Russian/Soviet Landmine Database

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT Created: 2026-03-28 Last Updated: 2026-03-28 Source Reliability: B-2 (Usually Reliable / Probably True) -- compiled from ODIN (TRADOC), METIS, CAT-UXO, Jane's, Wikipedia (cross-referenced), nolandmines.com, bulletpicker.com, manufacturer data Purpose: Comprehensive EOD reference for Russian/Soviet mine identification, hazard assessment, and clearance planning

SAFETY WARNING: This document is for IDENTIFICATION AND AWARENESS ONLY. It does NOT replace official EOD technical publications (60-series pubs, NAVEODFLTDIV, JODIC). Always refer to current TMs for render-safe procedures. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Anti-Personnel Blast Mines

1. PMN (Black Widow)
2. PMN-2
3. PMN-4
4. MS-3 (Anti-Handling Variant)
5. PMD-6 / PMD-6M (Wooden Box Mine)
6. PMD-7
7. PMA-1 (Yugoslav)
8. PMA-2 (Yugoslav)
9. PMA-3 (Yugoslav)

Anti-Personnel Fragmentation Mines

1. POMZ-2
2. POMZ-2M
3. OZM-3 (Bounding)
4. OZM-4 (Bounding)
5. OZM-72 (Bounding)
6. POM-2 / POM-2S (Scatterable)

Anti-Personnel Directional Mines

1. MON-50
2. MON-90
3. MON-100
4. MON-200

Anti-Vehicle Blast Mines

1. TM-46 / TMN-46
2. TM-57
3. TM-62M (Metallic)
4. TM-62P / TM-62P2 (Plastic, Ribbed)
5. TM-62P3 (Plastic, Smooth)
6. TM-62B (Cardboard/Paper)
7. TM-62D (Wooden)

Anti-Vehicle Shaped Charge / Influence / Off-Route Mines

1. TM-72 (Magnetic Influence)
2. TMK-2 (Shaped Charge, Tilt-Rod)
3. TM-83 (Off-Route, IR/Seismic)
4. TM-89 (EFP, Magnetic Influence)

Scatterable/Remotely-Delivered Mines

1. PFM-1 / PFM-1S (Butterfly)
2. PTM-1 / PTM-1S (AT Scatterable)
3. PTM-3 (AT Scatterable, Shaped Charge)
4. KPOM-2 (Cassette Dispenser)

Sea Mines (Summary)

1. MDM Series
2. UDM Series
3. SMDM (Self-Propelled)

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ANTI-PERSONNEL BLAST MINES

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PMN

designation: "PMN"
nato_designation: "N/A"
nickname: "Black Widow"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: ~1960
type: "AP blast"
status: "Obsolete but widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure-actuated integral fuze
• Arming: Steel ring-pull removed; spring-loaded striker held by thin steel wire cutting through lead strip (arming delay ~2-10 minutes)
• Mechanism: Pressure on rubber cap collapses internal bellows, driving striker into stab-detonator

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• WARNING: The PMN itself has no integral anti-handling device, BUT:
  • MS-3 variant is externally near-identical but contains a PRESSURE-RELEASE anti-handling device -- WILL DETONATE WHEN LIFTED
  • PMN-3 variant (see below) is identical to PMN-2 but contains electronic anti-handling
  • Commonly booby-trapped with ML-7 pressure-release device or ML-8 placed underneath
  • Pull-fuze attachments are common field expedients

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• None -- mines remain active indefinitely until mechanically degraded

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Black or dark brown bakelite
• Pressure plate: Black rubber disc, slightly domed, smooth surface
• Markings: Cyrillic factory markings, lot number on body side
• Distinctive: Horizontal cylindrical fuze assembly protruding from one side with ring-pull

Commonly Confused With

• PMN-2 -- similar name but completely different shape (PMN-2 has X-shaped rubber pressure plate)
• MS-3 -- EXTERNALLY NEAR-IDENTICAL to PMN; differentiation requires careful inspection (MS-3 has a small blister in center of pressure plate)
• Chinese Type 58 -- copy of PMN

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: If a "PMN" is encountered, it MAY be an MS-3 pressure-release mine. DO NOT LIFT without confirming identity
• Bakelite body degrades over time; explosive may be exposed and sensitized
• Old mines with corroded fuze components may be extremely sensitive
• Arming delay wire may have already cut through lead in old mines -- treat ALL as armed

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Produced: USSR, exported to 30+ countries
• Encountered: Afghanistan (nicknamed "Kandani" / sugar mine), Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Iraq, Chechnya, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Libya, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Yemen, Western Sahara
• One of the most produced AP mines in history -- tens of millions manufactured

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: Moderate metal content; detectable with standard metal detector
• Approach: Manual probing, careful visual identification to distinguish from MS-3
• Key risk: MS-3 look-alike; always probe edges first, never lift from center

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PMN-2

designation: "PMN-2"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: ~1975
type: "AP blast"
status: "In active service (Russia, widely exported)"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pneumatic pressure fuze, delay-armed
• Arming: Side safety key removed; spring-loaded bellows inflates over 2-3 minutes
• Mechanism: Pressure on X-shaped rubber plate compresses bellows; striker driven into detonator
• Blast-resistant: The X-shaped pressure plate design makes the PMN-2 resistant to blast overpressure clearance methods

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• The PMN-2 itself has NO integral anti-handling device
• WARNING: PMN-3 (see below) is EXTERNALLY IDENTICAL but has electronic anti-handling and self-destruct
• Can be booby-trapped from below with standard Soviet anti-lift devices

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• None on standard PMN-2 (PMN-3 variant has electronic self-destruct: 30 min to 8 hours, selectable)

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Leaf green plastic (sometimes brown/tan variants)
• Pressure plate: Black rubber X-shape (cross pattern) on top -- DISTINCTIVE feature
• Markings: Cyrillic designation stamped on body; may be removed before laying
• Distinctive: The black rubber X/cross on a green disc is the primary visual identifier

Commonly Confused With

• PMN-3 -- IDENTICAL external appearance; PMN-3 has Cyrillic "PMH-3" marking on side (often removed)
• PMN (original) -- different shape, smooth rubber cap, larger
• Chinese Type 72A -- similar concept but different shape

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL: Cannot visually distinguish from PMN-3 anti-handling variant without markings
• Treat ALL PMN-2-type mines as potential PMN-3 until confirmed otherwise
• PMN-3 detonates when rotated 90 degrees (normal disarming position)
• Blast-resistant design means blast-based clearance may be ineffective

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Russia (active service), former Soviet states, exported worldwide
• Encountered: Afghanistan, Chechnya, Ukraine (2022-present), Syria, Libya, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Azerbaijan-Armenia border
• 2025 Cambodia-Thailand border crisis: PMN-2 detonations caused casualties

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: LOW metal content -- may evade basic metal detectors; requires sensitive large-loop detectors or GPR
• Approach: Manual probing; assume PMN-3 until confirmed; do NOT rotate or tilt
• Blast-resistant: Standard flail and roller methods may not reliably detonate

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PMN-4

designation: "PMN-4"
country_of_origin: "Russia"
year_introduced: ~1990s
type: "AP blast"
status: "In active service (Russia)"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Delay-armed, pressure-fired
• Arming: Pull safety key; pyrotechnic arming delay
• Mechanism: Pressure on plate drives striker assembly

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling device reported
• Can be booby-trapped from below

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• None reported

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Reddish-brown or khaki plastic
• Pressure plate: Black plastic "spider" or "petal" shape concealed underneath a cap
• Distinctive: Smaller than PMN/PMN-2; flower-petal pressure plate visible when cap removed
• Markings: Cyrillic designation

Commonly Confused With

• PMN-2 -- larger, green body, X-shaped pressure plate
• PMN -- larger, black bakelite, smooth dome cap

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Significant metal content means readily detectable
• Smaller charge (55 g) but still capable of traumatic amputation

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Russia (active service)
• Encountered: Ukraine (2022-present), Chechnya

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: Readily detectable with metal detector due to significant metal content
• Approach: Standard manual clearance procedures

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MS-3

designation: "MS-3"
alt_names: "MS3, Anti-handling mine"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "Unknown (Cold War era)"
type: "AP blast / anti-handling device"
status: "Encountered in legacy minefields"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: PRESSURE-RELEASE
• Mechanism: Requires 5-6 kg minimum pressure on central blister. When pressure is REMOVED, mine detonates
• Purpose: Anti-handling device designed to kill deminers attempting to lift what appears to be a PMN

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• THE ENTIRE MINE IS AN ANTI-HANDLING DEVICE
• Detonates upon pressure release (lifting)

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• NEARLY IDENTICAL to PMN
• Key difference: Small raised "blister" in center of pressure plate
• Distinguishing from PMN requires careful close inspection

EOD Hazard Warnings

• CRITICAL THREAT TO DEMINERS: Designed to look like PMN but functions on pressure RELEASE
• If you encounter what appears to be a PMN, inspect for center blister BEFORE any manipulation
• Heavier than PMN (630 g vs 550 g) and more explosive (310 g vs 240 g)

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PMD-6 / PMD-6M

designation: "PMD-6 / PMD-6M"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1941 (PMD-6), 1950s (PMD-6M)"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Obsolete; found in legacy minefields"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure on hinged wooden lid
• Mechanism: Lid presses down on retaining pin holding spring-loaded striker; pin slips, striker hits detonator
• Fuze: MUV-type pull fuze (UPM-1, Model 43, or UANU-1)
• PMD-6M improvement: Internal leaf spring increases operating pressure for safer handling during laying

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling
• Easily booby-trapped by placing anti-lift device beneath
• Wood degrades unpredictably, making sensitivity unknown in aged mines

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• None -- wooden body rots over decades but explosive and detonator may remain live

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Unpainted natural wood (various species), darkens with age and weathering
• Shape: Simple rectangular box with hinged lid
• Distinctive: Slot cut in lid for fuze pin; two compartments (one for explosive, one for fuze)
• Markings: Usually none

Commonly Confused With

• PMD-7 -- similar concept but much smaller, cylindrical charge
• PMA-1 -- Yugoslav plastic copy of similar concept
• Various improvised wooden mines -- many countries copied the design

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DETECT -- almost no metal content, wooden body
• Wood deterioration makes operating pressure completely unpredictable
• Old mines may detonate at the slightest touch or even spontaneously
• WWII-era mines have been in the ground for 80+ years; explosive may be degraded or sensitized

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• WWII (Eastern Front), Korea, Vietnam, Middle East, Africa
• Found in legacy minefields across former Soviet-influenced areas

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: Near-zero metal content; undetectable by standard metal detectors
• Approach: Manual probing only; ground-penetrating radar may assist
• Key risk: Deteriorated wood makes sensitivity completely unknown

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PMD-7

designation: "PMD-7"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1940s"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Obsolete; legacy threat"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Same as PMD-6: hinged lid, MUV-type pull fuze
• Smaller cylindrical charge compared to PMD-6's block charge

Notes

• Smaller, lighter version of PMD-6 with significantly less explosive
• Same detection and clearance challenges as PMD-6
• 75 g charge still capable of foot/ankle injury

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PMA-1

designation: "PMA-1 / PMA-1A"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia (Serbia)"
year_introduced: "1960s"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Found in Balkans, Africa, exported"
manufacturer: "SDPR (Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement)"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure on hinged lid
• Fuze: UPM-1, Model 43, or UANU-1 (MUV-type)
• Mechanism: Pressure on lid crushes fuze components, initiating detonator
• Design is a plastic version of Soviet PMD-6 concept

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Dark green plastic rectangular box
• Distinctive: Two-piece hinged design, similar to PMD-6 but in plastic
• Markings: Yugoslav factory markings

Commonly Confused With

• PMD-6 -- same concept but wooden
• PMA-2/PMA-3 -- same PMA family but completely different shapes

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Yugoslavia, Balkans (Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo), Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Iraq

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PMA-2

designation: "PMA-2"
nickname: "Pashteta" (pate tin)
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia"
year_introduced: "1970s"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Widely encountered in Balkans and exported regions"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: UPMAH-2 chemical/friction pressure fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure on plunger (6-petal design) drives it into fuze body; friction-sensitive pyrotechnic ignites, flashes to detonator, initiates RDX booster, detonates main TNT charge
• Arming: Removal of safety pin

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Dark green plastic cylinder
• Distinctive: Six-petaled plunger on top -- UNIQUE visual identifier
• Resemblance: Superficially resembles a small pate tin (hence nickname "Pashteta")

Commonly Confused With

• PMN-4 -- similar size range but different shape and color
• PMA-3 -- same family but flatter, wider

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Minimum metal content makes detection extremely difficult
• Small size makes visual spotting challenging
• Chemical fuze can degrade unpredictably

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Balkans (massive use in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo), exported to Middle East, Africa
• One of the most commonly encountered mines in Balkan demining operations

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: Near-minimum metal; requires sensitive detectors or probing
• Approach: Manual probing; small size requires careful systematic search

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PMA-3

designation: "PMA-3"
country_of_origin: "Yugoslavia"
year_introduced: "1970s"
type: "AP blast"
status: "Widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Friction-actuated
• Mechanism: Tilting/pressure drives pin through friction-sensitive pyrotechnic compound, fires detonator, initiates main charge
• Very simple, reliable mechanism

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Dark green or olive plastic disc
• Distinctive: Two-part disc shape (upper and lower halves), rubber seam around circumference
• Very flat profile -- only 40 mm high

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Extremely sensitive -- only 1-5 kg operating pressure
• Minimum metal content -- extremely hard to detect
• Small explosive charge (35 g) but positioned directly under foot
• Rubber and plastic degrade, potentially increasing sensitivity

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Balkans, Africa, Middle East

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: Minimum metal mine -- one of the hardest mines to detect
• Requires ground-penetrating radar, dual-sensor detection, or manual probing
• Extremely low operating pressure demands extreme care during probing

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ANTI-PERSONNEL FRAGMENTATION MINES

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POMZ-2

designation: "POMZ-2"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1941 (POMZ), late 1940s (POMZ-2)"
type: "AP fragmentation (stake-mounted)"
status: "Obsolete but ubiquitous worldwide"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Trip-wire activated
• Fuze: MUV-2 or VPF pull/tilt fuze (standardized Soviet fuze well on top, covered by weather cap)
• Note: POMZ-2 fuze well is UNTHREADED -- fuze and igniter can fall out if mine is disturbed

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling
• Stake can be booby-trapped from below
• Disturbing the mine may cause unthreaded fuze to shift and detonate

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive drab or dark green painted cast iron cylinder
• Stake: Wooden or plastic, inserted into open bottom of fragmentation sleeve
• Distinctive: Cylindrical cast iron body with visible square fragment pattern on outer surface, mounted on stake protruding from ground
• Weather cap: Metal cap on top covering fuze well

Commonly Confused With

• POMZ-2M -- improved version with threaded fuze well, 5 rows of fragments (vs 6)
• DPRK POMZ-2M copies -- dimensionally identical
• PMR-2A (Yugoslav copy)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• UNTHREADED fuze well means disturbance may cause fuze to shift and detonate
• Trip-wires may be difficult to see, especially in vegetation
• Cast iron fragments are large and irregularly shaped -- lethal at surprising ranges
• Old mines with corroded trip-wire may have very low activation force

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• The most widely distributed stake mine in the world
• Encountered: Every Soviet-influenced conflict zone; Afghanistan, Vietnam, Korea, Africa, Middle East, Balkans, Ukraine

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POMZ-2M

designation: "POMZ-2M"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1950s"
type: "AP fragmentation (stake-mounted)"
status: "In service worldwide"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Trip-wire activated
• Fuze: MUV-2 or VPF pull/tilt fuze
• Key improvement: THREADED fuze well (vs unthreaded on POMZ-2) -- fuze more securely seated

Visual ID vs POMZ-2

• 5 rows of fragments (POMZ-2 has 6)
• Slightly shorter body
• Threaded fuze well (not visible externally but affects stability)
• Otherwise very similar appearance

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OZM-3

designation: "OZM-3"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "Early 1950s"
type: "AP bounding fragmentation"
status: "Obsolete; still encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Trip-wire (most common), also electronic fuze or command initiation
• Fuze well: Empty; accepts MUV-series booby-trap switches
• Mechanism: Trip-wire triggers lifting charge; mine body ejected from cast iron cup, tethered by wire; when tether goes taut at ~0.5 m, main charge detonates

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive green painted cast iron cylinder
• Buried: Only trip-wire and possibly fuze visible above ground
• Distinctive: Smaller and lighter than OZM-4 and OZM-72

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OZM-4

designation: "OZM-4"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1950s"
type: "AP bounding fragmentation"
status: "Obsolete; encountered in legacy minefields"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Trip-wire (most common); accepts variety of fuzes
• Fuze well: Empty; MUV-series standard
• Mechanism: Same as OZM-3 -- lifting charge ejects body, wire tether, detonation at apex

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive green cast iron cylinder
• Larger than OZM-3, more explosive

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OZM-72

designation: "OZM-72"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1972"
type: "AP bounding fragmentation"
status: "In active service (Russia); widely encountered"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Trip-wire (most common); electronic fuze; command initiation
• Fuze well: Empty; most commonly fitted with MUV booby-trap switch and trip-wire
• Mechanism: Trip-wire activates fuze; propelling charge (7 g black powder) launches mine body to 0.6-0.9 m; main charge detonates at apex

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• No integral anti-handling
• Can be fitted with anti-lift devices beneath

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive drab/green steel cylinder
• Distinctive: Larger and heavier than OZM-3/OZM-4; PREFORMED fragments (smooth exterior) vs cast iron irregular fragments
• Buried: Only trip-wire visible above ground

Commonly Confused With

• OZM-4 -- smaller, cast iron vs steel with preformed frags
• PROM-1 (Yugoslav bounding mine) -- similar concept, different body shape

EOD Hazard Warnings

• 2,400 preformed fragments create devastating casualty zone to 50 m
• 660 g TNT charge is significantly larger than OZM-3/OZM-4
• Trip-wires in vegetation may be invisible
• Most lethal of the OZM series

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Russia (active), former Soviet states
• Encountered: Ukraine (2022-present), Chechnya, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Africa

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: High metal content; easily detected
• Challenge: Trip-wire detection; systematic wire-search required before advancing
• Approach: Cut trip-wires from distance if possible; do not approach within lethal radius until trip-wire neutralized

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POM-2 / POM-2S

designation: "POM-2 / POM-2S"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1980s"
type: "AP fragmentation (scatterable, self-deploying, trip-wire)"
status: "In active service (Russia)"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Self-deploying trip-wire
• Mechanism: Upon landing, spring-loaded legs orient mine upright; four trip-wires automatically extend (6-8 m each) in different directions
• Activation: Pull of 0.3 kg on ANY of four trip-wires detonates mine
• Arming delay: Pyrotechnic delay after deployment (~60-120 seconds)

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Self-deployed trip-wires make approach extremely hazardous
• Moving any trip-wire with only 300 g of force will detonate
• Fragile trip-wires may be invisible in grass/debris

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• POM-2S: Self-destruct after 4-100 hours (85% destroyed by 80 hours)
• POM-2 (without S): No self-destruct
• Self-destruct is by detonation -- do not assume "safe" expired mines

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Green or olive cylindrical steel body
• Legs: Spring-loaded stabilizing legs extended after landing
• Trip-wires: Four thin nylon lines radiating outward -- NEARLY INVISIBLE
• Distinctive: Cylindrical mine standing on deployed legs with trip-wires radiating outward

Commonly Confused With

• POM-3 -- newer Russian variant, uses seismic fuze instead of trip-wire (even more dangerous)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• EXTREME HAZARD: 0.3 kg activation force on trip-wires -- lighter than the weight of many probing tools
• Trip-wires are nearly invisible nylon
• Four trip-wires in different directions create a "web" effect
• Self-destruct by DETONATION -- not safe to approach even after theoretical self-destruct time
• POM-2 (without S) has NO self-destruct and remains armed indefinitely

Delivery Systems

• KPOM-2 cassette (4 mines per cassette)
• BM-27 Uragan (9M59 rocket)
• BM-21 Grad (9M18 rocket)
• VSM-1 helicopter minelaying system
• UMZ remote mining machine
• PKM portable mining kit (infantry)

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Russia (active), former Soviet states
• Encountered: Ukraine (2022-present), Chechnya, Syria

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: Metal body is detectable, but trip-wires are the primary hazard
• Approach: Extreme caution -- systematic wire search in all directions before advancing
• Recommended: Remote clearance methods (line charges, rollers) where possible
• Do NOT attempt manual clearance within trip-wire radius unless all wires positively identified and cut

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ANTI-PERSONNEL DIRECTIONAL MINES

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MON-50

designation: "MON-50"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1965"
type: "AP directional fragmentation"
status: "In active service (Russia, widely exported)"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Command-detonated (primary), trip-wire, or electronic fuze
• Detonator wells: Two cavities flanking peep sight on top
• Aiming: Peep sight centered on top of mine

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Can be fitted with anti-disturbance fuzes
• Command-detonated versions have no inherent anti-handling

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive green or dark green plastic
• Front face: Slightly convex
• Distinctive: "FRONT TOWARD ENEMY" equivalent in Cyrillic/Russian; peep sight on top; folding scissor-type legs
• Bottom: Attachment point for clamp/spike (mounts to wood, metal, etc.)

Commonly Confused With

• US M18A1 Claymore -- MON-50 is a direct copy; similar size and shape but different markings
• Chinese Type 66 -- Chinese copy of MON-50
• MON-90 -- larger version with different body shape

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Russia, former Soviet states, exported worldwide
• Encountered: Ukraine, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Africa, Balkans

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MON-90

designation: "MON-90"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1960s"
type: "AP directional fragmentation"
status: "In active service"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Command-detonated (primary), trip-wire, or electronic fuze
• Plastic body with Claymore-style curved front

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive green plastic, Claymore-shaped but larger/thicker than MON-50
• Distinctive: Significantly larger and heavier than MON-50

Commonly Confused With

• MON-50 -- similar shape but much smaller (2 kg vs 12.1 kg)
• US M18A1 Claymore -- much smaller

EOD Hazard Warnings

• 6.2 kg of RDX -- massive blast effect
• 2,000 fragments lethal to 90 m
• Also effective against light vehicles

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MON-100

designation: "MON-100"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "Early 1960s"
type: "AP directional fragmentation"
status: "In service"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Command-detonated (primary), trip-wire, tilt-rod
• Narrow beam design -- aimed weapon

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Smooth, well-finished sheet steel "bowl" or "dish" shape
• Handle: Webbing handle mounted on upper edge
• Distinctive: Round, bowl-shaped -- very different from rectangular Claymore-type MON-50/MON-90
• Mounting: Spike or shackle mount

Commonly Confused With

• MON-200 -- same bowl shape but much larger and heavier
• NOT similar to MON-50/MON-90 (those are rectangular/Claymore-shaped)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Narrow beam means fragments are concentrated -- devastating within the beam
• Aimed weapon -- lethal range 100 m in a narrow cone

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MON-200

designation: "MON-200"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1960s"
type: "AP directional fragmentation / anti-vehicle"
status: "In service"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Command-detonated (primary), trip-wire, electronic fuze
• Rear vents to reduce backblast

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Large steel dish/bowl, same concept as MON-100 but much larger
• Distinctive: Very large and heavy (25 kg); requires two-person carry or vehicle mount

EOD Hazard Warnings

• 12 kg explosive charge -- effective against light-skinned vehicles and helicopters
• 200 m lethal range with 900 fragments
• Due to size, also considered an anti-vehicle weapon

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ANTI-VEHICLE BLAST MINES

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TM-46 / TMN-46

designation: "TM-46 / TMN-46"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1946"
type: "AV blast"
status: "Obsolete but still encountered worldwide"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Fuze options: MV-5, MV-5K, MVM pressure fuzes
• Tilt-rod fuze: Available
• TMN-46 variant: Has SECONDARY FUZE WELL on underside for anti-handling devices (MUV-2, MUV-3)

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• TM-46: No integral anti-handling; single top fuze well
• TMN-46: Secondary fuze well on BOTTOM for anti-handling device (MUV-2 or MUV-3 pull fuze activated by lifting mine)
• CRITICAL: TMN-46 was specifically designed with anti-lift capability

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive drab painted sheet steel disc
• Distinctive: Large central fuze well on top; TMN-46 has second well on bottom
• Predecessor to TM-57

Commonly Confused With

• TM-57 -- successor, slightly different dimensions and more explosive
• TM-62M -- later design, different fuze well configuration

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TM-57

designation: "TM-57"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1957"
type: "AV blast"
status: "In service worldwide; most common Soviet AT mine"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Primary: MVZ-57 pressure fuze (120-400 kg operating pressure, 45-second arming delay)
• Alternative: MVSh-57 tilt-rod fuze
• Fuze well: Central top well
• Bottom: Secondary fuze well for anti-handling device

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Secondary fuze well on bottom accepts anti-handling devices
• Commonly fitted with MUV-series pull fuze attached to base or ground anchor
• ALWAYS assume TM-57 has anti-lift device until proven otherwise

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive drab painted sheet steel
• Top: Stepped surface with central fuze well, circular carrying handle
• Bottom: Radial strengthening ribs visible on crimped base
• Distinctive: Larger charge than TM-46; development of TM-46 design

Commonly Confused With

• TM-46/TMN-46 -- predecessor, similar appearance but less explosive
• TM-62M -- similar size but different fuze system and body profile

EOD Hazard Warnings

• 6.3-7 kg of explosive -- will destroy any vehicle
• ALWAYS probe for anti-lift devices before attempting to move
• Tilt-rod fuze variant highly sensitive to vehicle passage
• Old mines with corroded fuze springs may have unpredictable operating pressure

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• One of the most widely distributed AT mines in the world
• Encountered: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, Cambodia, Balkans, Middle East, Africa

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: High metal content; easily detected
• Approach: Probe around and beneath mine for anti-lift devices before any movement
• Key risk: Anti-lift devices in bottom fuze well; ground anchor wires

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TM-62M

designation: "TM-62M"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1962"
type: "AV blast"
status: "In active service (Russia); most widely used of TM-62 series"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Compatible fuzes: MVCh-62 (pressure), MVZ-62 (pressure), MVP-62 (pressure), MVP-62M (pressure), MVN-72 (magnetic influence), MVN-80 (magnetic influence)
• Multiple fuze options give this mine series exceptional versatility
• Central top fuze well accepts all standard TM-62 series fuzes

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Secondary fuze well on bottom for anti-handling devices
• With magnetic influence fuze (MVN-72/80): Mine activates on magnetic signature -- no physical contact needed

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive drab painted sheet steel
• Top: Flat or slightly raised center with central fuze well
• Distinctive: Round metal body, smooth sides

Commonly Confused With

• TM-57 -- very similar size but different fuze well and body profile
• TM-62P/P2/P3 -- same family but plastic casing
• Chinese Type 72 AT (metallic) -- similar concept, different dimensions

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: High metal content; easily detected with metal detector
• Can be laid mechanically from PMR-1, PMR-2, GMZ-3, VMR-2 helicopter system

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TM-62P / TM-62P2

designation: "TM-62P / TM-62P2"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1960s"
type: "AV blast"
status: "In service"

Specifications

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Green/olive plastic with visible vertical ribbing on sides
• Distinctive: RIBBED SIDES -- key identifier vs TM-62P3 (smooth)
• Fuze well: Central top well, same TM-62 series fuze compatibility

Commonly Confused With

• TM-62P3 -- same family but SMOOTH sides
• TM-62M -- metal version
• Chinese Type 72 AT (non-metallic) -- similar concept

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: LOW metal content -- difficult to detect with standard metal detector
• Plastic body significantly reduces magnetic signature
• May require large-loop or dual-sensor detectors

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TM-62P3

designation: "TM-62P3"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1970s"
type: "AV blast"
status: "In active service; widely deployed"

Specifications

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Green/olive plastic with SMOOTH sides (no ribbing)
• Distinctive: Smooth plastic body distinguishes from ribbed TM-62P/P2
• Fuze well: Central top well

Commonly Confused With

• TM-62P/P2 -- same family but RIBBED sides
• Chinese Type 72 AT (non-metallic) -- FREQUENTLY CONFUSED in the field; Chinese Type 72 is slightly smaller (300 mm diameter), lighter, and may have different color

EOD Hazard Warnings

• 8.1 kg of explosive -- largest charge in TM-62 series
• LOW metal content makes detection extremely difficult
• Most dangerous TM-62 variant from a clearance perspective due to combination of large charge and low detectability

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: Low metal content -- challenging for standard metal detectors
• Requires sensitive detectors, GPR, or probing
• CRITICAL: Do not rely on metal detector alone; systematic manual probing required in suspected TM-62P3 areas

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TM-62B

designation: "TM-62B"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1960s"
type: "AV blast"
status: "Obsolete; encountered in legacy minefields"

Specifications

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Paper/cardboard wrapped block of cast explosive
• Distinctive: Essentially a disc of cast explosive with minimal casing
• Highest explosive-to-weight ratio in TM-62 series (8.2 kg explosive of 8.6 kg total)

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Near-zero metal content -- extremely difficult to detect
• Cardboard case deteriorates rapidly in ground -- explosive may be exposed
• Exposed explosive may be sensitized by moisture/chemical degradation

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TM-62D

designation: "TM-62D"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1960s"
type: "AV blast"
status: "Obsolete; encountered in legacy minefields"

Specifications

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Wooden box, rectangular (not round like other TM-62 variants)
• Distinctive: Only TM-62 variant that is rectangular and wooden
• Shape: Different from all other TM-62 variants

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Wooden case deteriorates over time -- explosive may be exposed
• Very low metal content
• Wooden construction absorbs moisture, potentially degrading explosive

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ANTI-VEHICLE SHAPED CHARGE / INFLUENCE / OFF-ROUTE MINES

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TM-72

designation: "TM-72"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1972"
type: "AV shaped charge (belly-attack, magnetic influence)"
status: "In service; encountered in Ukraine"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Primary fuze: MVN-72 magnetic influence fuze (detects vehicle magnetic signature)
• Alternative: MVN-80 magnetic influence fuze
• Mechanism: Magnetic field of passing vehicle triggers shaped charge detonation upward into vehicle belly
• Full-width attack: Magnetic fuze gives full-width attack capability (vehicle does not need to drive directly over mine)
• Clockwork delay arming with electrical initiation
• Blast overpressure resistant

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Magnetic influence fuze can be sensitive to nearby metal objects
• Moving metal objects near the mine may trigger it

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Olive drab sheet steel cylinder
• Distinctive: Smaller and flatter than TM-62 series; shaped charge liner visible internally
• Fuze: MVN-72/80 magnetic fuze unit visible on top

Commonly Confused With

• TM-89 -- similar magnetic fuze concept but larger and more capable
• TM-62M with MVN-72 fuze -- TM-62M is a blast mine; TM-72 is a shaped charge

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Magnetic influence fuze: Any metal object (tools, detectors) moved near mine may trigger it
• Approach with non-metallic probing tools only
• Shaped charge is directional (upward) but blast effect remains hazardous

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Russia, former Soviet states
• Encountered: Ukraine (2022-present, confirmed 2026)

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TMK-2

designation: "TMK-2"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1955"
type: "AV shaped charge (tilt-rod fuze)"
status: "Obsolete; found in legacy stocks"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: MVK-2 tilt-rod fuze (total height 1,130 mm when installed)
• Mechanism: Vehicle passage bends tilt rod 24-36 degrees; retaining balls release striker; spring drives striker into MD-7M detonator; detonation cord carries wave to DUM-2 detonator in main body
• Activation force: 8-12 kg sideways on antenna (tilt rod)

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Two truncated cone shapes joined at widest point (hourglass/diabolo profile)
• Tilt rod: Tall antenna extending ~1 m above ground
• Distinctive: Unique double-cone body shape; tall tilt rod visible above ground

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Tilt rod extends above ground -- visible but also sensitive to accidental contact
• Shaped charge directed upward into vehicle belly
• 8-12 kg activation force on rod -- person can accidentally trigger by walking into rod

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TM-83

designation: "TM-83"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1983 (first shown 1993)"
type: "AV off-route (shaped charge, IR/seismic triggered)"
status: "In active service"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Dual-sensor system:
  • Seismic sensor (VT-02): Continuously monitors ground vibration; detects approaching tracked/wheeled vehicles; LOW POWER standby mode
  • Infrared sensor (VT-01): Activated by seismic alert; confirms target heat signature; range 5-50 m
• Warhead: Misznay-Schardin effect EFP (Explosively Formed Projectile)
• Two operation modes:
  • Autonomous: Fully automatic seismic-to-IR target engagement
  • Controlled: 100 m command wire allows operator to switch modes

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Seismic sensor may detect approach of personnel
• DO NOT APPROACH if mine appears to be in armed state

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Steel cylinder on mounting stand/tripod
• Positioned: Typically 5 m from road edge, aimed at road using integral sight
• Distinctive: Cylindrical mine on stand aimed horizontally at road -- unlike buried mines

EOD Hazard Warnings

• SMART MINE -- dual-sensor (seismic + IR) means mine can detect approaching personnel
• 9.6 kg TG-40 charge is massive
• EFP penetrates 100 mm armor at up to 50 m range
• 30-day operational endurance
• Seismic sensor is ALWAYS active in armed mode -- approach may trigger alert
• Command-wire variant may have operator observing

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Russia, former Soviet states
• Encountered: Ukraine (reported), Chechnya

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: Visible above ground (placed alongside roads, not buried)
• Approach: EXTREME CAUTION -- seismic sensor detects footsteps
• Recommended: Remote neutralization (EOD robot, standoff disruption) only
• Do not approach on foot if mine appears armed

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TM-89

designation: "TM-89"
country_of_origin: "Russia"
year_introduced: "1989 (first shown 1993)"
type: "AV EFP (magnetic influence, full-width attack)"
status: "In active service"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Two-channel magnetic influence fuze
• Mechanism: Detects magnetic signature of passing vehicle; shaped charge/EFP fires upward into vehicle belly
• Full-width attack: Vehicle does not need to drive directly over mine
• Deployment: GMZ-3 mine layer, VMR-2 helicopter mine layer

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Magnetic influence fuze may react to metal objects brought near mine

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Steel disc, similar diameter to TM-62M but with EFP warhead
• Distinctive: Similar to TM-62M externally but different internal construction

Commonly Confused With

• TM-62M -- same diameter (320 mm) but TM-89 has EFP warhead vs blast
• TM-72 -- similar concept (magnetic + shaped charge) but TM-89 is larger

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Magnetic influence fuze -- do not approach with metal tools or equipment
• EFP warhead penetrates 100 mm of armor
• Two-channel fuze provides redundancy -- harder to defeat electronically
• Full-width attack means mine is effective even with near-miss by vehicle

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SCATTERABLE / REMOTELY-DELIVERED MINES

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PFM-1 / PFM-1S

designation: "PFM-1 / PFM-1S"
nato_nickname: "Green Parrot"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1978"
type: "AP blast (scatterable)"
status: "In active service (Russia)"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Hydraulic pressure fuze
• Mechanism: Pressure on thick wing compresses liquid explosive against internal plunger; detonation occurs when critical pressure exceeded
• Arming: Automatic after deployment; safety mechanism releases during air descent

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Liquid explosive is inherently sensitive
• DO NOT PICK UP OR HANDLE -- pressure on body can cause detonation
• Attractive to children due to "butterfly" or "toy" appearance

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• PFM-1: NO self-destruct -- remains active indefinitely until degraded
• PFM-1S: Self-destructs after 1-40 hours; 85% destroyed by 80 hours
• Self-destruct is by DETONATION
• CRITICAL: Cannot reliably distinguish PFM-1 from PFM-1S externally; assume NO self-destruct

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Green, brown, tan, or sand-colored polyethylene
• Shape: Butterfly/maple seed -- one thick wing (contains explosive), one thin wing (aerodynamic)
• Distinctive: Unique butterfly shape unlike any other mine; very small and flat
• Deployment scatter: Found in clusters across terrain after aerial dispersal

Commonly Confused With

• Nothing -- shape is unique and immediately recognizable
• Children may mistake for toy due to butterfly shape

EOD Hazard Warnings

• DO NOT HANDLE -- liquid explosive sensitive to pressure
• Zero metal content -- UNDETECTABLE by metal detectors
• Extremely small size makes visual search difficult
• Scattered in large numbers (hundreds to thousands per deployment)
• Attractive to children -- significant humanitarian hazard
• UV degradation of plastic may expose liquid explosive, increasing sensitivity

Delivery Systems

• KMGU universal munitions dispenser (aircraft)
• BM-27 Uragan MLRS
• Helicopter dispersal systems

Countries in Service / Conflicts

• Russia, former Soviet states
• Encountered: Afghanistan (massive deployment 1979-1989), Ukraine (2022-present), Chechnya
• Responsible for enormous civilian casualties in Afghanistan, particularly children

Mine Clearance Notes

• Detection: UNDETECTABLE by metal detector; visual search or thermal imaging only
• Approach: Do not touch; destroy in place with explosive charges or incendiary
• Large-area clearance: Extremely challenging due to scatter pattern, small size, and zero metal

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PTM-1 / PTM-1S

designation: "PTM-1 / PTM-1S (also PGMDM)"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1970s-1980s"
type: "AV blast (scatterable)"
status: "In active service"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Pressure-actuated
• Arming: Pyrotechnic delay (~30 seconds after ejection); releases safety block enabling pressure sensor
• Mechanism: Vehicle pressure on mine body triggers detonation

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• PTM-1S: Self-destruct timer settable in 2-hour increments, max 24 hours (some sources: 3-40 hours)
• PTM-1 (without S): No self-destruct
• Clockwork self-destruct timer in cylindrical housing at one end

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Rectangular plastic body, olive green or brown
• Shape: Flat rectangular -- very different from round conventional AT mines
• Distinctive: Rectangular flat shape; cylindrical timer housing at one end

Delivery Systems

• KMGU universal munitions dispenser (aircraft)
• BM-21 Grad MLRS
• BM-27 Uragan MLRS
• Helicopter systems

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Liquid explosive -- sensitive to handling
• Plastic body with low metal content -- difficult to detect
• Self-destruct by detonation -- dangerous to be near expired mines

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PTM-3

designation: "PTM-3"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1980s"
type: "AV shaped charge (scatterable)"
status: "In active service"

Specifications

Fuze/Activation

• Type: Magnetic influence fuze (BT-06), battery-powered
• Arming: Two stages -- pyrotechnic then mechanical
• Full-width attack: Magnetic fuze detects vehicle magnetic signature

Anti-Handling/Anti-Lift Features

• Magnetic influence fuze may react to metal objects

Self-Destruct/Self-Neutralization

• Self-destruct: 16-24 hours after deployment
• Self-destruct by detonation

Color/Markings/Visual ID

• Body: Steel rectangular block with notches on sides
• Distinctive: Rectangular steel block -- shaped charge effect on 5 faces (4 sides + 1 end)
• Notches: Side notches visible -- part of shaped charge design

Commonly Confused With

• PTM-1 -- similar concept but PTM-1 is blast, PTM-3 is shaped charge

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Magnetic influence fuze -- do not approach with metal
• Shaped charge on 5 faces -- effective regardless of mine orientation after scatter
• Short self-destruct time (16-24 hours) but self-destruct is by DETONATION
• Used on Lancet drones for standoff mine delivery (reported 2024)

Delivery Systems

• GMZ-3 mine layer
• VMR-2 helicopter mine layer
• KMGU dispenser
• Lancet drones (recent adaptation)

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KPOM-2

designation: "KPOM-2"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union"
year_introduced: "1980s"
type: "Cassette dispenser for POM-2 AP mines"
status: "In active service"

Specifications

Delivery Systems

• PKM-1 portable mining kit (infantry -- hand-launched cassettes)
• BM-27 Uragan (9M59 rocket)
• BM-21 Grad (9M18 rocket)
• VSM-1 helicopter system
• UMZ remote mining machine

EOD Hazard Warnings

• Each cassette deploys 4 POM-2 mines with self-deploying trip-wires
• Rapid area denial -- multiple cassettes create dense minefields
• See POM-2 entry for individual mine hazards

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SEA MINES (SUMMARY)

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MDM Series

designation: "MDM series (MDM-1, MDM-2, MDM-3, MDM-4, MDM-5, MDM-6)"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union / Russia"
type: "Bottom-influence naval mines (export designation)"
status: "In service"

Overview

The MDM designations are export versions of the UDM series. They are bottom-influence mines using multi-channel fuzing (acoustic, magnetic, hydrodynamic -- any combination).

Key Variants

Fuze System

• Three-channel influence exploders: acoustic, electromagnetic (magnetic), hydrodynamic
• Hemispherical danger zone detection
• Can be configured in any 2-channel or 3-channel combination
• Ship-count settings available (detonate on Nth ship passage)

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UDM Series

designation: "UDM series (UDM, UDM-2, UDM-500)"
full_name: "Universalnaya Donnaya Mina (Universal Bottom Mine)"
country_of_origin: "Soviet Union / Russia"
year_introduced: "1961 onwards"
type: "Bottom-influence naval mines"
status: "In active service (Russian Navy)"

Key Specifications (UDM-2)

Size Categories

• Superlarge: UDM-2, DM-1, MDM-5, MDM-1, MDM-6
• Large: IGDM, AMD-2M, Serpei, UDM, MDM-4
• Small: IGDM-500, UDM-500, MDM-3

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SMDM

designation: "SMDM"
full_name: "Self-Transporting Sea Bottom Mine"
country_of_origin: "Russia"
type: "Self-propelled bottom mine (torpedo-form factor)"
status: "In service (Russian Navy)"
manufacturer: "MPO-Gidropribor"

Specifications

Concept

• Launched from submarine torpedo tube like a standard torpedo
• Self-propels to designated location and settles on sea bottom
• Functions as a bottom-influence mine at its destination
• Enables mine-laying from stand-off distance

EOD/MCM Notes

• Torpedo-shaped object on sea bottom may be SMDM, not a dud torpedo
• 500 kg warhead is capable of destroying ships and submarines of all classes
• 300 m detection/tracking radius

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CROSS-REFERENCE: DETECTION AND CLEARANCE SUMMARY

Metal Content Assessment (Critical for Detection Planning)

Anti-Handling Threat Matrix

Self-Destruct Summary

WARNING: Self-destruct is typically by DETONATION. Mines that have "self-destructed" may have malfunctioned and remain armed. NEVER assume a scatterable mine is safe because the self-destruct period has passed. Failure rates of 5-15% are documented.

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Sources

• PMN mine - Wikipedia
• PMN-2 - nolandmines.com
• PMN-4 - ODIN TRADOC
• PMN-4 - Bomb Techs Without Borders
• POMZ - Wikipedia
• POMZ-2M - nolandmines.com
• OZM - Wikipedia
• OZM-72 - nolandmines.com
• POM-2 - Wikipedia
• POM-2 - ODIN TRADOC
• MON-50 - Wikipedia
• MON-90 - Wikipedia
• MON-100 - Wikipedia
• MON-200 - Wikipedia
• TM-46 - Wikipedia
• TM-57 - Wikipedia
• TM-62 - Wikipedia
• TM-62 - ODIN TRADOC
• TM-72 - Wikipedia
• TMK-2 - Wikipedia
• TM-83 - Wikipedia
• TM-89 - Wikipedia
• PFM-1 - Wikipedia
• PTM-1 - Wikipedia
• PTM-3 - Wikipedia
• PMD series - Wikipedia
• PMA-2 - Wikipedia
• PMA-3 - Wikipedia
• PMA-1 - nolandmines.com
• MS-3 - nolandmines.com
• PMN-3 - ODIN TRADOC
• METIS - Fenix Insight
• CAT-UXO
• Bulletpicker.com
• NavWeaps - Russian Mines
• ARES - Armament Research Services