variant)"
status: "In production"
source_rating: "C-3"

Specifications

• Variant of YM-IV with integrated fuze assembly
• Same operational characteristics as YM-IV

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M18-1

designation: "M18-1"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Defense Industries Organization (DIO)"
based_on: "US M18A1 Claymore"
type: "AP directional fragmentation"
status: "In production / exported to proxies"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Key Differences from US M18A1

• Flat face (NOT concave like the US original)
• Tripod legs (NOT scissor-type legs)
• Circular peepsight (NOT rectangular)
• Similar explosive fill to US M18A1 (~680 g C-4 equivalent)

Forensic Indicators of Iranian Manufacture

• Flat face is the primary visual differentiator from US M18A1
• Tripod legs instead of scissor legs
• Iranian markings in Farsi; some labeled "Claymore" in English for export

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Command-detonated -- look for command wires leading away from mine
• Tripwire variants function autonomously -- extreme caution in approach
• 700+ steel balls projected in 60-degree arc to 50+ meters

Countries in Service / Theaters Encountered

• Manufactured: Iran
• Encountered: Iraq (via Shia militias), Syria, Lebanon (Hezbollah)
• Source: ODIN/TRADOC; ARES [B-2]

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M18A2

designation: "M18A2"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Defense Industries Organization (DIO)"
based_on: "US M18A1 Claymore (significantly enlarged)"
type: "AP directional fragmentation"
status: "In production / exported"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Key Differences from M18-1

• Significantly LARGER body -- nearly 3x the explosive fill
• Flat face (same as M18-1)
• Tripod legs
• Circular peepsight
• Much greater lethal range due to increased charge

Forensic Indicators of Iranian Manufacture

• Size alone distinguishes it from US Claymore and Iranian M18-1
• Some specimens labeled "Claymore" in English for export branding
• Farsi markings and DIO lot codes

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Nearly 3x the explosive fill of standard Claymore -- significantly greater blast and fragmentation radius
• Treat danger zone as minimum 100 meters in the aim direction
• Command wire or tripwire initiated

Countries in Service / Theaters Encountered

• Manufactured: Iran
• Encountered: Syria (recovered by Ajnad al-Sham from pro-Assad forces near Aleppo, June 2016), Iraq, Lebanon
• Source: ARES (Armament Research Services) 2016 report [B-2]

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ANTI-TANK / ANTI-VEHICLE MINES

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YM-II

designation: "YM-II"
also_known_as: "YM-2"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Defense Industries Organization (DIO)"
based_on: "Italian SB-81 AT mine (Valsella Meccanotecnica)"
type: "AT blast"
status: "In production / exported"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure-actuated blast-resistant fuze
• Mechanism: Based on SB-81 pneumatic fuze system -- requires sustained vehicle-weight pressure

Forensic Indicators of Iranian Manufacture

• Farsi date stamps and DIO lot markings
• ABS plastic quality and color differ slightly from Italian SB-81 original
• Rectangular shape identical to SB-81 profile

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum-metal construction -- requires dual-sensor detection
• Blast-resistant fuze may survive nearby detonations
• 2 kg Comp B main charge is sufficient to destroy light armored vehicles and disable heavier vehicles

Countries in Service / Theaters Encountered

• Manufactured: Iran
• Encountered: Afghanistan, Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iran
• Source: bulletpicker.com; Wikipedia (cross-referenced); CAT-UXO [B-2]

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YM-III

designation: "YM-III"
also_known_as: "YM-3"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Defense Industries Organization (DIO)"
based_on: "Chinese Type 72 non-metallic AT mine"
type: "AT blast"
status: "In production / exported"
source_rating: "B-1"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Blast-resistant pressure fuze
• Mechanism: Requires gradual sustained application of vehicle-weight pressure (450-900 kg); designed to resist blast initiation

Forensic Indicators of Iranian Manufacture

• Farsi markings and DIO lot stamps
• ABS plastic case -- dimensional copy of Chinese Type 72
• Color: typically olive drab or sand

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: 5.7 kg Comp B -- will destroy any wheeled vehicle and severely damage tracked vehicles
• Minimum-metal construction -- extremely difficult to detect
• Blast-resistant fuze -- clearance by sympathetic detonation may fail; direct action required
• Large explosive content creates significant blast radius

Countries in Service / Theaters Encountered

• Manufactured: Iran
• Encountered: Iran-Iraq War legacy fields, Afghanistan, exported
• Source: bulletpicker.com; CAT-UXO; Wikipedia [B-1]

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NAVAL MINES

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SADAF-01

designation: "SADAF-01"
also_known_as: "Sadaf-1"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
based_on: "Soviet MYAM moored contact mine"
type: "Moored contact naval mine"
status: "In service with IRIN/IRGCN"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Chemical horn contact fuze -- detonates on contact with vessel hull
• Moored mine may break free and become drifting hazard
• Simple but effective -- primary Strait of Hormuz defense asset
• Used in Iran-Iraq War "Tanker War" (1984-1988); USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian M-08 mine in 1988

Theaters Encountered

• Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Iran-Iraq War (as "Al Mara" when captured by Iraq)
• Source: Military Periscope; Strauss Center; Covert Shores [B-2]

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SADAF-02

designation: "SADAF-02"
also_known_as: "Sadaf-2"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "Moored contact naval mine (anchored)"
status: "In service with IRIN/IRGCN"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

EOD Hazard Warnings

• 100 kg HE charge -- catastrophic to small/medium vessels

• Contact-fuzed -- detonates when struck by hull
• Soviet-derived design; simple and reliable
• May be deployed rapidly from small IRGCN fast boats in large numbers

Theaters Encountered

• Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf
• Source: CMANO database; MVRsimulation; Covert Shores [B-2]

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Maham-2

designation: "Maham-2"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "Bottom influence naval mine"
status: "In service with IRIN/IRGCN"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: 320 kg warhead -- catastrophic to any vessel
• Bottom mine -- rests on seabed; difficult to detect by sonar
• Dual-influence (acoustic + magnetic) fuzing -- may trigger on vessel signature without contact
• MCM operations require mine-hunting sonar and remote neutralization

Theaters Encountered

• Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf
• Source: Covert Shores; Strauss Center [B-2]

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Maham-3

designation: "Maham-3"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "Moored influence naval mine"
status: "In service with IRIN/IRGCN"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Key Differences from SADAF Series

• Does NOT require physical contact -- influence-fuzed
• Magnetic and acoustic sensors detect target signature at ~3 meters
• More modern and harder to sweep than contact-horn mines

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Influence-fuzed -- may detonate when MCM vessel approaches if degaussing is insufficient
• Moored mine that can target without contact
• Requires remote MCM neutralization

Theaters Encountered

• Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf
• Source: Mindex; Covert Shores [B-2]

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Maham-7

designation: "Maham-7"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "Bottom influence mine (limpet-class)"
status: "In service"
source_rating: "C-2"

Specifications

Key Features

• GRP body with special form factor designed to deviate sonar waves from minesweepers -- detection by sonar is extremely difficult
• Low weight allows mine-laying ships to carry more mines
• Multi-sensor (acoustic + 3-axis magnetic) influence fuzing
• Can be deployed in very shallow littoral waters

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Specifically designed to defeat minesweeping sonar -- requires visual/diver detection
• Multi-sensor influence fuze may trigger on diver equipment magnetic signature
• Shallow-water capability means littoral/amphibious landing zones are vulnerable

Theaters Encountered

• Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz
• Source: CAT-UXO; Mindex [C-2]

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EM-52

designation: "EM-52"
also_known_as: "Rocket-Propelled Rising Mine"
country_of_origin: "China (imported by Iran)"
original_designation: "Te-1 / Specialized-1 (PLA Navy)"
type: "Bottom-laid rocket-propelled rising mine"
status: "In service with IRIN/IRGCN"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREME HAZARD: Rocket-propelled -- mine launches from seabed toward target
• 272 kg warhead at impact velocity -- catastrophic to any vessel including warships
• Multi-influence sensor suite makes sweeping extremely difficult
• Deployed at depths up to 200 m -- beyond reach of most diver-based MCM
• Requires remote/autonomous MCM systems for neutralization

Theaters Encountered

• Strait of Hormuz (persistent reports of Iranian stockpile)
• Source: Military Periscope; ODIN/TRADOC; Covert Shores; USNI [B-2]

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Iranian Limpet Mine

designation: "Iranian Limpet Mine"
also_known_as: "IRGCN Limpet Device"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
manufacturer: "Research company affiliated with IRGC"
type: "Diver-placed magnetic limpet mine"
status: "Active -- used in 2019 Gulf of Oman attacks"
source_rating: "B-1"

Specifications

Notable Incidents

• June 13, 2019: Two tankers attacked in Gulf of Oman (M/T Kokuka Courageous, Front Altair) using limpet mines
• US Navy MH-60R helicopter photographed IRGCN personnel removing an unexploded limpet mine from Kokuka Courageous hull
• May 12, 2019: Four tankers attacked near Fujairah, UAE
• 2020-2026: Multiple incidents in Red Sea attributed to Houthi use of Iranian-supplied limpet devices

Forensic Indicators of Iranian Manufacture

• Conical shape distinctive from Western limpet mine designs
• Specimens displayed by CENTCOM showed IRGC-affiliated manufacturer markings
• Magnetic attachment method consistent with IRGC diver training doctrine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Timer-fuzed -- unknown time remaining on any discovered device
• Attached to hull below waterline -- requires underwater EOD (UWIED) approach
• Magnetic attachment -- may shift or detach unpredictably
• Secondary device possibility -- always search for additional devices after one found
• IRGCN doctrine involves small-boat delivery; look for IRGCN fast-boat activity as indicator

Countermeasures

• Enhanced hull surveillance in threat areas
• Underwater hull inspection before and after transit of Strait of Hormuz
• Diver-based detection and EOD render-safe
• Degaussing does NOT prevent nail-attached variants

Theaters Encountered

• Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea (Houthi proxy use), Persian Gulf
• Source: CENTCOM briefings; USNI News; Reuters; AP [B-1]

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EXPLOSIVELY FORMED PENETRATORS (EFPs)

CONTEXT: Iranian EFPs killed at least 196 US troops and wounded hundreds more in Iraq (2005-2011). Total Iranian IED-linked coalition deaths estimated at 500-603 across Iraq and Afghanistan. EFPs were manufactured primarily in Iran and supplied via IRGC Quds Force to Shia militia groups including Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups, Kata'ib Hezbollah, and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). EFP technology was subsequently transferred to Hezbollah (Lebanon), Houthis (Yemen), and other proxies. Source: Washington Post, Defense One, Military Times [B-1]

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Standard EFP

designation: "Standard EFP (Single Copper Liner)"
also_known_as: "Explosively Formed Penetrator, Self-Forging Fragment (SFF)"
country_of_origin: "Iran (factory-produced) / Iraq (locally assembled from Iranian components)"
type: "Shaped charge IED -- armor-defeating"
status: "Active across multiple theaters"
source_rating: "B-1"

Specifications

Construction Details

• Steel or PVC casing holds the explosive charge
• Concave copper disc (liner) is seated at the forward end of the cylinder
• Rear end contains detonator and firing circuit
• On detonation, explosive force collapses copper disc into a hyper-velocity "slug" (tadpole-shaped penetrator)
• Slug punches through multiple layers of armor, ceramic plating, and vehicle structure
• Entry and exit holes resemble large-caliber gunshot wounds (~4 inches / 100 mm)

Trigger Mechanisms (see specific entries below)

• Passive Infrared (PIR) sensor
• Command wire (electrical)
• Radio-controlled (RCIED)
• IR beam-break
• Magnetic influence

Forensic Indicators of Iranian Manufacture

• Copper discs: Precision-machined with 140-degree curvature; quality exceeds local Iraqi manufacturing capability; discs found in Baghdad machine shops were 5-inch diameter, stamped as part of ongoing production orders
• Circuit boards: Identical PCB designs traced across Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen by Conflict Armament Research -- confirmed common Iranian origin
• C-4/PE-4 explosive: Chemical analysis traceable to Iranian production lots
• Component serialization: Electronic components (PIR sensors, timers) traceable to Iranian commercial supply chains
• Machining precision: Steel casings show lathe marks consistent with Iranian factory production, not field-expedient construction

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREME HAZARD: EFP penetrates up-armored HMMWV, MRAP, and even M1 Abrams side armor
• Copper slug maintains coherence for 100+ meters -- standoff does NOT guarantee safety
• Secondary EFPs common -- always search for additional devices
• Anti-handling / anti-tamper devices frequently incorporated
• Daisy-chained EFPs targeting lead and trail vehicles in convoy
• Concealed in roadside debris, concrete barriers, animal carcasses, piles of refuse

Countermeasures

• Rhino Passive Infrared Defeat System: Heat decoy on telescoping pole mounted to vehicle front; premature-detonates PIR-triggered EFPs (16,000+ deployed; ~$1,800/unit)
• CREW/Duke Jammer: Vehicle-mounted RF jammer defeats RCIED triggers
• Route clearance: Engineer route clearance teams with mine rollers and interrogation arms
• Armor: MRAP V-hull design deflects underbody blast (but EFPs defeat side armor)
• Tactical: Vary routes, timing, speeds; avoid patterns; use offset/alternate routes

Countries in Service / Theaters Encountered

• Manufactured: Iran (factory), Iraq (assembly from Iranian kits)
• Encountered: Iraq (2004-2017+), Afghanistan, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon
• Source: Washington Post; CENTCOM; CAR; DVIDSHUB [B-1]

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Multi-Array EFP

designation: "Multi-Array EFP (MEFP)"
also_known_as: "Multiple Explosively Formed Penetrator"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "Multi-projectile shaped charge IED"
status: "Active"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Key Differences from Standard EFP

• Produces multiple smaller penetrators instead of single large slug
• Wider area of effect -- harder to defeat with single-point armor
• Some variants use multiple detonators fired in sequence to shape different waveform patterns producing either long-rod penetrators, aerodynamic slugs, or multiple fragments

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Multiple penetrators increase probability of crew compartment penetration
• Wider dispersion pattern means larger danger zone
• Same concealment and triggering methods as standard EFP

Theaters Encountered

• Iraq (2006+), Yemen
• Source: Wikipedia (EFP article, cross-referenced); Military Wiki [B-2]

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PIR-Triggered EFP

designation: "PIR-Triggered EFP"
also_known_as: "Passive Infrared EFP"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "Autonomously triggered shaped charge IED"
status: "Active"
source_rating: "B-1"

Specifications

Operational Characteristics

• PIR sensor detects heat and motion signature of approaching vehicle
• Functions like a garage door safety beam -- detects body heat differential against ambient background
• Extremely accurate -- detonates at optimal standoff distance as target passes
• Can be emplaced and left indefinitely -- "fire and forget" weapon
• Combination of EFP lethality and PIR accuracy made this the deadliest single IED variant in Iraq

Countermeasures

• Rhino II Device: Heat source on telescoping pole premature-detonates PIR-triggered EFPs ahead of vehicle
• NOTE: By 2010, insurgents adapted by using RF energy from coalition jammers (instead of PIR) to trigger EFPs -- countermeasure arms race

Forensic Indicators

• PIR sensor units traceable to Iranian commercial electronics supply
• Identical PIR sensor models found across Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen (CAR tracing)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREME HAZARD: Autonomous triggering -- EFP may fire on approaching EOD personnel
• Approach from oblique angle relative to EFP aim direction
• PIR sensor has limited field of view -- identify aim direction before approach
• Disable PIR sensor before approaching main charge if possible

Theaters Encountered

• Iraq (most lethal variant, 2005-2011+), Yemen, Bahrain
• Source: CENTCOM; US Patent 20100175573; DSIAC; CAR [B-1]

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Command-Wire EFP

designation: "Command-Wire EFP (CWIED-EFP)"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "Operator-initiated shaped charge IED"
status: "Active"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

EOD Hazard Warnings

• NOT defeated by electronic jamming -- command wire is hardwired
• Operator may be observing from concealed position -- security element critical
• Trace command wire to identify firing point
• Wire may be buried or concealed in existing infrastructure (culverts, curbs)

Countermeasures

• Visual detection of command wire during route clearance
• Disruption of operator observation positions
• Counter-sniper/counter-observer operations

Theaters Encountered

• Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen
• Source: Wikipedia (IED article); CAT-UXO [B-2]

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IR Beam-Break Triggered EFP

designation: "IR Beam-Break EFP"
country_of_origin: "Iran (technology transfer via Hezbollah)"
type: "Autonomously triggered shaped charge IED"
status: "Active"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Operational Characteristics

• British intelligence confirmed Iran and Hezbollah taught Iraqi fighters this technique
• IR beam is invisible to naked eye
• Emitter and receiver can be concealed in roadside debris on opposite sides of road
• Triggers only when beam is broken by vehicle -- highly selective

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Cannot be defeated by Rhino (heat decoy) or CREW (RF jammer)
• Requires visual detection of emitter/receiver components
• Beam-break is instantaneous -- no warning

Theaters Encountered

• Iraq (Shia militia areas, 2005+), Lebanon
• Source: UK government statements; Seattle Times; Britannica [B-2]

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Magnetic Influence EFP

designation: "Magnetic Influence EFP"
country_of_origin: "Iran"
type: "Magnetically triggered shaped charge IED"
status: "Active"
source_rating: "C-2"

Specifications

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Magnetic trigger may activate on any ferrous object -- including EOD tools
• Approach with minimum ferrous equipment
• "Sticky bombs" (magnetically attached IEDs) use same magnetic trigger principle

Theaters Encountered

• Iraq, Afghanistan
• Source: Britannica; Wikipedia [C-2]

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IMPROVISED ROCKET-ASSISTED MUNITIONS (IRAM)

CONTEXT: IRAMs are improvised weapons combining large explosive warheads (typically propane tanks) with rocket motors for propulsion. Primarily used by Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq against US Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and Combat Outposts (COPs). Also known as "lob bombs" or "flying IEDs." Source: Long War Journal; ARES; VOA [B-2]

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Standard IRAM

designation: "Standard IRAM (107mm Booster)"
also_known_as: "Lob bomb, Flying IED"
country_of_origin: "Iraq (locally assembled) with Iranian rocket components"
type: "Improvised rocket-assisted munition"
status: "Active"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Construction

• Propane or fuel tank drained of original contents
• Tank filled with HE (commonly ammonium nitrate/fuel oil or military-grade explosive)
• Scrap metal, ball bearings, and nails packed as fragmentation
• 107 mm rocket motor lashed/welded to base of tank
• Multiple IRAMs loaded on truck bed on improvised rail launchers
• Fired by remote control (RC) or timer

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Unexploded IRAMs are extremely unstable -- large HE fill with improvised fuzing
• Propane tank may still contain residual fuel vapors -- dual explosive/fire hazard
• Impact fuze may be armed but unfired -- vibration/movement hazard
• Large fragmentation radius (100+ m) from shrapnel fill

Countermeasures

• C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar) systems
• FOB perimeter observation and early warning
• Counter-battery radar
• Pre-emptive strikes on launch sites

Theaters Encountered

• Iraq (Baghdad, southern Iraq -- Shia militia areas, 2008-2011+)
• Source: Long War Journal; Washington Post; VOA [B-2]

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Falaq-1 Based IRAM

designation: "Falaq-1 Based IRAM (240mm)"
country_of_origin: "Iran (Falaq-1 motor) / Iraq (improvised warhead)"
type: "IRAM with Iranian military rocket motor"
booster: "Falaq-1 (240 mm)"
status: "Active"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Theaters Encountered

• Iraq (PMF/militia use against ISIS post-2014), Syria
• Source: ARES Research Report No. 2 [B-2]

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Falaq-2 Based IRAM

designation: "Falaq-2 Based IRAM (333mm)"
country_of_origin: "Iran (Falaq-2 motor) / Iraq (improvised warhead)"
type: "IRAM with Iranian military rocket motor"
booster: "Falaq-2 (333 mm)"
status: "Active"
source_rating: "B-2"

Specifications

Key Users

• Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) -- photos documented AAH with Falaq-2 rockets and improvised launchers
• Kata'ib Hezbollah
• Other PMF factions

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Same as standard IRAM plus: Falaq-2 rocket motor contains significant propellant -- dual explosive hazard
• Unexpended rocket motors are extremely dangerous
• 333 mm motor with improvised warhead creates massive blast

Theaters Encountered

• Iraq (post-2011), Syria
• Source: ARES (Armament Research Services) field report [B-2]

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PROXY IED PATTERNS BY THEATER

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Iraq IEDs

designation: "Iraq -- Iranian-Supplied/Influenced IED Patterns"
period: "2003-present"
primary_threat: "EFP (underbody and roadside)"
proxy_groups: "JAM Special Groups, Kata'ib Hezbollah, AAH, Badr Organization"
source_rating: "B-1"

Primary IED Types Encountered

1. Roadside EFP (most lethal): Concealed in roadside debris, aimed at vehicle side armor; PIR, command-wire, or RCIED triggered
2. Underbody EFP: Buried in road surface; aimed upward into vehicle belly; pressure-plate or magnetic trigger
3. Shaped Charge IED: Conventional copper-lined shaped charge (smaller than EFP); used against lighter vehicles
4. RCIED: Radio-controlled IED using cell phone, cordless phone, or pager as trigger; defeated by CREW jamming
5. CWIED: Command-wire IED; immune to electronic jamming
6. VBIED: Vehicle-borne IED; used by both Sunni and Shia groups
7. IRAM: Rocket-propelled warheads against FOBs (see IRAM section)

Iranian Supply Chain Indicators

• EFP components (copper discs, circuit boards) entering Iraq via Amarah, Meran border crossing, and Basra area
• IRGC Quds Force operatives providing training and logistics
• CD-ROMs with EFP construction instructions circulated among bombmakers
• Identical components traced to Iranian commercial electronics supply chains

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Afghanistan IEDs

designation: "Afghanistan -- Iranian-Influenced IED Patterns"
period: "2001-2021"
primary_threat: "Pressure-plate IED / VOIED"
proxy_influence: "Limited direct Iranian EFP supply; some technology transfer"
source_rating: "B-2"

Primary IED Types Encountered

1. Pressure-Plate IED (PPIED): Victim-operated; wooden or plastic pressure plates with metal contacts; buried in road or path; detonates under foot or vehicle pressure
2. VOIED (Victim-Operated IED): Tripwire, spring-loaded release, push/pull/tilt mechanisms
3. RCIED: Cell phone, cordless phone, or two-way radio triggered
4. EFP: Limited but increasing presence -- same Iranian design as Iraq variants; confirmed by investigators as "precisely the configuration used by Iranian-backed networks in Lebanon, Iraq"
5. Magnetically Attached IED ("Sticky Bomb"): Magnetic mount attached to vehicle underside

Iranian Connection

• At least 500 US deaths in Iraq AND Afghanistan linked to Iran (Military Times)
• EFP technology transfer confirmed but less prevalent than in Iraq
• Iranian-manufactured YM-I mines encountered in large numbers on former Northern Alliance frontlines

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Yemen/Houthi IEDs

designation: "Yemen -- Houthi Iranian-Supplied IED Patterns"
period: "2015-present"
primary_threat: "WBIED / Sea mines / EFP / Landmines"
proxy_group: "Ansar Allah (Houthis)"
source_rating: "B-1"

Primary IED Types Encountered

1. Waterborne IED (WBIED) / Explosive Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV):

   • Modified 10 m patrol boats (originally UAE-donated to Yemeni coast guard, seized by Houthis)
   • Retrofitted with hydraulic auto-pilot and improvised throttle control
   • Remote-controlled via artisanal control box
   • Warhead: Soviet-era anti-shipping missile warhead with improvised pressure switches and detonator
   • Conversion kits supplied by Iran; IRGC has been iterating explosive boats since Iran-Iraq War
   • Known variants include "Blowfish" type USV

2. EFP (Roadside):

   • Same design, construction, and materials as Iraqi EFPs -- confirmed identical by CAR investigators
   • Electronic components traced to common Iranian origin (same as Bahrain and Jihan 1 seizure)
   • Increasingly used against Saudi-led coalition armored vehicles

3. Improvised Landmines:

   • Mass-produced using Iranian components
   • Standardized production -- not purely improvised; semi-industrial manufacturing
   • Significant portion of west coast mines are improvised but domestically produced

4. Sea Mines:

   • Iranian-supplied moored and bottom mines deployed in Red Sea
   • SADAF-type contact mines and influence mines encountered

Forensic Evidence of Iranian Supply

• CAR: Identical circuit boards in Houthi EFPs and Bahraini militant bombs (2017) -- "exactly the same in design, construction, and materials employed"
• Iranian arms smuggling vessel Jihan 1 intercepted (January 2013) carrying Iranian C-4, SAMs, and EFP components
• UN investigations confirmed Iran provided weapons, IEDs, drones, missiles, and WBIED conversion technology

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Syria IEDs

designation: "Syria -- Iranian-Backed Ordnance Patterns"
period: "2011-present"
primary_threat: "Directional mines / VBIED / Barrel bombs (regime)"
proxy_groups: "Hezbollah, IRGC advisors, NDF, various Shia militias"
source_rating: "B-2"

Primary Ordnance Types Encountered

1. Iranian Directional AP Mines (M18A2):

   • Recovered near Aleppo (June 2016) from pro-Assad/Iranian-backed positions
   • ARES confirmed Iranian manufacture

2. Barrel Bombs (Assad Regime -- Iranian-supported):

   • Improvised aerial munitions dropped from helicopters
   • Construction: Metal barrel or pipe filled with explosives (fertilizer/diesel or military HE), scrap metal, nails, bolts
   • Later variants: 454-1,000+ kg with impact fuzes and stabilizing fins
   • Cost: ~$200-300 each
   • Produced at facilities including Qasioun Mountain, Damascus
   • Some contain chemical agents (chlorine)

3. VBIED:

   • Used by multiple factions; Iranian-backed groups primarily use conventional VBIED tactics
   • Vehicle packed with HE and fragmentation

4. EFP:

   • Same Iranian-origin EFP design encountered in Hezbollah and IRGC-supported positions

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IRANIAN COMPONENTS AND FORENSIC INDICATORS

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Iranian Components

designation: "Iranian IED Component Identification"
purpose: "Forensic indicators linking IED components to Iranian manufacture/supply"
source_rating: "B-1"

Electronic Triggering Components

Explosive Components

Manufacturing Indicators

Key Forensic Reports

• Conflict Armament Research (CAR): "Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen" -- confirmed identical circuit boards across Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen
• CAR: "Anatomy of a Drone Boat" -- documented WBIED conversion technology from Iran
• UK Government (October 2005): Charged Iran with supplying shaped-charge IED technology and training
• CENTCOM Briefings (2007): Displayed seized Iranian EFP components with manufacturing evidence
• UN Panel of Experts on Yemen: Confirmed Iranian weapons, IED, drone, and WBIED technology transfers

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APPENDIX: COUNTERMEASURES SUMMARY

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SOURCES

• Washington Post: Soleimani's Quds Force Saturated Iraq with EFPs [B-1]
• Defense One: How Many US Troops Were Killed by Iranian IEDs [B-2]
• Military Times: Iran Linked to Deaths of 500 US Troops [B-2]
• Military Times: Trail of Evidence Leads to Iran [B-2]
• ARES: Iranian Directional AP Mines in Syria [B-2]
• ARES: Falaq-2 Based IRAM in Iraq [B-2]
• Conflict Armament Research: Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen [B-1]
• Conflict Armament Research: Anatomy of a Drone Boat [B-1]
• The Defense Post: Houthis Mass-Produced Mines and IEDs Using Iranian Components [B-2]
• Washington Institute: Defeating Iran's Roadside Bombs in Yemen [B-2]
• Covert Shores: Guide to Iran's Naval Mines [B-2]
• Covert Shores: Houthi Blowfish USV Guide [B-2]
• Strauss Center: Strait of Hormuz Mines [B-2]
• Mindex (Iranian Defense Export): Bounding Mines [A-3]
• Mindex: Maham 7 [A-3]
• ODIN/TRADOC: M18-1 Iranian AP Mine [A-2]
• ODIN/TRADOC: EM-52 Chinese Rocket Mine [A-2]
• CAT-UXO: YM-1 Landmine [B-2]
• CAT-UXO: YM-3 Landmine [B-2]
• CAT-UXO: YM-4 Landmine [B-2]
• bulletpicker.com: YM-III [B-2]
• bulletpicker.com: YM-II [B-2]
• Wikipedia: Explosively Formed Penetrator [C-2]
• Wikipedia: Lob Bomb [C-2]
• Wikipedia: Rhino PIR Defeat System [C-2]
• Wikipedia: June 2019 Gulf of Oman Incident [C-2]
• USNI: Mine the Gap -- Iranians and the Strait of Hormuz [B-2]
• Long War Journal: Mahdi Army Uses Flying IEDs [B-2]
• HRW: Landmine Monitor 1999 -- Iran [B-2]
• The Monitor: Iran Mine Ban Policy [B-2]
• IMAS: YM-1(B) Technical Note 09.30/05 [A-2]
• CENTCOM: IRGC Limpet Mine Imagery (2019) [B-1]
• Stimson Center: Five Things to Know About Iranian Minelaying [B-2]