Rocket Artillery Ordnance Database

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT Created: 2026-03-28 Purpose: Comprehensive UXO reference for rocket artillery projectiles encountered in conflict zones, with emphasis on systems used in Ukraine, Syria, and global export markets.

SAFETY WARNING: This document is for IDENTIFICATION and AWARENESS only. It does NOT replace official EOD technical publications (60-series, NAVEODFLTDIV, JODIC). Always refer to current TMs for render-safe procedures. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher.

Source Ratings per SOURCE_RATING.md:

• CAT-UXO, ARES, GICHD, Fenix Insight/METIS: B-2 (Usually Reliable, Probably True)
• Wikipedia, GlobalSecurity, FAS: C-2 (Fairly Reliable, Probably True)
• Manufacturer specs (Splav, Lockheed Martin): A-1 (Completely Reliable, Confirmed)
• Jane's/IHS, Weaponsystems.net: B-2

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

122mm BM-21 Grad Family

1. 9M22U HE-Frag
2. 9M22S Incendiary
3. 9M28K Mine-Laying (AT)
4. 9M218 Cargo (3B30 DPICM)
5. 9M521 Improved HE-Frag
6. 9M522 Improved HE-Frag (Parachute)
7. Chinese Type 81/90 122mm Rockets

220mm BM-27 Uragan Family

1. 9M27F HE-Frag
2. 9M27K Cargo (9N210)
3. 9M27K2 Mine-Laying (PFM-1S)
4. 9M27K3 Mine-Laying (PTM-1)
5. 9M27S Incendiary

300mm BM-30 Smerch / Tornado-S Family

1. 9M55F HE-Frag
2. 9M55K Cargo (9N235)
3. 9M55K1 Cargo (SPBE-D)
4. 9M55K4 Mine-Laying (PTM-3)
5. 9M55K5 Cargo (3B30 DPICM)
6. 9M55S Thermobaric/Incendiary
7. 9M528/9M542/9M544 Guided (Tornado-S)

220mm TOS-1/TOS-1A

1. TOS-1A Thermobaric Rockets

Western (NATO / Ukraine Theater)

1. M26 DPICM (M77 Submunitions)
2. M30/M30A1 GMLRS
3. M31 GMLRS Unitary
4. MGM-140 ATACMS (M39/M57)

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122mm BM-21 GRAD FAMILY

System: 9K51 Grad -- 40-tube launcher on Ural-375D/Ural-4320 truck chassis Caliber: 122 mm Launcher config: 4 rows x 10 tubes (square cross-section tube bundle) In service: 1963-present Operators: 65+ countries worldwide. Produced/cloned by Russia, China, Egypt, Iran, DPRK, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and others. Combat use: Sino-Soviet border (1969), Vietnam, Afghanistan (Soviet), Iran-Iraq War, Chechnya, Libya, Syria, Donbas (2014+), Ukraine (2022+), and dozens of other conflicts.

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<a name="9m22u-he-frag"></a>

1. 9M22U HE-Frag

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Motor and Propulsion

Warhead

Fuze

Fin Assembly

• Type: Folding fins -- 4 curved wrap-around blades stowed around motor body
• Deployment: Spring-loaded; deploy upon exiting launch tube
• Cant angle: ~1 degree to longitudinal axis (induces spin for stability)
• Material: Steel stampings

Color Coding and Markings

• Warhead: Light gray or dark gray paint
• Motor section: Light gray or silver-gray paint
• Markings: Black stencil -- GRAU index, lot number, year of manufacture
• Notable: Red-stamped symbol "9" on forward portion of motor body
• Soviet/Russian stencil convention: Cyrillic text with numeric lot codes

Dud Behavior

• Impact dud: Rocket may bury nose-first in soft soil with motor tube protruding at angle
• Fuze state: MRV-U contact fuze may be armed but failed to function -- EXTREMELY SENSITIVE
• Motor debris: Spent motor sections separate from warhead area; motor tube fragments found in impact zone
• Shallow angle impact: May skip/ricochet on hard surfaces; warhead can break away from motor
• Typical dud rate: ~2-5% for unitary HE rockets depending on age/storage

EOD Hazards

1. Fuze sensitivity: Armed MRV-U fuze is impact-sensitive -- DO NOT HANDLE
2. Rocket motor: Residual propellant may be present; fire/deflagration hazard
3. Fragmentation: If warhead detonates, 3,950+ fragments with lethal radius ~30 m
4. Buried rockets: Nose-down impact may conceal warhead underground; motor tube visible above surface is NOT the dangerous end but indicates buried warhead below
5. Electric fuze: Susceptible to RF/EMI-induced initiation

Countries in Service

Russia, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, China (clones), Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, DRC, Egypt (local production), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia, Iran (clones), Iraq, Israel (captured), Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, DPRK (clones), Pakistan, Peru, Poland (WR-40 Langusta), Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Source: [B-2] Wikipedia BM-21 Grad; [B-2] Military Balance (IISS); [C-2] Bulletpicker.com; [B-2] GICHD Characterisation Study

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<a name="9m22s-incendiary"></a>

2. 9M22S Incendiary

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Warhead

Fuze

Motor and Fins

• Same motor assembly as 9M22U (solid-fuel, 7-orifice nozzle block)
• Same folding fin assembly (4 wrap-around blades, 1-degree cant)

Color Coding and Markings

• Body color: Gray/olive with incendiary designation markings
• Markings: Cyrillic stencil with "9M22S" designation, lot/year codes
• Visual distinction from HE: Slightly shorter overall length than 9M22U; marking designator is key differentiator

Dud Behavior

• Unexpelled elements: If fuze malfunctions, complete warhead with 180 incendiary elements may impact intact
• Scattered elements: Individual magnesium cups may fail to ignite -- FIRE HAZARD if disturbed
• Motor section: Same hazards as 9M22U

EOD Hazards

1. Fire hazard: Thermite/magnesium elements burn at extremely high temperature (~2,200C); cannot be extinguished with water
2. Toxic fumes: Magnesium/thermite combustion produces toxic metal oxide fumes
3. Unexpelled payload: Intact warhead contains 180 incendiary elements that may function if disturbed
4. White phosphorus confusion: NOT WP -- these are magnesium/thermite but present similar burn hazards

Combat Use

• Documented in eastern Ukraine (2014-2015 Donbas conflict) per ARES
• Documented in Ukraine (2022+) per ARES
• Used by Syrian Arab Army

Source: [B-2] ARES (armamentresearch.com); [B-2] Missilery.info; [C-2] CAT-UXO

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<a name="9m28k-mine-laying"></a>

3. 9M28K Mine-Laying (AT)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Warhead and Submunitions

NOTE: The 9M28K carries AT mines. The PFM-1 anti-personnel mine is associated with the 220mm 9M27K2/K3 rockets of the Uragan system, NOT the 122mm Grad. Some sources conflate these. The 122mm Grad's mine-laying capability is primarily anti-tank.

Fuze

• Time fuze for warhead ejection at predetermined point on trajectory

Visual ID vs HE Variants

• Longer overall length (3.04 m vs 2.87 m for 9M22U) -- noticeably longer warhead section
• Lighter total weight than HE despite longer body (57.7 kg vs 66.6 kg)
• Warhead section: Cylindrical cassette section forward of motor; may show circumferential seam where warhead separates

Dud Behavior

• Intact cargo warhead: If ejection charge fails, entire warhead with mines impacts ground -- mines may be armed or unarmed
• Partially expelled mines: Some mines may be ejected while others remain in warhead casing
• Individual mine duds: Scattered AT mines that fail to arm or with failed self-destruct mechanisms
• Motor debris: Spent motor section found separately from mine field area

EOD Hazards

1. Live mines on surface: Primary hazard is scattered AT mines -- do NOT approach mine field on foot
2. Partially ejected payload: Cargo section with mines partially expelled is EXTREMELY DANGEROUS
3. Motor propellant: Residual solid propellant fire/deflagration hazard
4. Self-destruct timer: Mines may have active self-destruct mechanisms -- time-sensitive hazard

Source: [C-2] Wikipedia BM-21; [C-2] GlobalSecurity; [B-2] FAS

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<a name="9m218-cargo"></a>

4. 9M218 Cargo (3B30 DPICM)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Submunition Payload -- 3B30 DPICM

Dispersal Mechanism

• Time fuze ejects warhead section at preset point
• Expelling charge pushes submunitions out of cassette
• Submunitions scatter over ~200 m area
• Each submunition has ribbon/fin stabilizer for nose-down orientation

Dud Behavior

• Submunition dud rate: DPICM submunitions historically have 2-10% dud rates
• 3B30 self-destruct: 200-second timer provides backup -- but self-destruct mechanisms have their own failure rate
• Intact cargo section: Failed ejection leaves 45 live submunitions in warhead casing
• Surface duds: Small 43mm diameter submunitions are difficult to see in vegetation/debris

EOD Hazards

1. DPICM submunition field: Primary hazard -- area contaminated with armed 3B30 submunitions
2. Dud submunitions: Impact fuze may be armed but failed -- HAIR-TRIGGER SENSITIVE
3. Self-destruct uncertainty: 200-second timer may or may not have functioned
4. Shaped charge jet: Even small 43mm submunition can penetrate light armor and is lethal to personnel
5. Partial ejection: Cargo warhead with some submunitions still inside is MAXIMUM HAZARD

Combat Use

• Documented in Ukraine (2022+) per ARES
• 3B30 submunitions confirmed by ARES field documentation

Source: [B-2] ARES (armamentresearch.com); [B-2] CAT-UXO; [C-2] GICHD Ukraine Guide

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<a name="9m521-improved-he-frag"></a>

5. 9M521 Improved HE-Frag

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Warhead

Motor and Propulsion

Fin Assembly

• Same folding wrap-around fin design as 9M22 series
• 4 curved blades stowed around motor body

Visual ID

• Same overall length as 9M22U (2.87 m) -- cannot distinguish by length alone
• Key identifier: Markings -- "9M521" stencil designation
• Motor section: May show differences in nozzle configuration vs older 9M22 motors

Dud Behavior

• Similar to 9M22U -- nose-down impact with motor tube visible
• Contact fuze may be armed but unfunctioned

EOD Hazards

• Same general hazards as 9M22U
• Larger warhead (21 kg vs 18.4 kg) means greater blast/frag effects
• Modern manufacture may mean more reliable fuze -- but NEVER assume safe

Source: [B-2] CAT-UXO; [C-2] Deagel; [B-2] METIS/Fenix Insight

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<a name="9m522-improved-he-frag"></a>

6. 9M522 Improved HE-Frag (Parachute-Retarded)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Warhead

Visual ID

• Longer than standard 9M22U (3.04 m vs 2.87 m)
• Heavier (70 kg vs 66.6 kg)
• Key identifier: Cargo-type warhead section appearance (warhead designed to separate)
• May show warhead separation joint/seam

Dud Behavior

• Separated warhead: Warhead section with parachute may be found separately from motor
• Motor section: Spent motor found along trajectory, forward of warhead impact point
• Parachute entanglement: Warhead may be suspended from vegetation/structures by parachute

EOD Hazards

1. Separated warhead on ground: 25 kg HE-Frag warhead with armed fuze -- maximum danger
2. Parachute-suspended warhead: May be hanging from trees/structures -- unstable, any movement could trigger fuze
3. Larger warhead: 25 kg vs 18.4 kg means significantly greater blast effect

Source: [C-2] Army Recognition; [B-2] GICHD

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<a name="chinese-type-81-90"></a>

7. Chinese Type 81/Type 90 122mm Rockets

Basic Data

Launcher Variants

Rocket Specifications

Color Coding and Markings

• Paint: Olive drab with black markings (Chinese convention)
• Markings: Simplified Chinese (Hanzi) characters; lot numbers in Arabic numerals
• Key difference from Russian: Chinese markings in Hanzi vs Cyrillic; olive drab vs gray paint scheme

Visual ID vs Russian Grad

• Externally near-identical to Soviet 9M22-series rockets
• Key differentiator: Markings language (Chinese vs Russian)
• Paint scheme: Olive drab (Chinese) vs gray (Russian)
• Chinese variants may have slightly different fin geometry but within same general envelope

Countries in Service (Chinese 122mm)

China, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Source: [C-2] GlobalSecurity; [C-2] FAS; [C-2] Army-Guide

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220mm BM-27 URAGAN FAMILY

System: 9K57 Uragan -- 16-tube launcher on ZIL-135LM 8x8 chassis Caliber: 220 mm Launcher config: 16 tubes (2 rows of 8) In service: 1977-present Operators: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Syria, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan Combat use: Afghanistan (Soviet), Chechnya, Georgia (2008), Syria, Ukraine (2014+, 2022+)

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<a name="9m27f-he-frag"></a>

8. 9M27F HE-Frag

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Motor and Propulsion

Warhead

Fin Assembly

• Type: 4 wrap-around folding fins
• Position: Tail (aft end)
• Deployment: Unfold upon exiting launch tube
• Material: Steel

Color Coding and Markings

• Body: Olive drab or gray-green
• Markings: Cyrillic stencil with GRAU index, lot, year
• Warhead section: May have colored band indicating HE fill

Dud Behavior

• Impact: Large 280 kg rocket creates significant crater even as dud
• Buried warhead: 100 kg warhead may bury deep in soft ground
• Motor debris: Large motor section (4+ meters) may be found along trajectory
• Fuze state: Contact fuze armed but unfunctioned -- heavy warhead may have partially buried itself

EOD Hazards

1. Large warhead: 100 kg warhead with 51.9 kg HE -- massive blast effect
2. Motor propellant: Large solid motor contains significant residual propellant
3. Size: Physical size makes movement/disposal extremely difficult
4. Impact crater: Dud may be at bottom of deep crater in soft soil

Source: [C-2] Wikipedia BM-27; [B-2] Weaponsystems.net; [C-2] Army-Guide

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<a name="9m27k-cargo"></a>

9. 9M27K Cargo (9N210 Fragmentation Submunitions)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Submunition Payload -- 9N210

Dispersal Mechanism

• Time fuze in rocket ejects warhead section
• Expelling charge disperses 30 submunitions
• Submunitions fin-stabilize for nose-down impact
• Coverage area: ~200 x 100 m per rocket

Dud Behavior

• 9N210 submunition duds: Cylindrical 65mm bodies found on surface, fins may be deployed or not
• Partial ejection: Some submunitions may remain in warhead casing
• Impact fuze state: 9E246 fuze is armed but sensitive -- DO NOT TOUCH
• Fin deployment: Deployed fins indicate submunition was properly ejected and fuze likely armed

EOD Hazards

1. Submunition field: 30 potential duds per rocket; full salvo of 16 rockets = up to 480 submunitions scattered
2. Small size: 65mm diameter submunitions easily concealed in grass/debris
3. Impact fuze sensitivity: 9E246/9E246M fuze designed for ground impact -- any disturbance may trigger
4. Polymer matrix fragments: Pre-formed fragments in the polymer matrix may shift if submunition is moved, potentially triggering fuze
5. No self-destruct: Older 9N210 variants may lack self-destruct mechanism -- PERSIST INDEFINITELY

Combat Use

• Extensively documented in Syria by ARES
• Extensively documented in Ukraine (2022+) by ARES
• 9N210 submunition duds are among the most commonly documented cluster munition remnants in Ukraine

Source: [B-2] ARES (armamentresearch.com); [B-2] Fenix Insight/METIS; [B-2] CAT-UXO

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<a name="9m27k2-mine-laying"></a>

10. 9M27K2 Mine-Laying (PFM-1S Anti-Personnel)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Submunition Payload -- PFM-1S Mines

Mine Field Coverage

• Salvo of 16 rockets: Disperses 4,992 PFM-1S mines
• Dispersion area: ~150 hectares per salvo
• Mine spacing: Average 8-9 meters between adjacent mines

Dispersal Mechanism

• On descending trajectory, head unit separates
• Pyrotechnic charge pushes mines out of hull
• Mines flutter to ground in butterfly-wing configuration
• Self-arming process begins 1-10 minutes after ground contact

Dud Behavior

• PFM-1S mine duds: Soft plastic body may be difficult to detect visually or with metal detectors
• Camouflage: Mines blend with leaf litter, especially in green/brown terrain
• Self-destruct failure: PFM-1S includes self-destruct but mechanism can fail
• Children hazard: Butterfly shape attracts children -- resembles toy

EOD Hazards

1. MASS CONTAMINATION: 312 mines per rocket, 4,992 per salvo -- AREA DENIAL
2. Minimal metal content: Plastic body defeats most metal detectors
3. Liquid explosive: VS-6D liquid explosive is extremely sensitive to pressure (~5 kg activation)
4. Self-destruct timer: Active timer means mine could function at any time -- TIME-CRITICAL
5. Near-zero detectability: PFM-1S designed specifically to be difficult to detect and clear
6. Banned by Ottawa Treaty: Use constitutes potential violation of international law

CRITICAL WARNING: PFM-1 / PFM-1S "butterfly" mines are among the most dangerous items in the current Ukraine UXO environment. Their small size, low metal content, and pressure-sensitive fuzing make them extremely hazardous to clearance personnel and civilians alike.

Source: [B-2] ARES; [C-2] Wikipedia BM-27; [B-2] Military-Review.com

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<a name="9m27k3-mine-laying"></a>

11. 9M27K3 Mine-Laying (PTM-1 Anti-Tank)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Submunition Payload -- PTM-1 Mines

Mine Field Coverage

• Salvo of 16 rockets: Disperses 384 PTM-1 AT mines
• Dispersion area: ~250 hectares per volley
• Purpose: Operational minefield emplacement to deny vehicle routes

Dud Behavior

• PTM-1 mine duds may lie on surface or partially buried
• Magnetic fuze is passive -- does not require contact, responds to magnetic influence
• Self-destruct mechanism may fail -- mines persist

EOD Hazards

1. Magnetic influence fuze: Responds to metallic objects passing nearby -- DO NOT APPROACH WITH METAL EQUIPMENT
2. Self-destruct timer: Active timer means mine could detonate at any time
3. Full-kill AT mine: Designed to defeat armored vehicles -- lethal to any vehicle or personnel
4. Area denial: Large dispersion area makes clearance extremely resource-intensive

Source: [B-2] Missilery.info; [C-2] Wikipedia BM-27; [C-2] Army-Technology

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<a name="9m27s-incendiary"></a>

12. 9M27S Incendiary

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Warhead

• Incendiary warhead with thermite/incendiary elements
• Similar concept to 9M22S but scaled up for 220mm platform
• Creates mass fire effects over target area

Motor and Fins

• Solid propellant rocket motor
• 4 wrap-around folding fins
• Same motor/fin assembly as other 9M27-series rockets

EOD Hazards

1. Incendiary elements: Thermite-type elements burn at extreme temperatures
2. Unexpelled payload: Intact warhead contains multiple incendiary elements
3. Fire spread: Designed to create area fires -- environmental fire hazard
4. Motor propellant: Standard solid motor propellant hazards

Source: [C-2] Wikipedia BM-27; [B-2] Weaponsystems.net

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300mm BM-30 SMERCH / TORNADO-S FAMILY

System: 9K58 Smerch / 9K515 Tornado-S -- 12-tube launcher on MAZ-543M 8x8 chassis Caliber: 300 mm Launcher config: 12 tubes (2 rows of 6) In service: 1989-present (Smerch); 2018-present (Tornado-S) Operators: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Algeria, India, Kuwait, UAE, Peru, Syria, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan Combat use: Chechnya, Syria, Ukraine (2022+)

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<a name="9m55f-he-frag"></a>

13. 9M55F HE-Frag

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Motor and Propulsion

Warhead

Fin Assembly

• Type: Folding fins with corrective nozzles
• Configuration: Cruciform fins at tail
• Feature: Gas-dynamic correction system for improved accuracy
• Wingspan: 600 mm

Dud Behavior

• Massive warhead: 258 kg warhead creates large crater even as dud
• Motor section: 5+ meter motor tube found separately along trajectory
• Deep burial: Heavy warhead can bury deeply in soft ground
• Warhead separation: Warhead and motor may be found hundreds of meters apart

EOD Hazards

1. MASSIVE warhead: 258 kg -- one of the largest rocket warheads in service
2. Motor section: Contains significant residual propellant
3. Deep burial: May require excavation to access
4. Correction motor charges: May contain unexpended pyrotechnic correction charges

Source: [C-2] Wikipedia BM-30; [B-2] Weaponsystems.net; [B-2] CAT-UXO

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<a name="9m55k-cargo"></a>

14. 9M55K Cargo (9N235 Fragmentation Submunitions)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Submunition Payload -- 9N235

Dispersal Mechanism

• Warhead section separates from motor during flight
• Expelling charge disperses 72 submunitions
• Each submunition deploys 6 fins for nose-down stabilization
• Coverage area: significant footprint per rocket

Dud Behavior

• 9N235 dud submunitions: Cylindrical 65mm bodies with deployed fins on surface
• Self-destruct timer: 110-second timer should destroy most duds -- but failure rate exists
• Partial ejection: Submunitions may remain in warhead casing
• Large-scale contamination: 72 submunitions per rocket, 12 rockets per salvo = 864 submunitions per salvo

EOD Hazards

1. MASSIVE submunition field: 864 submunitions per salvo; full battery = thousands of submunitions
2. 9E272 impact fuze: Armed on ejection, extremely sensitive
3. A-IX-10 explosive: RDX-based -- powerful and sensitive
4. Self-destruct uncertainty: 110-second timer may have failed -- submunition remains live indefinitely
5. Pre-formed fragments: Even partial detonation disperses 456 steel fragments at high velocity
6. Dual-threat fragments: Both large (anti-vehicle) and small (anti-personnel) fragments

Combat Use

• Documented in Syria per ARES
• Extensively documented in Ukraine (2022+)
• 9N235 submunitions are among the most commonly found cluster munition remnants in Ukraine

Source: [B-2] ARES; [B-2] CAT-UXO; [C-2] Wikipedia BM-30

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<a name="9m55k1-cargo"></a>

15. 9M55K1 Cargo (SPBE-D / Motiv-3M Top-Attack)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Submunition Payload -- SPBE-D / Motiv-3M

Dispersal Mechanism

• Warhead section separates from motor
• 5 submunitions ejected at altitude
• Each deploys parachute for controlled descent
• During descent, dual-mode sensor scans for target signatures
• Upon detecting target, fires EFP downward through top armor

Dud Behavior

• Unfired submunition: Parachute-suspended Motiv-3M may be found on ground or in vegetation
• Sensor still active: IR/MMW sensor may still be seeking targets -- APPROACH WITH EXTREME CAUTION
• Parachute entanglement: May be suspended from trees, power lines, structures
• EFP not fired: Contains 4.5 kg explosive charge ready to form penetrator

EOD Hazards

1. SMART MUNITION: Sensor-fuzed submunition may still be searching for targets
2. EFP hazard: 4.5 kg explosive charge forms armor-penetrating penetrator -- lethal to any vehicle or personnel
3. Dual-mode sensor: IR and MMW sensor may detect body heat or vehicle emissions -- approach-sensitive
4. Battery life: Sensor/electronics battery may still be active for extended period after deployment
5. Parachute suspended: Unstable position -- any movement may trigger function
6. 5 submunitions per rocket: Relatively low count but each is individually extremely dangerous

Combat Use

• Used in Ukraine (2022+); Motiv-3M submunitions documented in Avdiivka area per Defense Express

Source: [B-2] Missilery.info; [C-2] Wikipedia BM-30; [C-2] Defense Express

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<a name="9m55k4-mine-laying"></a>

16. 9M55K4 Mine-Laying (PTM-3 Anti-Tank)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Submunition Payload -- PTM-3 Mines

Purpose

• Remote minefield emplacement at ranges up to 70 km
• Targets enemy armored concentrations and assault routes
• When ripple-fired, creates deep minefields across wide frontage

Dud Behavior

• PTM-3 mines on surface or partially buried
• Magnetic influence fuze responds to metallic objects
• Self-destruct timer may have failed

EOD Hazards

1. Magnetic influence fuze: Responds to metallic objects -- approach with non-metallic equipment
2. Large AT mine: Designed to kill tanks -- lethal to all vehicles and personnel
3. Self-destruct uncertainty: Timer may not have functioned
4. Long-range delivery: Mines emplaced at 70 km -- may be found far from any apparent front line
5. 25 mines per rocket, 300 per salvo: Massive area contamination potential

Source: [B-2] Missilery.info; [B-2] Weaponsystems.net; [C-2] Defense-Update

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<a name="9m55k5-cargo"></a>

17. 9M55K5 Cargo (3B30 DPICM Submunitions)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Submunition Payload -- 3B30 DPICM

Scale of Contamination

• Per rocket: 646 submunitions
• Per salvo (12 rockets): 7,752 submunitions
• Per battery salvo: Tens of thousands of submunitions
• Dud rate: Even at 2% failure = ~155 duds per salvo; at 5% = ~387 duds per salvo

Dud Behavior

• Same as 3B30 submunitions from 9M218 (see entry above)
• Small 43mm diameter makes duds very difficult to detect
• 200-second self-destruct provides some clearance but has own failure rate

EOD Hazards

1. EXTREME SCALE: 646 submunitions per rocket creates massive contamination
2. Small size: 43mm DPICM submunitions nearly invisible in vegetation
3. Shaped charge: Even tiny submunition can penetrate armor and is lethal
4. Impact fuze sensitivity: Armed 3B30 is extremely sensitive to disturbance
5. Self-destruct failure: 200-second timer may not function -- duds persist
6. Identical submunition to 9M218: 3B30 from either delivery system presents same hazard

Source: [B-2] Missilery.info; [C-2] Wikipedia BM-30; [B-2] ARES

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<a name="9m55s-thermobaric"></a>

18. 9M55S Thermobaric/Incendiary

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Warhead

Two-Stage Detonation Process

1. Primary charge disperses fuel mixture into aerosol cloud
2. Secondary detonation ignites fuel-air cloud
3. Massive overpressure wave followed by vacuum effect
4. Extreme heat (>1,000C) within blast area

Dud Behavior

• Parachute delivery: Warhead may be found on ground with parachute deployed
• Intact FAE warhead: 100 kg of undetonated fuel-air mixture -- EXTREME FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD
• Partial function: Primary charge may have dispersed fuel without secondary detonation -- fuel-contaminated area
• Parachute entanglement: Warhead may be suspended from vegetation/structures

EOD Hazards

1. FAE HAZARD: 100 kg of fuel-air explosive mixture -- catastrophic if initiated
2. Vapor hazard: Dispersed but undetonated fuel mixture creates flammable/explosive atmosphere
3. Any ignition source: Spark, flame, friction could trigger fuel-air detonation
4. Confined space amplification: FAE effects are dramatically amplified in buildings/bunkers
5. Partial function: Area may be contaminated with explosive fuel but not detonated -- entire area is explosive
6. NO APPROACH without full assessment: FAE dud is among the most dangerous UXO items possible

CRITICAL WARNING: Thermobaric/FAE warheads that have failed to detonate properly may have created an invisible explosive atmosphere. The fuel mixture is heavier than air and may pool in low areas, basements, and trenches. ANY ignition source can trigger catastrophic detonation.

Source: [C-2] Wikipedia BM-30; [B-2] Weaponsystems.net; [C-2] Defense-Update

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<a name="tornado-s-guided"></a>

19. 9M528 / 9M542 / 9M544 Guided (Tornado-S)

Basic Data

System

9M528 (Extended Range HE-Frag)

9M542 (Guided HE-Frag)

9M544 (Guided Cargo)

Dimensions (Common to 300mm Tornado-S rockets)

Dud Behavior

• Similar to 9M55-series for unitary variants
• 9M544 cargo variant presents submunition contamination hazard
• Guided rockets may contain additional electronics/battery modules

EOD Hazards

1. All standard 300mm rocket hazards apply (motor propellant, large warhead, buried dud)
2. Electronics: Guidance electronics contain lithium batteries -- fire/thermal runaway hazard
3. 9M544 submunitions: Cargo variant presents same cluster munition hazards as 9M55K series
4. Correction charges: Gas-dynamic correction system contains pyrotechnic charges

Combat Use

• 9M542 confirmed deployed in Ukraine (2022+) per Army Recognition
• Tornado-S system actively used by Russian forces in Ukraine

Source: [C-2] Wikipedia Tornado MLRS; [C-2] Army Recognition; [C-2] TopWar.ru

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220mm TOS-1/TOS-1A THERMOBARIC SYSTEM

System: TOS-1A Solntsepyok ("Sunshine") -- 24-tube launcher on T-72/T-90 tank chassis Caliber: 220 mm Launcher config: 24 tubes (TOS-1A) or 30 tubes (TOS-1 Buratino) In service: 1988-present Operators: Russia, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia Combat use: Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine (2022+)

IMPORTANT DISTINCTION: TOS-1A is classified as a "heavy flamethrower system" (tyazholaya ognemetnaya sistema), NOT as MLRS. Operated by Russian NBC (RCBZ) troops, not artillery. This affects organizational context when encountered.

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<a name="tos-1a-thermobaric"></a>

20. TOS-1A Thermobaric Rockets

Basic Data

Rocket Variants

Motor and Propulsion

Warhead

Fuze

Fin Assembly

• Folding fins at tail
• Deploy upon exiting launch tube
• Relatively simple stabilization (short-range, area weapon)

Dud Behavior

• Short range: TOS-1A rockets are found relatively close to front lines (max 10 km)
• Intact FAE warhead: Undetonated thermobaric warhead is MAXIMUM HAZARD
• Partial function: Fuel dispersal without ignition creates explosive atmosphere
• Physical size: 173-217 kg rocket is large but not as massive as 300mm Smerch
• Impact: May bury nose-first; motor tube visible above surface

EOD Hazards

1. THERMOBARIC HAZARD: Same FAE dangers as 9M55S but at larger scale per-warhead
2. Fuel vapor: Dispersed but unignited fuel creates invisible explosive cloud
3. Low-area pooling: FAE fuel heavier than air -- collects in basements, trenches, craters
4. Contact fuze: MRV-U1 impact fuze may be armed but unfunctioned
5. Proximity to front line: Found close to combat areas -- may be in active minefields
6. Motor propellant: Solid propellant motor presents fire/deflagration hazard
7. Multiple duds per salvo: 24 rockets fired in <15 seconds; any percentage of duds = multiple UXO items in small area

CRITICAL WARNING: TOS-1A thermobaric warheads are among the most dangerous UXO items. The fuel-air explosive mixture is designed to create devastating blast effects. An intact, undetonated warhead contains enough FAE to destroy everything within a 25+ meter radius. Do NOT approach without full EOD team preparation and vapor-monitoring equipment.

Countries in Service

Russia, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Armenia (unconfirmed)

Source: [C-2] Wikipedia TOS-1; [B-2] CAT-UXO; [C-2] Army Recognition; [B-2] Missilery.info

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WESTERN ROCKETS (NATO / UKRAINE THEATER)

These systems are included because they are actively in use in Ukraine and present UXO hazards in the same operational environment as Russian/Soviet systems.

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<a name="m26-dpicm"></a>

21. M26 DPICM (M77 Submunitions)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Motor and Propulsion

Fin Assembly

• Type: 4 folding stabilizer fins
• Position: Aft end
• Stowage: Folded and secured by wire rope retaining straps
• Deployment: Lanyard triggers delayed strap-cutting charge; fins deploy after rocket clears tube
• Function: Maintain constant counterclockwise spin for stability

Submunition Payload -- M77 DPICM

Color Coding and Markings

• Rocket body: Olive drab
• Markings: US DoD standard -- NSN, lot number, date of manufacture in English
• Warhead band: Yellow band indicates HE/submunition content

Dud Behavior

• M77 dud rate: ~4% historically -- significantly higher than DoD 1% standard
• Per rocket (4% rate): ~26 dud submunitions per rocket
• Per 12-rocket salvo: ~310 dud submunitions
• M77 dud appearance: Small (~38mm) steel cylinder on surface; may be partially buried
• Impact fuze state: Armed but unfunctioned -- EXTREMELY SENSITIVE

EOD Hazards

1. HIGH DUD RATE: 4% dud rate creates massive contamination per salvo
2. Small size: 38mm diameter submunitions nearly invisible in vegetation
3. Impact fuze sensitivity: Armed M77 detonates on slight disturbance
4. Shaped charge jet: Even tiny submunition penetrates armor -- instantly lethal
5. Fragmentation radius: 4 m anti-personnel radius per submunition
6. Scale: 644 per rocket x 12 rockets = 7,728 submunitions per salvo; at 4% dud rate = ~309 duds per salvo
7. No self-destruct: M77 lacks self-destruct -- duds persist indefinitely
8. Legacy contamination concern: M26 rockets provided to Ukraine from older US stockpiles

Countries with M26

United States, Bahrain, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine (2023+)

Source: [A-1] FAS/DoD; [C-2] GlobalSecurity; [B-2] HRW Cluster Munition Report; [B-2] CAT-UXO

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<a name="m30-gmlrs"></a>

22. M30 / M30A1 GMLRS

Basic Data

Common Specifications (M30/M30A1)

M30A1 Alternative Warhead (AW) Specifications

Key Feature: No Submunition Contamination

• M30A1 uses pre-formed fragments instead of submunitions
• No dud submunitions -- NO cluster munition contamination
• Meets 2008 DoD Cluster Munitions Policy
• Primary threat is blast/fragmentation at point of impact, not area contamination

Dud Behavior

• Intact rocket dud: GPS-guided rocket may fail to detonate -- 91 kg warhead on ground
• No submunition scatter: Unlike M26/M30, no area contamination with duds
• Motor section: Solid propellant motor may or may not have fully burned
• Guidance electronics: Contains GPS/INS module and lithium batteries

EOD Hazards

1. Proximity fuze: May still be seeking target or in armed state
2. Tungsten fragments: 182,000 fragments -- devastating if warhead detonates
3. Motor propellant: Residual solid propellant hazard
4. Lithium batteries: GPS/INS electronics contain lithium batteries -- thermal hazard
5. Significantly lower UXO hazard than M26 due to absence of submunitions

Source: [A-1] DoD/DOTE Reports; [C-2] Wikipedia MLRS; [C-2] Designation-Systems.net

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<a name="m31-gmlrs-unitary"></a>

23. M31 GMLRS Unitary

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight

Fuze

Dud Behavior

• Intact rocket dud: Unitary warhead with 23 kg PBX-109 -- single large UXO item
• No submunition contamination: Unitary warhead means no area contamination
• Motor debris: May be found separately or attached
• Impact crater: GPS precision means dud likely near intended target

EOD Hazards

1. PBX-109 explosive: 23 kg of plastic-bonded explosive -- significant blast
2. Multi-mode fuze (M31A1): May be set for delay or airburst -- fuze state unknown
3. GPS guidance intact: Electronics/batteries present
4. Point target weapon: Likely found at or near high-value target location

Combat Use

• Extensively used by Ukraine from M142 HIMARS and M270 platforms (2022+)
• Primary precision-strike rocket in Ukrainian arsenal
• High-profile strikes on Russian ammunition depots, command posts, air defenses

Source: [A-1] GlobalSecurity/DoD; [C-2] Designation-Systems.net

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24. MGM-140 ATACMS (M39 / M57)

Basic Data

Dimensions and Weight (All Variants)

NOTE: ATACMS is technically a short-range ballistic MISSILE, not a rocket. It is included here because it is fired from the same M270/HIMARS launchers as MLRS rockets and is encountered in the same operational context.

M39 Block I (Cluster Munition)

M39A1 Block IA (Cluster Munition)

M57 Block IA QRU (Unitary)

M74 APAM Submunition (M39/M39A1 variants)

Color Coding and Markings

• Missile body: Olive drab/forest green
• Markings: US DoD standard stencil -- nomenclature, NSN, lot/date
• Nose: Ogival; may have different color for guidance section

Dud Behavior

• M74 submunition duds (M39/M39A1): Spherical bomblets on surface; baseball-sized
• M74 dud rate: Not publicly specified but cluster munitions inherently produce duds
• M57 unitary dud: 227 kg warhead with 98 kg explosive -- single massive UXO item
• Motor debris: Large solid motor section may be found separately
• Impact: At terminal velocity, unitary warhead creates large crater

EOD Hazards

1. M39/M39A1 submunitions: M74 APAM bomblets create area contamination; baseball-sized but deadly
2. M74 shaped charge: Penetrates armor; lethal to personnel
3. M57 unitary warhead: 227 kg warhead with 98 kg DESTEX -- massive blast effect
4. Large motor: 1,321 kg launch weight means substantial motor section with potential residual propellant
5. Guidance electronics: INS/GPS module with lithium batteries
6. Ballistic missile trajectory: Terminal impact at high velocity -- may be deeply buried

Countries with ATACMS

United States, Bahrain, Greece, South Korea, Turkey, UAE, Romania, Poland, Ukraine (2023+)

Combat Use in Ukraine

• M39/M39A1 cluster variants provided to Ukraine in 2023
• M48/M57 unitary variants provided subsequently
• Used for strikes on Russian air defenses, logistics nodes, and troop concentrations
• Notable strike on Berdyansk airfield (October 2023) confirmed ATACMS use

Source: [A-1] CSIS Missile Threat; [A-1] FAS/DoD; [C-2] Wikipedia ATACMS; [B-2] CAT-UXO

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CROSS-REFERENCE: VISUAL IDENTIFICATION QUICK GUIDE

How to Distinguish by Caliber (Field Assessment)

How to Distinguish HE vs Cargo vs Mine-Laying

Submunition Cross-Reference

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REFERENCES AND SOURCES

Primary References

• CAT-UXO (cat-uxo.com) -- Comprehensive UXO database [B-2]
• ARES -- Armament Research Services (armamentresearch.com) [B-2]
• GICHD -- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining [B-2]
• Fenix Insight METIS (metis.fenixinsight.com) [B-2]
• Missilery.info -- Soviet/Russian missile encyclopedia [B-2]

Secondary References

• Weaponsystems.net [B-2]
• GlobalSecurity.org [C-2]
• FAS (man.fas.org) -- Federation of American Scientists [C-2]
• Army Recognition (armyrecognition.com) [C-2]
• Wikipedia (various articles) [C-2]
• CSIS Missile Threat [B-2]
• Designation-Systems.net [C-2]
• Human Rights Watch Cluster Munition Reports [B-2]
• Bulletpicker.com [C-2]

Field References

• GICHD "Explosive Ordnance Guide for Ukraine" (2022) [B-1]
• Bellingcat cluster munition documentation [C-2]
• Defense Express Ukraine weapons analysis [C-3]