SALW Ammunition & AFV Munitions Ordnance Database

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT Created: 2026-03-28 Purpose: Comprehensive UXO/EOD reference for small arms, light weapons ammunition, RPG systems, ATGMs, AFV main gun rounds, and MANPADS encountered in conflict zones, with emphasis on Ukraine theater, Middle East, and global export markets.

SAFETY WARNING: This document is for IDENTIFICATION and AWARENESS only. It does NOT replace official EOD technical publications (60-series, NAVEODFLTDIV, JODIC). Always refer to current TMs for render-safe procedures. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher.

Source Ratings per SOURCE_RATING.md:

• CAT-UXO, ARES, GICHD, Fenix Insight/METIS: B-2 (Usually Reliable, Probably True)
• Wikipedia, GlobalSecurity, FAS, inetres.com: C-2 (Fairly Reliable, Probably True)
• Manufacturer specs (Bazalt, KBP, Raytheon, Saab, MBDA): A-1 (Completely Reliable, Confirmed)
• Jane's/IHS, Weaponsystems.net, DTIC pubs: B-2
• russianammo.org, cartridgecollectors.org: C-3 (Fairly Reliable, Possibly True)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part 1: SALW Ammunition

1. 7.62x39mm (Soviet/AK)
2. 5.45x39mm (Soviet/AK-74)
3. 7.62x54mmR (Soviet MG/Sniper)
4. 12.7x108mm (Soviet HMG)
5. 14.5x114mm (Soviet HMG)
6. 5.56x45mm NATO
7. 7.62x51mm NATO
8. .50 BMG (12.7x99mm NATO)
9. Headstamp Identification & Country Determination
10. SALW Ammunition Storage Hazards

Part 2: RPG Systems as UXO

1. RPG-18 Mukha
2. RPG-22 Netto
3. RPG-26 Aglen
4. RPG-27 Tavolga
5. RPG-29 Vampir
6. RPG-30
7. RPG-32 Barkas
8. SPG-9 Kopye Rounds
9. Carl Gustaf (84mm)
10. AT4 (M136)
11. NLAW (MBT LAW)
12. Panzerfaust 3

Part 3: ATGMs as UXO

1. 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
2. 9M111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
3. 9M113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
4. 9M119 Refleks (AT-11 Sniper)
5. 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
6. BGM-71 TOW
7. FGM-148 Javelin
8. Stugna-P (Skif)

Part 4: AFV Main Gun Ammunition

1. 125mm Smoothbore (T-72/T-80/T-90)
2. 120mm NATO Smoothbore (M1 Abrams / Leopard 2)
3. 100mm Rifled (T-55)
4. 73mm Smoothbore (BMP-1 Grom)
5. 30mm Autocannon (BMP-2/BMP-3 2A42)

Part 5: MANPADS as Debris

1. 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)
2. 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)
3. 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
4. 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
5. 9K333 Verba (SA-25 Willow)
6. FIM-92 Stinger
7. Starstreak HVM

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PART 1: SALW AMMUNITION

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<a name="762x39"></a>

1. 7.62x39mm (M43 Soviet)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD / Storage Hazards

• Cook-off risk: Propellant autoignition ~190-200 deg C; in vehicle fires, expect rounds to cook off within 1-5 minutes
• Sympathetic detonation: Individual SALW rounds pose minimal SD risk; bulk storage (crates/pallets) may produce mass fire / cook-off chain but not true detonation
• Incendiary/tracer: Fired tracer/incendiary that fails to fully burn can ignite dry vegetation; unfired incendiary rounds leak IM composition when corroded
• Handling: Corroded steel-case ammunition may have case head separation risk; do not fire corroded rounds
• API rounds: Black-tip BZ rounds contain incendiary composition -- handle as fire hazard

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<a name="545x39"></a>

2. 5.45x39mm (M74 Soviet)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD Notes

• Air cavity: 7N6 ball has a hollow cavity in nose behind steel core -- this is a design feature for terminal ballistics, not a fuze; no explosive content
• All variants are inert (no explosive filler) -- these are kinetic energy projectiles only
• Storage: Same cook-off and fire risks as 7.62x39mm

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<a name="76254r"></a>

3. 7.62x54mmR (Soviet MG/Sniper)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

B-32 API Detailed Specs

EOD Notes

• B-32 API: Contains small incendiary charge (thermite-based); treat as fire hazard
• Rimmed case: The protruding rim can cause hang-ups in belt-fed systems -- loose rounds found near fighting positions should not be assumed safe
• This caliber is extremely common in any post-Soviet conflict zone due to PKM prevalence

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<a name="127x108"></a>

4. 12.7x108mm (Soviet HMG)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

B-32 API Detailed Specs

EOD Hazards

• MDZ rounds contain explosive filler -- these are effectively miniature HE-I rounds; handle with care
• BSPh-46 contains white phosphorus -- WP will auto-ignite on exposure to air if container is breached; significant burn/fire hazard
• BZT-44: Tracer element may still be active in unfired rounds; potential fire starter
• Bulk ammunition: A full DShK ammunition box (50 rds) weighs ~7.5 kg; cook-off in fires produces dangerous projectile scatter
• 12.7mm rounds CAN PENETRATE light cover -- maintain standoff even from unfired rounds in fire scenarios

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<a name="145x114"></a>

5. 14.5x114mm (Soviet HMG)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD Hazards

• EXTREME PENETRATION CAPABILITY: 14.5mm can penetrate most field fortifications and light armored vehicles; maintain maximum standoff
• MDZ rounds contain explosive -- fragmentary effect possible
• 14.5mm cook-off is significantly more dangerous than SALW calibers due to energy (~32,000 J muzzle energy vs ~2,000 J for 7.62x39)
• B-32 incendiary composition: Fire hazard; can ignite fuel and ammunition
• This caliber is often found in ZPU AA positions -- expect mixed belts with multiple ammunition types

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<a name="556nato"></a>

6. 5.56x45mm NATO

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD Notes

• All variants are inert projectiles (no explosive content) -- kinetic energy only
• M855A1 steel tip is exposed -- can be confused with AP; the tip protrudes beyond the jacket
• Tracer: M856 contains pyrotechnic composition; fire hazard if unfired rounds are exposed to heat
• M995 AP: Tungsten-carbide core; very hard -- will spark on steel

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<a name="762nato"></a>

7. 7.62x51mm NATO

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD Notes

• M993 tungsten core -- does NOT contain depleted uranium; safe to handle but very hard
• M62 tracer -- contains strontium peroxide pyrotechnic; fire hazard
• 7.62 NATO is NOT interchangeable with .308 Winchester in all weapons (chamber pressure differences) but cartridge dimensions are nearly identical for ID purposes

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<a name="50bmg"></a>

8. .50 BMG (12.7x99mm)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD Hazards

• Mk 211 Raufoss CONTAINS EXPLOSIVE FILLER -- unlike standard SALW rounds, this multipurpose round has RDX/PETN charge and zirconium incendiary; treat as explosive ordnance
• M8 API incendiary composition -- IM 11 can auto-ignite when exposed; fire hazard
• .50 BMG rounds have EXTREME energy (~18,000 J) -- cook-off produces lethal projectile hazard at significant range
• SLAP rounds: Discarding sabot creates secondary hazards at close range during firing
• Bulk storage fires with .50 BMG are extremely dangerous -- full fragmentation/projectile hazard radius applies

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<a name="headstamps"></a>

9. Headstamp Identification & Country Determination

Soviet/Russian Factory Codes

Headstamp Reading Guide (Soviet/Russian Format)

Standard format (small caliber):

     [Factory Number]
   /                  \
  [Year]          [Lot Number]

Example: "188" at 12 o'clock, "85" at 6 o'clock
= Factory 188 (Novosibirsk), Year 1985

Cyrillic marks:
- "3" (backwards) = Cyrillic "Z" = "Zavod" (Factory)
- Star symbol (★) = military acceptance mark

Key Foreign Producer Headstamps

Tip Color Code Summary (Soviet/Russian System)

Tip Color Code Summary (NATO System)

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<a name="salw-storage"></a>

10. SALW Ammunition Storage Hazards

Cook-Off

• Smokeless propellant autoignition: 190-200 deg C
• In vehicle/structure fires, cook-off begins within 1-5 minutes depending on fire intensity and round proximity
• Cook-off produces projectile hazard but generally NOT high-order detonation for standard ball/AP/tracer
• EXCEPTION: Mk 211 Raufoss (.50 BMG) and any round with explosive filler may produce HE effects

Sympathetic Detonation Risk

• Individual SALW cartridges: VERY LOW sympathetic detonation risk
• Bulk storage in sealed containers: MODERATE -- cook-off chain reaction can propagate through crate/pallet
• Mixed storage (SALW + HE munitions): HIGH -- cook-off can initiate fuzes on adjacent ordnance
• Jack-in-the-box effect: In AFVs, ammunition cook-off can blow turret off hull (especially T-72 family with carousel autoloader)

Fire Approach Distances (General Guidance)

NOTE: These are general OSINT guidelines. Actual withdrawal distances per DoD 6055.09-M or applicable service TMs.

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PART 2: RPG SYSTEMS AS UXO

CRITICAL EOD NOTE: All RPG warheads use piezoelectric (impact) fuzes that arm after a short flight distance (typically 5-15 m). Dud RPG warheads are EXTREMELY DANGEROUS because the piezoelectric crystal is stressed on impact and may function from minimal subsequent disturbance. Most RPGs also have self-destruct timers (4-6 seconds) that may fail. A dud RPG warhead should be treated as armed and fuzed with hair-trigger sensitivity. DO NOT APPROACH -- establish cordon and call EOD.

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<a name="rpg18"></a>

11. RPG-18 Mukha (Fly)

Basic Data

Penetration

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Self-destruct at 6 seconds -- if SD fails, warhead is ARMED and impact-sensitive
• Piezoelectric fuze -- may function from very slight disturbance; extremely sensitive when armed
• Launcher tube: Collapsed tube = unfired; extended tube = fired OR misfired (MOST DANGEROUS)
• Extended but intact tube with warhead still in place = MISFIRE -- treat as worst-case armed ordnance

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<a name="rpg22"></a>

12. RPG-22 Netto

Basic Data

Penetration

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Same hazards as RPG-18 but with larger warhead
• Improved over RPG-18 with better penetration and slightly longer range
• Extended tube with visible warhead = DO NOT APPROACH

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<a name="rpg26"></a>

13. RPG-26 Aglen

Basic Data

Penetration

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Self-destruct timer: ~5-6 seconds post-launch
• Common UXO in Ukraine -- found both fired (dud) and unfired (abandoned positions)
• The RPG-26 uses a flip-up rear sight and fore/aft dust covers; if covers are open and sights up = system was armed
• Compared to RPG-18/22: non-telescoping tube (fixed length)

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<a name="rpg27"></a>

14. RPG-27 Tavolga

Basic Data

Penetration

EOD / Dud Behavior

• TANDEM WARHEAD -- two shaped charges; precursor may have functioned while main charge remains intact (partial detonation UXO)
• Significantly larger warhead than RPG-18/22/26 family
• Both warheads independently dangerous -- a partially functioned tandem warhead is an extreme hazard
• Greater explosive mass = larger fragmentation hazard radius than single-charge RPGs

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<a name="rpg29"></a>

15. RPG-29 Vampir

Basic Data

Penetration

Combat Record

• Penetrated front hull armor of M1A1 Abrams in Iraq (2007)
• Penetrated Merkava Mk IV frontal armor in Lebanon (2006)
• Extensively used in Syria and Ukraine

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Most lethal conventional RPG in widespread service
• Tandem warhead creates double hazard (see RPG-27 notes)
• Reusable launcher -- finding an empty tube does NOT confirm warhead detonated; tube may be reloaded
• PG-29V warhead as UXO: extremely dangerous, large explosive content
• Thermobaric variant (TBG-29V) also exists -- fuel-air explosive warhead; dud TBG is a significant toxic and fire hazard

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<a name="rpg30"></a>

16. RPG-30

Basic Data

Penetration (PG-30 Main Round)

Unique Feature

• Dual-tube design: 40 mm precursor rocket fires a fraction of a second before main 105 mm round
• Purpose: defeat Active Protection Systems (APS) like Trophy/Arena by saturating the defense
• APS reset time is 0.2-0.4 seconds; the RPG-30 exploits this gap

EOD / Dud Behavior

• TWO potential UXO items -- the decoy rocket and the main warhead
• The 40 mm precursor may also contain a small warhead
• Both tubes visible on launcher; if only one cap is missing, determine which round fired

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<a name="rpg32"></a>

17. RPG-32 Barkas

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Reusable launcher means fired tubes may be reloaded
• Thermobaric warhead (TBG-32V) as UXO: contains fuel-air mixture; toxic vapor hazard even unfunctioned; fire/explosion hazard
• PG-32V tandem warhead: same double-hazard as RPG-27/29

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<a name="spg9"></a>

18. SPG-9 Kopye Rounds

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD / Dud Behavior

• PG-9 HEAT rounds have piezoelectric fuze + self-destruct
• Rocket motor ignites at ~20 m from launcher -- unfired rounds found <20 m from launcher may have live rocket motor propellant
• OG-9 HE-Frag contains TNT filler -- conventional HE UXO hazard
• The SPG-9 is widely used by irregular forces globally; ammunition quality varies significantly among producers

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<a name="carlgustaf"></a>

19. Carl Gustaf (84mm Recoilless Rifle)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD / Dud Behavior

• HEDP 502 has selectable fuze delay -- dud may be set to either impact or delay mode; unpredictable behavior
• All HEAT rounds use piezoelectric fuzes -- same hazards as RPG warheads
• Wide variety of ammunition types -- correct identification critical before approach
• 84mm rounds are compatible across M2/M3/M4 launchers -- round type cannot be determined from launcher alone
• Backblast area: 25 m danger zone behind weapon; residual propellant may be scattered

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<a name="at4"></a>

20. AT4 (M136)

Basic Data

Penetration (varies by variant)

EOD / Dud Behavior

• PIBD fuze is ARMED after ~10 m flight -- dud warhead is fully armed and impact-sensitive
• Disposable launcher: fired tube has visible backblast exit; unfired tube retains rear seal
• The AT4 cannot be reloaded -- an empty tube is safe
• Cockback safety lever on top of tube: if lever is forward = weapon was armed/fired
• Self-destruct mechanism present but not always reliable
• AT4 CS variant uses saltwater countermass for confined-space firing -- no change to warhead hazards

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<a name="nlaw"></a>

21. NLAW (MBT LAW)

Basic Data

Penetration

Attack Modes

• Overfly Top Attack (OTA): Missile flies over target and fires warhead downward into thin top armor
• Direct Attack (DA): Direct impact for structures, bunkers, soft vehicles

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Guided missile -- more complex than unguided RPG; contains electronics, battery, guidance computer
• PLOS guidance means the missile has onboard inertial navigation -- electronics may retain battery charge
• Dud NLAW warhead may be armed -- piezoelectric fuze
• OTA attack mode means warhead detonates at a standoff above target; if OTA fuze fails, warhead may impact ground at distance from target
• Soft launch (low velocity exit) followed by rocket motor ignition -- unfired rocket motor propellant is a fire/explosion hazard
• EXTREMELY COMMON UXO IN UKRAINE -- one of the most widely supplied Western weapons

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<a name="pzf3"></a>

22. Panzerfaust 3

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Warhead arms at ~5 m -- safety mechanism releases fuze after short flight
• Percussion fuze detonates on impact or when propellant exhausts (self-destruct feature)
• DM22 tandem warhead: Two independent explosive charges; partial function is possible
• Octol 7030 explosive fill (70% HMX, 30% TNT) -- insensitive munition characteristics; less likely to cook off but high output when detonated
• PBX HMX fill in DM22 -- extremely powerful explosive; larger hazard radius
• The firing unit is reusable -- presence of firing unit alone does not indicate round was fired

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PART 3: ATGMs AS UXO

CRITICAL EOD NOTE: ATGM warheads are designed to defeat heavy armor and contain large shaped-charge explosive fills. Dud ATGMs may have armed warheads, intact rocket motors with propellant, energized batteries, and trailing guidance wires. NEVER pull on guidance wires -- this can activate the missile. Dud ATGMs require maximum standoff and professional EOD response. Many ATGMs contain depleted uranium or other hazardous materials in their liner or penetrator.

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<a name="9m14"></a>

23. 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)

Basic Data

Variants and Penetration

EOD / Dud Behavior

• MCLOS variants require continuous wire connection -- severed wire = missile goes ballistic and may impact short of target
• Trailing wire -- DO NOT PULL guidance wire; may activate squib or residual electronics
• Fiberglass launch container -- the suitcase launcher may contain additional unfired missiles
• Oldest ATGM still in widespread service -- thousands remain in global arsenals; quality/reliability degrades with age
• Solid rocket motor propellant degrades over time -- produces toxic fumes and becomes friction-sensitive

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<a name="9m111"></a>

24. 9M111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)

Basic Data

Variants and Penetration

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Tube-launched -- the round comes in a sealed fiberglass transport-launch container; if the seals are intact, the missile is unfired
• SACLOS guidance wire spools out from the missile -- wire trail on ground indicates missile flight path
• Boost charge ejects missile from tube before sustainer ignites -- unfired missile in container retains both boost and sustainer propellant
• The 9P135 launcher can fire both Fagot and Konkurs (9M113) -- correct missile ID is critical

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<a name="9m113"></a>

25. 9M113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)

Basic Data

Variants and Penetration

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Larger warhead than Fagot -- greater explosive content and fragmentation hazard
• 9M113M has tandem warhead -- extended probe/precursor charge adds complexity
• Same wire/container/launcher hazards as 9M111
• EXTREMELY COMMON in post-Soviet conflict zones; standard BMP-2 armament
• Container markings in Cyrillic identify round type -- critical for determining if tandem or single warhead

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<a name="9m119"></a>

26. 9M119 Refleks (AT-11 Sniper)

Basic Data

Penetration

EOD / Dud Behavior

• GUN-LAUNCHED from 125mm tank cannon -- found as UXO, these look like tank projectiles, NOT typical ATGMs
• Separate loading ammunition -- propellant charge is in a combustible case; missile and propellant found separately in autoloader
• The missile has a sustainer rocket motor that ignites after gun launch -- additional propellant hazard
• Laser beam-riding guidance means no trailing wire, but contains optical sensor in tail
• Tandem warhead -- precursor and main charge both contain shaped-charge explosive
• Distinguished from APFSDS/HE by the presence of folding fins in the missile body

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<a name="9m133"></a>

27. 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)

Basic Data

Warhead Variants

EOD / Dud Behavior

• MOST CAPABLE Russian ATGM in widespread service -- extremely lethal warhead
• Thermobaric variant (9M133F-1) as UXO: contains fuel-air mixture; toxic vapor + fire + explosion hazard; cloud may be invisible
• Laser beam-riding -- no trailing wire, but optical window in tail section is visible
• Large missile (152 mm diameter) -- significantly more explosive content than Fagot/Konkurs
• Container/tube is reusable -- finding empty tube does not confirm warhead detonation
• Kornet has been used extensively by non-state actors (Hezbollah, various Syrian factions) -- may be found in irregular storage conditions

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<a name="tow"></a>

28. BGM-71 TOW

Basic Data

Variants and Warhead Data

EOD / Dud Behavior

• WIRE-GUIDED -- guidance wires trail behind missile; NEVER pull wires
• ITOW/TOW-2 have extendable nose probes -- a visible extended probe means the warhead is in armed configuration
• TOW-2B top-attack uses dual EFP (explosively-formed penetrator) warheads with magnetic/IR sensors -- this is fundamentally different from shaped-charge variants; the warhead section contains sensor electronics
• Large wire spools both in the missile and in the launch tube -- wire can extend hundreds of meters
• Solid rocket motor -- unfired motor propellant is a fire/explosion hazard
• EXTREMELY common -- over 700,000 produced; used by 40+ nations

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<a name="javelin"></a>

29. FGM-148 Javelin

Basic Data

Penetration

• RHA: 600-800 mm (stated to exceed 762 mm / 30 inches per US Army)
• All known ERA defeated by tandem precursor charge
• Top-attack profile: strikes thinnest armor (typically 20-40 mm on MBTs)

Attack Modes

• Top attack (primary): Climbs to 150 m altitude, then dives onto target top
• Direct attack: Climbs to 60 m, then direct trajectory -- for bunkers, buildings, low-flying helicopters

EOD / Dud Behavior

• FIRE-AND-FORGET with onboard IR seeker -- the missile has an autonomous guidance computer and cooled IR sensor
• Battery/coolant unit (BCU) -- single-use argon gas cooling unit for IR seeker; contains pressurized gas
• Soft launch system -- low-velocity launch allows indoor/enclosed firing; but means dud missiles may land relatively close to launch point
• TANDEM WARHEAD -- two explosive charges; partial function possible
• Top-attack trajectory means the impact point may be far from the apparent line of fire
• CLU is reusable -- finding an empty CLU does not confirm missile detonated
• Launch tube is disposable -- used tubes should have visible ejection marks at rear
• PBXN explosive fill -- polymer-bonded explosive; relatively insensitive but powerful
• VERY COMMON UXO IN UKRAINE -- thousands supplied to Ukrainian forces

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<a name="stugna"></a>

30. Stugna-P (Skif)

Basic Data

Warhead Variants

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Laser beam-riding -- no trailing wire; optical sensor in missile tail
• Remote operation -- operator can be 50+ m from launcher using cable/remote display; the launcher may be unmanned
• Large tandem warhead in 152 mm variant -- significant explosive content
• Ukrainian domestic production -- markings in Ukrainian/Cyrillic
• Commonly used with remote tripod -- found abandoned at defensive positions
• Automated tracking mode means missile may have been launched without continuous operator control

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PART 4: AFV MAIN GUN AMMUNITION

EOD NOTE: AFV main gun rounds are among the most dangerous UXO items due to their size, explosive content, and fuze complexity. APFSDS penetrators (especially those with depleted uranium) pose radiological hazards. HEAT rounds have large shaped-charge warheads. HE-Frag rounds contain several kilograms of high explosive. All AFV rounds require professional EOD response. Many Russian AFV rounds use two-piece (separate loading) ammunition with combustible cartridge cases.

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<a name="125mm"></a>

31. 125mm Smoothbore (T-72/T-80/T-90)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD / Dud Behavior

• SEPARATE LOADING AMMUNITION -- projectile and propellant charge stored/found separately
• Combustible case for propellant: may burn but generally does not detonate; residual propellant is flammable
• APFSDS duds: The penetrator is a dense metal rod (tungsten or DU) with no explosive content; the primary hazard is the discarded sabot petals (4 aluminum/steel segments) scattered 50-200 m from muzzle, and DU toxicity/radioactivity for DU variants
• HEAT duds: Large shaped-charge warhead with piezoelectric fuze -- extremely dangerous; treat as armed
• HE-Frag duds: Contain 3+ kg of high explosive with impact/graze fuze -- extreme hazard
• Autoloader carousel in destroyed T-72/T-90: ammunition stored in a ring below turret; hull penetration almost always detonates ammunition causing catastrophic turret ejection (jack-in-the-box)
• DU penetrators (Svinets-2): Radiological hazard; pyrophoric (self-igniting) fragments; requires HAZMAT protocols

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<a name="120mm"></a>

32. 120mm NATO Smoothbore (M1 Abrams / Leopard 2)

Basic Data

US Ammunition Types

German/NATO Ammunition Types

EOD / Dud Behavior

• ONE-PIECE AMMUNITION -- projectile and propellant are a single unit (unlike Russian 125mm separate loading)
• Semi-combustible case -- the aft case body burns away; only a metal stub base remains after firing
• DU penetrators (M829 series): Radiological + pyrophoric hazard; DU fragments self-ignite; aerosol inhalation risk; requires rad survey and HAZMAT
• M830/M830A1 HEAT: Large shaped-charge warhead; piezoelectric fuze; standard HEAT UXO hazards
• M830A1 MPAT air-burst mode: Contains proximity fuze electronics -- may have residual battery charge
• M908 HE-OR: Delay fuze designed to penetrate walls before detonating -- dud may have armed delay fuze
• DM11 programmable HE: Electronic fuze with multiple modes (impact, delay, airburst) -- complex fuze system increases unpredictability of dud behavior
• 120mm rounds are LARGE (22+ kg each) -- significant blast and fragmentation radius

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<a name="100mm"></a>

33. 100mm Rifled (T-55)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD / Dud Behavior

• APHE (BR-412D) contains explosive filler in the projectile body -- this is an AP round WITH explosive charge; detonates after penetrating armor; dud APHE is extremely dangerous
• HE-Frag (OF-412Zh) -- large TNT filler; standard HE UXO hazards
• T-55 ammunition is some of the oldest armored vehicle ammunition still in use -- significant quantities exist globally from Cold War stockpiles
• Degraded fuzes and propellant in old stocks -- increased sensitivity and unpredictability
• The 100mm caliber is also used in the MT-12 (Rapira) towed anti-tank gun -- these rounds may be found in non-armored vehicle contexts

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<a name="73mm"></a>

34. 73mm Smoothbore (BMP-1 2A28 Grom)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

EOD / Dud Behavior

• PG-15V is ROCKET-ASSISTED -- the round has a rocket motor that ignites after leaving the barrel; unfired/dud rounds contain live rocket propellant
• PG-15V uses same PG-9 warhead as SPG-9 -- piezoelectric fuze; impact-sensitive when armed
• OG-15V contains TNT -- standard HE UXO hazard
• OG-15V is hand-loaded (too short for autoloader) -- may be found loose in BMP-1 turret
• PG-15V fin assembly is visible at base -- 6 folding fins; distinguishes from other 73mm items
• The 73mm caliber is relatively uncommon outside BMP-1 and SPG-9 -- caliber alone helps ID the source weapon

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<a name="30mm"></a>

35. 30mm Autocannon (BMP-2/BMP-3 2A42)

Basic Data

Ammunition Types

Typical Combat Load (BMP-2)

• 160 rounds AP-T
• 340 rounds HE-I/HE-Frag-T
• Total: 500 rounds

EOD / Dud Behavior

• HEI-T and HE-Frag-T rounds contain explosive filler -- these are NOT inert like SALW; each 30mm HE round is a small grenade
• Self-destruct timer (6-14 seconds) on HE rounds -- if SD fails, round impacts with armed fuze
• AP-T rounds are inert projectiles (no explosive) -- tracer element is only pyrotechnic hazard
• High volume of fire -- a BMP-2 engagement can scatter hundreds of rounds; expect large UXO fields
• 30mm brass/steel cases litter fighting positions -- cases are NOT hazardous (no propellant retention)
• Aircraft ammunition (Mi-28, Ka-52) uses the same 30x165mm cartridges -- strafing runs create linear UXO patterns
• APDS-T sabot petals -- discarding sabot components can cause injuries; found near firing positions

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PART 5: MANPADS AS DEBRIS

EOD NOTE: MANPADS are man-portable surface-to-air missile systems. As UXO, they present multiple hazards: explosive warhead, solid-fuel rocket motor (may still contain propellant), battery/power supply, and potentially toxic materials. Intact unfired MANPADS are high-value proliferation-risk items and should be reported through proper channels. Self-destruct mechanisms arm after a set time of flight (10-17 seconds) and are designed to destroy the missile if it misses; however, self-destruct reliability is not 100%.

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<a name="strela2"></a>

36. 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)

Basic Data

EOD / Dud Behavior

• MOST WIDELY PROLIFERATED MANPADS IN HISTORY -- estimated 500,000+ produced; found globally
• Grazing fuze -- detonates from even slight bending of the missile body; extremely sensitive
• Self-destruct timer (14-17 sec) -- if SD fails, missile may impact as armed UXO anywhere along flight path
• Rocket motor may contain residual propellant -- fire/explosion hazard
• Seeker and electronics are obsolete but still contain hazardous materials (lead, cadmium)
• IR seeker is tail-chase only -- missile approaches targets from behind; debris pattern reflects this
• Grip stock/launcher tube is reusable -- empty tubes are not inherently dangerous but should be reported

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37. 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)

Basic Data

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Similar hazards to Strela-2 but with improved seeker
• All-aspect engagement capability means debris could come from any direction relative to target aircraft
• FM modulation seeker -- less susceptible to decoy flares; more complex electronics
• Same 72mm diameter as Strela-2 -- visual distinction requires examining the gripstock and launch tube details

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38. 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)

Basic Data

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Improved guidance over Strela series; better discrimination of targets vs. decoys
• Same 72mm diameter as Strela-2/3 -- visual distinction from those systems requires detailed examination
• Laser proximity fuze on later models -- optimizes detonation timing near target; electronics may retain charge
• IFF (Friend/Foe) interrogator may be attached to gripstock -- contains battery and electronic components

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39. 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)

Basic Data

Improved Variant: 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Igla-S has significantly larger warhead (2.5 kg vs 1.27 kg) -- greater blast and fragmentation hazard
• "Smart" fuze on Igla-S waits for penetration confirmation before optimal detonation -- complex electronic fuze system; unpredictable in dud state
• Magnetic proximity fuze may be triggered by ferrous metal near the missile -- keep metal tools/equipment away during approach
• Rocket motor propellant -- both stages use composite solid propellant; energetic material hazard
• Widely deployed in Ukraine by both sides; common UXO item

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40. 9K333 Verba (SA-25 Willow)

Basic Data

EOD / Dud Behavior

• Most advanced Russian MANPADS -- multi-spectral seeker makes it highly resistant to countermeasures
• Three-band seeker contains sophisticated optics and electronics -- higher-value intelligence item; report through channels
• Same physical hazards as Igla-S: warhead, rocket motor, fuze
• Limited production and distribution -- finding Verba components is a significant intelligence indicator
• 72mm diameter maintained across all Russian MANPADS from Strela-2 to Verba -- caliber alone does not identify the specific system

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41. FIM-92 Stinger

Basic Data

EOD / Dud Behavior

• HTA-3 warhead explosive (HMX/TNT/aluminum) -- high-output explosive; significant blast hazard
• 17-second self-destruct timer -- relatively long flight time before SD activates
• Proximity fuze (FIM-92J) -- optimized for small targets like UAVs; electronic fuze may retain charge
• IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system uses a separate battery-powered interrogator; this should be removed/secured separately
• Gripstock/BCU is reusable -- can be coupled to fresh missile rounds
• Argon gas BCU (Battery Coolant Unit) -- pressurized gas container; do not puncture
• SUPPLIED TO UKRAINE -- significant numbers provided; potential UXO item
• Historical proliferation concern -- Stingers were provided to Afghan Mujahideen in 1980s; some remain unaccounted for globally

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42. Starstreak HVM

Basic Data

Unique Warhead Design

EOD / Dud Behavior

• UNIQUE THREE-DART WARHEAD -- this is fundamentally different from all other MANPADS
• Three separate UXO items if darts separate but fail to function -- each dart is independently dangerous
• Extremely high velocity (Mach 4+) means dart impact creates significant fragmentation and penetration
• Laser beam-riding -- no IR seeker to detect; operator must maintain aim
• Booster section separates after acceleration -- a large booster casing and three small darts may be found in different locations
• Tungsten-alloy dart body -- dense, heavy for size; distinctive elongated shape
• PBX-98 explosive in each dart -- polymer-bonded explosive; relatively insensitive but high output
• SUPPLIED TO UKRAINE -- used against Russian aircraft and helicopters

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Quick Reference -- Explosive Content by Category

Appendix B: Dud Sensitivity Quick Guide

Appendix C: Cordon Distances (General OSINT Guidance)

NOTE: These are minimum recommended distances from OSINT sources. Always defer to official service TMs and QD tables.

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Document version: 1.0 Last updated: 2026-03-28 Compiled from OSINT sources rated per SOURCE_RATING.md