MASTER ORDNANCE IDENTIFICATION DECISION TREES
VISUAL IDvisual-id/decision-trees
MASTER ORDNANCE IDENTIFICATION DECISION TREES
Version: 1.0 Date: 2026-03-28 Purpose: Structured visual identification guide for the ordnance identification agent. Each tree walks through discriminating visual and contextual questions to narrow an unknown ordnance item to a specific identification.
SAFETY WARNING: This decision tree system is for IDENTIFICATION ONLY. It does NOT replace official EOD technical publications. Always refer to current 60-series pubs, JODIC, and applicable TMs for render-safe procedures. When in doubt, withdraw and call higher. NEVER approach, touch, or disturb unidentified ordnance.
AGENT INSTRUCTIONS: At each decision node, evaluate the visual evidence from the image. If a feature is ambiguous, follow BOTH branches and present the user with discriminating follow-up questions. Always include confidence levels and safety warnings. If at any point a STOP-HAZARD warning is reached, present it IMMEDIATELY before continuing identification.
TREE 1 -- MASTER CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION
Entry Point: Unknown ordnance item observed. Determine general category.
Node 1.0: What is the general form factor?
1.0 GENERAL FORM FACTOR
│
├─[A] ELONGATED BODY WITH FINS AND/OR PROPULSION
│ │ (cylindrical or ogival body, visible fins/wings, nozzle/intake/motor)
│ │
│ ├─ Is there a propulsion system visible (nozzle, intake, motor, propeller)?
│ │ ├─ YES ──► Go to Node 1.1 (Propelled Munition)
│ │ └─ NO (fins at tail only, no propulsion evidence) ──► TREE 3: BOMB
│ │
│ └─ Node 1.1: PROPELLED MUNITION — What type of propulsion?
│ │
│ ├─[a] Air intake visible (scoop, duct, chin inlet)
│ │ └─ Turbojet/ramjet propulsion ──► Is there a wing/planform?
│ │ ├─ Wings present (swept, delta, cruciform) ──► TREE 2: MISSILE
│ │ └─ No wings, delta-wing body ──► TREE 6: DRONE/UAS
│ │
│ ├─[b] Rocket nozzle at base (single or cluster, no intake)
│ │ └─ Is it man-portable size (<1.5 m)?
│ │ ├─ YES ──► Consider RPG/ATGM warhead or MANPADS
│ │ └─ NO ──► Fin configuration?
│ │ ├─ Cruciform/X-form fins with seeker nose ──► TREE 2: MISSILE
│ │ ├─ Folding fins, cylindrical, nozzle at base ──► TREE 8: ROCKET ARTILLERY
│ │ └─ Grid fins or trapezoidal control surfaces ──► TREE 2: MISSILE (ballistic)
│ │
│ ├─[c] Propeller visible (pusher or tractor)
│ │ └─ TREE 6: DRONE/UAS
│ │
│ └─[d] Propeller at tail, torpedo-shaped, maritime context
│ └─ TREE 9: TORPEDO
│
├─[B] TEARDROP/CYLINDRICAL BODY WITH FIN GROUP AT TAIL, NO PROPULSION
│ │ (smooth body, nose fuze or fuze wells, stabilizer fins, no nozzle/intake)
│ └─ TREE 3: BOMB
│
├─[C] DISC, CYLINDER, OR BOX SHAPE — NO FINS — AT GROUND/SEA LEVEL
│ │ (round, flat, squat profile; may have fuze protruding from top/side)
│ └─ TREE 4: MINE
│
├─[D] SMALL ITEM (<30 cm), FOUND IN CLUSTERS OR SCATTERED
│ │ (cylindrical, spherical, or unusual shape; ribbon/parachute may be present)
│ └─ TREE 5: SUBMUNITION/BOMBLET
│
├─[E] WINGED AIRFRAME WITH ELECTRONICS VISIBLE
│ │ (wings, propeller/motor, camera, antenna, circuit boards, battery packs)
│ └─ TREE 6: DRONE/UAS
│
├─[F] NON-STANDARD / IMPROVISED APPEARANCE
│ │ (PVC pipe, metal cylinder, wires, cell phone, unusual container, aiming stake)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ IED/EFP indicators. PIR sensor may be active.
│ │ DO NOT APPROACH. Withdraw to minimum 300m.
│ │ Report and request EOD support.
│ │
│ └─ TREE 7: EFP/IED
│
├─[G] PARTIAL ITEM / FRAGMENT / DEBRIS
│ │ (broken section, separated warhead, motor section, fin assembly, wing fragment)
│ └─ Examine fragment features:
│ ├─ Bowtie-shaped fragments ──► S-300 (48N6) warhead debris
│ ├─ Copper disk/slug ──► EFP remnant ──► TREE 7
│ ├─ Delta wing fragment, composite ──► Shahed-136/drone debris ──► TREE 6
│ ├─ Turbine blade, jet engine section ──► Cruise missile debris ──► TREE 2
│ ├─ Solid propellant grain visible ──► Rocket motor section ──► TREE 2 or TREE 8
│ ├─ Fin assembly with rocket nozzle ──► Rocket artillery ──► TREE 8
│ ├─ Guidance section (circuit boards, seeker dome) ──► TREE 2 (missile)
│ └─ Cannot determine ──► Request additional photos, context, measurements
│
└─[H] LARGE SPHERICAL / CYLINDRICAL OBJECT IN MARITIME CONTEXT
│ (floating, anchored, on seabed, washed ashore)
└─ TREE 4: MINE (Naval)
Confidence Guidance for Category:
- HIGH (>85%): Clear form factor match with multiple confirming features
- MEDIUM (50-85%): Form factor suggestive but some features ambiguous
- LOW (<50%): Partial view, heavy damage, or features consistent with multiple categories
TREE 2 -- MISSILE IDENTIFICATION
Entry: Item classified as missile (elongated body with propulsion and guidance features).
Node 2.0: Size Class
2.0 ESTIMATED SIZE CLASS
│
├─[A] VERY LARGE (>7 m length, >0.8 m diameter)
│ └─ Go to Node 2.1A (Strategic/Large Missile)
│
├─[B] LARGE (4-7 m, 0.3-0.8 m diameter)
│ └─ Go to Node 2.1B (Tactical Cruise/AShCM)
│
├─[C] MEDIUM (2-4 m, 0.2-0.4 m diameter)
│ └─ Go to Node 2.1C (Tactical/SHORADS Missile)
│
└─[D] SMALL (<2 m)
└─ Go to Node 2.1D (MANPADS/Small Missile)
Node 2.1A: Very Large Missile (>7 m)
2.1A VERY LARGE MISSILE
│
├─ Is liquid propellant evident? (staining, IRFNA orange residue, UDMH smell)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ TOXIC PROPELLANT. IRFNA/UDMH/TG-02 are extremely toxic and carcinogenic.
│ │ Full HAZMAT/CBRN response BEFORE EOD approach.
│ │ Minimum 300m exclusion zone upwind.
│ │
│ ├─ YES — Liquid fueled ──►
│ │ ├─ Body diameter ~0.88 m, conical nosecone
│ │ │ ├─ Length ~11 m, fins present ──► Shahab-1 / Scud-B derivative [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │ ├─ Length ~12 m ──► Shahab-2 / Scud-C derivative [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │ └─ Finless (cylindrical, smooth body, no stabilizers)
│ │ │ └─ ──► Qiam-1/2 (Iranian, TVC, no fins) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Body diameter ~1.25 m, baby-bottle nosecone
│ │ │ └─ ──► Shahab-3 / Ghadr-1 (MRBM) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Very large body (~11.7 m length, 920 mm diameter)
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ │ Kh-22/Kh-32: TG-02 fuel is EXTREMELY TOXIC AND CARCINOGENIC.
│ │ │ │ CHEMICAL HAZARD FIRST, EXPLOSIVE SECOND.
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ └─ ──► Kh-22 / Kh-32 (AS-4 Kitchen) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Separating warhead (nose section different from body)
│ │ └─ Check for MaRV features (control surfaces on warhead)
│ │ ├─ MaRV present ──► Emad-1 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ └─ Standard warhead ──► Shahab-3 variant [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ NO — Solid fueled ──►
│ ├─ Grid fins or trapezoidal control surfaces visible
│ │ ├─ ~7.3 m length, ~920 mm diameter, pointed conical nose
│ │ │ └─ ──► Iskander-M (9M723) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ └─ Smaller, ~5.5 m, ~760 mm diameter
│ │ └─ ──► Hwasong-11D (DPRK) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ ├─ Large delta fins, cylindrical body, ~7.5 m
│ │ └─ White/light gray body, radar proximity fuze nose
│ │ └─ ──► S-300 / 48N6 (used as ground-attack) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ ├─ Two-stage solid, large (~18 m)
│ │ └─ ──► Sejjil-2 (Iranian MRBM) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │
│ ├─ Road-mobile TEL context, ~8.86 m, 0.61 m diameter
│ │ ├─ EO/IR terminal seeker window visible
│ │ │ └─ ──► Khalij Fars ASBM [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ └─ No terminal seeker
│ │ └─ ──► Fateh-110 family (Gen 4 / Fateh-313 / Zolfaghar) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Discriminate by range marking/context:
│ │ - ~300 km range context ──► Fateh-110
│ │ - Separating warhead ──► Zolfaghar
│ │ - Composite casing ──► Raad-500
│ │
│ ├─ ~13 m length, stepped diameter, MaRV warhead
│ │ └─ ──► Kheibar Shekan [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ Three-stage, road-mobile, very large (>15 m)
│ └─ ICBM class — determine origin:
│ ├─ 9-axle TEL ──► Hwasong-14/15/18 (DPRK) or Yars (Russia)
│ ├─ 11-axle TEL ──► Hwasong-17/19 (DPRK) or DF-41 (China)
│ └─ [Confidence: LOW — strategic systems rarely encountered as UXO]
Node 2.1B: Large Tactical Missile (4-7 m)
2.1B LARGE TACTICAL MISSILE (4-7 m)
│
├─ Body cross-section?
│ ├─ Triangular cross-section
│ │ └─ Swept wings, turbojet exhaust aft, EO/DSMAC window on nose
│ │ └─ ──► Kh-101 (AS-23A Kodiak) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ Gray/dark gray; ~7.4 m; air intake underneath
│ │
│ └─ Cylindrical cross-section ──► Continue below
│
├─ Air intake visible?
│ │
│ ├─ YES — Turbojet/ramjet powered ──►
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Intake on underside, mid-body swept wings
│ │ │ ├─ ~6.4 m length, ~360 mm diameter, cruciform wings + tail fins
│ │ │ │ ├─ Chinese markings (Simplified Chinese) ──► YJ-83 / C-802 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ │ ├─ Farsi markings or no markings ──► Noor (Iranian C-802) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ │ └─ No markings, combat recovery context
│ │ │ │ └─ Examine booster attachment point, seeker type
│ │ │ │ └─ ──► C-802 family [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ │ C-802/Noor has DELAYED FUZE. Warhead penetrates before detonation.
│ │ │ │ UXO may be embedded in structure with armed delay mechanism.
│ │ │ │ 500m exclusion zone. Do not approach nose-on.
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ └─ Larger (~6.5 m), improved seeker
│ │ │ └─ ──► Ghader/Qader (extended-range Noor) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Intake on underside, cruciform folding wings, ~533 mm diameter
│ │ │ └─ ──► 3M14 Kalibr [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ Cylindrical body, ~6.2 m without booster
│ │ │ Booster section may be found separately
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Intake on underside, smaller body (~380 mm diameter)
│ │ │ └─ TV window (EO seeker) on nose?
│ │ │ ├─ YES ──► Kh-59 (TV-guided) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ └─ NO ──► Kh-59MK2 (autonomous) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Pop-out wings, Kh-55 airframe shape (~7-8 m)
│ │ │ ├─ Russian markings ──► Kh-55/55SM [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ └─ No markings / Iranian context ──► Soumar / Hoveyzeh [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Small body (~4.5-5 m), pop-out wings, small turbojet (TJ100-type)
│ │ │ └─ Commercial GPS receiver boards in debris
│ │ │ └─ ──► Quds-1/2 (Iranian LACM) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Ramjet intake (large chin or nose intake), supersonic profile
│ │ ├─ Very large warhead section, ~5-6 m
│ │ │ └─ ──► YJ-12 / CM-302 (supersonic AShCM) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ └─ Two-stage (subsonic bus + supersonic dart separates)
│ │ └─ ──► YJ-18 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ NO — Solid rocket motor only ──►
│ │
│ ├─ ~3.5 m length, ~280 mm diameter, solid rocket
│ │ └─ ──► Nasr-1 / C-704 (short-range AShCM) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ ├─ Cruciform mid-body wings, radar seeker dome nose
│ │ ├─ ~5 m, sea-skimming context ──► Kumsong-3 / Kh-35 derivative (DPRK) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ └─ Older, larger (~6 m), heavy ──► HY-2 Silkworm / P-15 Styx [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ Large SAM-type body, large fins
│ └─ Refer to SAM identification below
Node 2.1C: Medium Missile (2-4 m)
2.1C MEDIUM MISSILE (2-4 m)
│
├─ Visible seeker type?
│ │
│ ├─ Radar dome (semi-transparent, rounded nose)
│ │ ├─ Large cruciform fins, ~3.5-4 m ──► SAM type
│ │ │ ├─ Two-stage solid ──► Pyoljji-1-2 / Pongae-6 (DPRK) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ │ ├─ S-75 / SA-2 profile ──► S-75 Guideline [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │ └─ Smaller ──► S-125 / SA-3 Goa [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Medium fins, ~3 m ──► Buk / HQ-16 type [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ ├─ IR seeker (glass dome, darkened window)
│ │ ├─ MANPADS size (<2 m) ──► Node 2.1D
│ │ └─ Larger (2-4 m), cruciform fins
│ │ ├─ Dual-pulse motor, ~3 m ──► Tor-M2 / HQ-17 missile [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ └─ ──► Short-range SAM [Confidence: LOW]
│ │
│ └─ EO/TV window (flat glass panel)
│ └─ Small body, air-launched context ──► Kh-38 or Kh-29 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
├─ Fin configuration?
│ ├─ Cruciform wings + cruciform tail (8 surfaces total)
│ │ └─ SAM or AAM class
│ ├─ X-wing (4 wings at 45-degree angles)
│ │ └─ ──► Lancet-type loitering munition ──► TREE 6
│ └─ Wrap-around fins (curved around body)
│ └─ ──► Likely AAM (PL-series, R-73, R-77) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
└─ Air-to-air missile indicators (found near aircraft wreckage):
├─ ~3-4 m, active radar seeker, cruciform fins ──► R-77 / PL-12 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
├─ ~3 m, IR seeker, thrust vectoring nozzle ──► R-73 / PL-10 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
├─ ~4 m, large, ramjet/dual-pulse ──► PL-15 / R-37M [Confidence: LOW]
└─ Cannot determine type ──► Request markings, measurements, context
Node 2.1D: Small Missile (<2 m)
2.1D SMALL MISSILE (<2 m)
│
├─ Tubular, man-portable, IR seeker dome
│ ├─ ~1.4 m, narrow ──► Igla / SA-18 MANPADS [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ ├─ ~1.5 m ──► Strela / SA-7 MANPADS [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ └─ Grip stock / launch tube present ──► Confirm MANPADS [Confidence: HIGH]
│
├─ Shaped-charge warhead visible (copper cone in nose)
│ └─ ATGM type
│ ├─ Wire trailing ──► Wire-guided ATGM (Toophan/TOW, Dehlavieh/Kornet) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ ├─ Laser seeker window ──► Laser-guided ATGM [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ └─ Tandem warhead (precursor charge visible) ──► Advanced ATGM [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
└─ Cannot determine ──► Request additional photos and measurements
Missile Marking Discrimination
MARKING-BASED DISCRIMINATION (when visible):
│
├─ Cyrillic text (Russian) ──► Russian-manufactured
│ └─ Cross-reference body shape with Russian missile catalog
│
├─ Simplified Chinese characters ──► PRC-manufactured
│ └─ Cross-reference with Chinese missile catalog
│
├─ Farsi/Persian script ──► Iranian-manufactured
│ └─ Cross-reference with Iranian missile catalog
│
├─ Korean (Hangul/Chosongul) ──► DPRK-manufactured
│ └─ Cross-reference with DPRK missile catalog
│
├─ No markings or markings removed ──► Proxy use likely
│ └─ Determine origin by construction features, seeker type, component markings
│
└─ Western component markings on non-Western airframe
└─ Sanctions-evasion procurement; document for forensic exploitation
TREE 3 -- BOMB IDENTIFICATION
Entry: Item classified as bomb (teardrop/cylindrical body, fin group at tail, no propulsion).
Node 3.0: Size Estimation
3.0 ESTIMATED SIZE / WEIGHT CLASS
│
├─ Use reference objects in image for scale estimation
│ (person, vehicle, doorway, standard objects)
│
├─[A] VERY LARGE (body length >2 m, diameter >500 mm)
│ └─ Node 3.1A
│
├─[B] LARGE (body length 1.5-2 m, diameter 350-500 mm)
│ └─ Node 3.1B
│
├─[C] MEDIUM (body length 1-1.5 m, diameter 200-350 mm)
│ └─ Node 3.1C
│
├─[D] SMALL (body length <1 m)
│ └─ Node 3.1D
│
└─ Cannot estimate size ──► Proceed to body shape (Node 3.2)
Node 3.1A: Very Large Bomb
3.1A VERY LARGE BOMB
│
├─ Estimated weight ~3,000 kg, massive body (~1,400 kg explosive fill)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ MAXIMUM HAZARD ITEM. 1,500+ meter evacuation.
│ │ Requires senior EOD authority for disposition.
│ │ Do NOT approach.
│ │
│ ├─ UMPK wing kit attached (bolt-on wings, guidance module on body)?
│ │ ├─ YES ──► FAB-3000 M-54 with UMPK [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ GLONASS guidance module; lithium batteries; intelligence value
│ │ └─ NO ──► FAB-3000 M-54 (unguided) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ └─ Cyrillic body markings confirm weight class
│
├─ Estimated weight ~1,500 kg, diameter ~580 mm
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ 675 kg explosive fill. 1,000+ meter minimum evacuation.
│ │
│ ├─ UMPK wing kit attached?
│ │ ├─ YES ──► FAB-1500 M-54 with UMPK [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ └─ NO ──► FAB-1500 M-54 (unguided) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ └─ Old design (M-54 = 1954-era); may show significant age/corrosion
│
└─ Very large but cannot determine specific type
└─ Request measurements, markings, additional angles
└─ [Confidence: LOW] Treat as FAB-1500+ class for evacuation purposes
Node 3.1B: Large Bomb (~500 kg class)
3.1B LARGE BOMB (~500 kg class, diameter ~450 mm)
│
├─ Is a guidance kit / wing assembly attached?
│ │
│ ├─ YES — UMPK bolt-on wing kit visible
│ │ │
│ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ UMPK guidance module: lithium batteries, GLONASS receiver may be active.
│ │ │ Electronic fuzing. Do not use RF transmitters nearby.
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Check body markings for fill type:
│ │ │ ├─ Standard fill (TNT, TGA) ──► FAB-500 M-62 with UMPK [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ └─ Different fill designation stenciled (thermobaric markings)
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ │ FAB-500 ShN THERMOBARIC. Fuel-air explosive fill.
│ │ │ │ If cracked/leaking: FLAMMABLE AND TOXIC vapor cloud.
│ │ │ │ NO open flame, spark-generating tools, or RF transmitters.
│ │ │ │ Maximum standoff BIP only.
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ └─ ──► FAB-500 ShN (Thermobaric) with UMPK [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │
│ │ └─ UMPK wing sections may be found separated from body (detach on impact)
│ │
│ ├─ YES — EO/laser seeker on nose (not bolt-on wings)
│ │ ├─ Electro-optical window (glass/lens) on nose
│ │ │ └─ ──► KAB-500Kr (TV-guided) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ Laser seeker window
│ │ │ └─ ──► KAB-500L (laser-guided) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ └─ Satellite/INS guidance section (no seeker window)
│ │ └─ ──► KAB-500S (GLONASS-guided) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ └─ YES — Chinese guidance kit (LS-6, LT-2, FT-series)
│ ├─ Pop-out wings/fins, GPS/BeiDou guidance ──► LS-6-500 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ ├─ Laser seeker window ──► LT-2 / LT-3 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ └─ Satellite-guided tail kit ──► FT-series (FT-1/2/3) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
├─ NO — Unguided bomb
│ │
│ ├─ Olive drab/dark green body, Cyrillic markings
│ │ ├─ Standard HE fill markings ──► FAB-500 M-62 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Thermobaric fill markings
│ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD (see thermobaric warning above) ***
│ │ └─ ──► FAB-500 ShN [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ ├─ Chinese markings
│ │ └─ ──► 500-3/4 (Chinese GP bomb) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ Fragmentation sleeve visible (pre-scored body)
│ └─ ──► OFAB-500 (fragmentation bomb) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
└─ SPECIAL BOMB TYPES at ~500 kg class:
│
├─ Cylindrical body with dispenser section (seams visible, submunition access panels)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Cluster bomb. If dispenser failed, contains armed submunitions.
│ │ Survey surrounding area for scattered submunitions before approach.
│ │
│ ├─ RBK-500 series markings ──►
│ │ ├─ Contains PTAB-2.5M (anti-armor submunitions) ──► RBK-500 PTAB [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ Contains ShOAB-0.5 (anti-personnel) ──► RBK-500 ShOAB [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ └─ Contains SPBE-D (sensor-fuzed)
│ │ │
│ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ SPBE-D submunitions have IR sensors that may FIRE ON BODY HEAT.
│ │ │ Wait 48+ hours. Cold-body/robotic approach only.
│ │ │
│ │ └─ ──► RBK-500U SPBE-D [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ └─ Cannot read markings ──► Treat as cluster; survey for submunitions
│
└─ Concrete-piercing nose (hardened steel penetrator tip, longer nose)
└─ ──► BETAB-500 (concrete-piercing bomb) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
Check for rocket-assist motor on tail
Node 3.1C: Medium Bomb (~250 kg class)
3.1C MEDIUM BOMB (~250 kg class)
│
├─ Olive drab, Cyrillic markings, ~1.2 m body
│ ├─ UMPK wing kit attached ──► FAB-250 M-62 with UMPK [Confidence: HIGH]
│ ├─ Standard tail fins, nose fuze (vane-type arming device visible)
│ │ └─ ──► FAB-250 M-62 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ └─ Pre-scored fragmentation body ──► OFAB-250 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
├─ Chinese markings
│ ├─ Guidance kit attached (LS-6, FT-series) ──► LS-6-250 / FT-series [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ └─ Unguided ──► 250-3/4 (Chinese GP bomb) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
├─ Dispenser body (cluster)
│ └─ ──► RBK-250 series [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ Survey surrounding area for submunitions
│
└─ DPRK context (Korean War legacy or current)
└─ Soviet FAB-250 type (identical to Russian) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
Node 3.1D: Small Bomb (<250 kg class)
3.1D SMALL BOMB
│
├─ Very small (25-100 kg), guidance kit, Chinese markings
│ ├─ GPS/BeiDou wing kit ──► LS-6-100 or LS-6-50 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ └─ Satellite-guided ──► FT-5/6/7 (small PGM) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
├─ Small cylindrical body from drone hardpoint
│ ├─ ~8-10 kg, laser/GPS guided ──► Sadid-1 (Iranian drone-dropped PGM) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ ├─ ~20-40 kg, seeker window ──► Qaem-series (Qaem-1/5/9) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ └─ Small glide body ──► Balaban (Iranian glide bomb) [Confidence: LOW]
│
└─ Incendiary body markings
└─ ──► ZAB-series incendiary bomb [Confidence: MEDIUM]
Bomb Fuze Location Quick Check
FUZE LOCATION (aids identification of all bombs):
│
├─ Nose fuze only
│ └─ Typical of unguided FAB series, OFAB
│
├─ Nose AND tail fuze wells
│ └─ Standard Soviet/Chinese GP bomb design (FAB, 250/500-3/4)
│
├─ Guidance section replaces nose fuze
│ └─ KAB-series guided, LS-6, LT-2, FT-series
│
├─ Electronic fuze module (UMPK integration)
│ └─ UMPK-equipped bomb
│
└─ Vane-type arming device visible (propeller-like)
└─ Vanes partially rotated = PARTIALLY ARMED = MOST DANGEROUS STATE
Band Color Quick Reference
BOMB BODY BAND COLORS (Russian convention):
│
├─ Yellow band ──► HE fill
├─ Brown band ──► TNT fill
├─ Green band ──► Chemical fill *** STOP — CBRN HAZARD ***
├─ Blue band ──► Training/practice (but verify — may be mislabeled)
├─ Red band ──► Incendiary
└─ No bands ──► Field-prepared or aged stock
TREE 4 -- MINE IDENTIFICATION
Entry: Item classified as mine (disc/cylinder/box shape, at ground level or maritime context).
Node 4.0: Context — Land or Sea?
4.0 MINE CONTEXT
│
├─[A] LAND CONTEXT (on ground, in soil, roadside, field, structure)
│ └─ Node 4.1 (Land Mine)
│
├─[B] MARITIME CONTEXT (floating, anchored, on seabed, washed ashore, in port)
│ └─ Node 4.5 (Naval Mine)
│
└─[C] UNCERTAIN ──► Examine features
├─ Small, ground-level, plastic/metal disc ──► Land mine (Node 4.1)
├─ Large, spherical/cylindrical, horn-like protrusions ──► Naval mine (Node 4.5)
└─ Cannot determine ──► Request context (location, environment, nearby features)
Node 4.1: Land Mine — Shape
4.1 LAND MINE — SHAPE
│
├─[A] BUTTERFLY / PETAL SHAPE (soft plastic, wing-like, small)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ PFM-1 Butterfly Mine. LETHAL.
│ │ DO NOT touch or step near.
│ │ Near-zero metal content — metal detectors largely ineffective.
│ │ If one found, expect HUNDREDS more in 200-300m radius.
│ │ Liquid explosive fill becomes MORE SENSITIVE with age.
│ │
│ ├─ Green/brown/tan soft plastic; 120mm x 60mm x 20mm; 75g
│ │ ├─ Any visible liquid seepage or crystalline deposits?
│ │ │ └─ YES ──► SENSITIZED. Maximum standoff. Do not approach.
│ │ └─ Self-destruct timer housing visible?
│ │ ├─ YES ──► PFM-1S (self-destruct variant, BUT 10% failure rate)
│ │ │ If found after 48+ hrs, assume SD failed = ARMED INDEFINITELY
│ │ └─ NO ──► PFM-1 (non-self-destructing) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ REMAINS LETHAL INDEFINITELY
│ │
│ └─ [Confidence: HIGH] — Butterfly shape is unmistakable
│
├─[B] ROUND, FLAT DISC — LARGE (diameter >200 mm)
│ │ Likely anti-tank mine
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Check for anti-handling devices BEFORE approach.
│ │ Russian doctrine commonly places pull fuze with detonator
│ │ UNDERNEATH AT mines. Wires may be connected.
│ │
│ ├─ ~320 mm diameter, ~128 mm height
│ │ ├─ Olive drab METAL casing, central fuze well on top
│ │ │ └─ ──► TM-62M (metal-cased AT mine) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ Check fuze type:
│ │ │ - MVCh-62: pressure (standard)
│ │ │ - MVZ-62: magnetic influence (detonates under vehicle, NOT by stepping)
│ │ │ - MV-62: tilt-rod
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Dark green/brown PLASTIC casing
│ │ └─ ──► TM-62P3 (plastic-cased AT mine) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ Higher detection difficulty
│ │
│ ├─ Large metallic disc, Chinese markings
│ │ ├─ Metal casing, ~200-280 mm diameter ──► Type 59 AT mine [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ └─ Sheet metal or plastic casing
│ │ ├─ Plastic, ~6.5 kg ──► Type 72 AT (non-metallic) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ Type 72 AT (non-metallic) has T-72 blast-resistant fuze.
│ │ │ Resists explosive breaching (MICLIC/APOBS).
│ │ │ VERY HIGH detection difficulty.
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Sheet metal, ~6.8 kg ──► Type 72 AT (metallic) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ └─ Other large disc/round mine
│ └─ ──► Generic AT mine; request markings, measurements [Confidence: LOW]
│
├─[C] ROUND, FLAT DISC — SMALL (diameter <100 mm)
│ │ Likely anti-personnel blast mine
│ │
│ ├─ ~78 mm diameter x 38 mm high, circular, green/dark plastic disc
│ │ │
│ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ Type 72 AP Mine. MINIMUM METAL — extremely hard to detect.
│ │ │ Type 72B/72C: ANTI-HANDLING DEVICE — DETONATES IF DISTURBED.
│ │ │ DESTROY IN PLACE.
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Simple pressure plate ──► Type 72 AP (basic) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ Electronic components visible ──► Type 72B (electronic SD) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ └─ ──► Type 72C (improved anti-handling) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ ├─ Cylindrical, ~112 mm diameter, Bakelite body, ~240g TNT
│ │ └─ ──► PMN-type derivative [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Moderate detection — Bakelite has some metal
│ │
│ └─ Phone-sized plastic, leaf-shaped camouflage pattern
│ └─ ──► DPRK "Leaf" Mine [Confidence: HIGH]
│ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ EXTREME detection difficulty — minimal metal content.
│ DMZ context.
│
├─[D] RECTANGULAR / BOX SHAPE — SMALL
│ │
│ ├─ ~255 mm x 80 mm x 52 mm, olive drab
│ │ └─ ──► PTM-1 Scatterable AT Mine [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ Self-destruct timer (16-64 hrs) — 10% failure rate.
│ │ Found on roads, fields, near rocket impact areas.
│ │ Dispensed from Uragan rockets (24 per warhead).
│ │
│ └─ Other rectangular ──► Request additional info [Confidence: LOW]
│
├─[E] CURVED / DIRECTIONAL SHAPE (convex front face)
│ │
│ ├─ Convex face with "FRONT TOWARD ENEMY" equivalent in Cyrillic
│ │ ├─ ~226 mm wide ──► MON-50 (Claymore equivalent) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ ~354 mm wide ──► MON-90 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ ~434 mm wide ──► MON-100 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ └─ ~670 mm wide ──► MON-200 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Check for trip wire before approach.
│ │ If trip-wire present, any disturbance could detonate.
│ │ If command-wire only, verify no booby-trap.
│ │
│ └─ Directional shape without markings ──► Generic directional mine [Confidence: LOW]
│
├─[F] STAKE MINE (post/stake driven into ground, fragmentation body on top)
│ │
│ ├─ Cast iron body, tripwire ──► POMZ-2M type [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ └─ ──► Fragmentation stake mine [Confidence: LOW]
│
└─ Cannot determine mine type ──► DO NOT APPROACH.
Document with photos from multiple angles at maximum zoom.
Request EOD support.
Node 4.5: Naval Mine
4.5 NAVAL MINE
│
│ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ All naval mines are EXTREME hazard.
│ Combination fuzing (contact + influence) is common.
│ DO NOT approach closer than 500m.
│ Report to naval EOD / MCM authority immediately.
│
├─ SHAPE
│ │
│ ├─[A] SPHERICAL with horn-like protrusions
│ │ └─ Moored contact mine
│ │ ├─ Hertz horns (lead horns containing glass vial + electrolyte)
│ │ │ ├─ Large (>500 mm diameter) ──► MKB type (DPRK) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ │ ├─ Medium, Soviet-pattern ──► M-08 type [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │ │ (~115 kg TNT fill; struck USS Samuel B. Roberts)
│ │ │ └─ Chinese markings ──► EM-31/32 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Mooring cable visible/attached
│ │ └─ Mine has broken free from mooring = DRIFTING MINE
│ │ *** EXTREME HAZARD — report immediately ***
│ │
│ ├─[B] CYLINDRICAL, lying on bottom
│ │ └─ Bottom/ground influence mine
│ │ ├─ Multi-influence fuzing (magnetic/acoustic/pressure sensors)
│ │ │ ├─ Chinese markings or construction ──► EM-11 [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ │ ├─ Iranian construction ──► SADAF-series [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ │ └─ Russian construction ──► MDM-series [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Command-detonated (antenna/transducer visible)
│ │ └─ ──► EM-57 remote-controlled mine (Chinese) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │
│ ├─[C] CYLINDRICAL with ROCKET MOTOR visible
│ │ │
│ │ │ *** STOP — EXTREME HAZARD ***
│ │ │ EM-52 ROCKET-RISING MINE. Fires rocket-propelled warhead
│ │ │ UPWARD into ship hull from seabed.
│ │ │ Rocket motor may fire during neutralization.
│ │ │ Defeats conventional MCM techniques.
│ │ │ Maximum standoff. Naval EOD/MCM authority only.
│ │ │
│ │ └─ ──► EM-52 / Te-1 Rocket-Rising Mine [Confidence: MEDIUM if rocket visible]
│ │ Chinese origin; depth capability up to 200m
│ │ Also in Iranian inventory
│ │
│ ├─[D] SMALL, attached to hull (limpet)
│ │ │
│ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ Limpet mine. May have anti-removal features.
│ │ │ 2019 Gulf of Oman precedent: IRGC limpet mine attacks.
│ │ │
│ │ └─ ──► Limpet mine (Iranian or generic) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Magnetic attachment; small HE charge; delayed/command fuze
│ │
│ └─[E] SHALLOW-WATER, disc-shaped
│ └─ ──► Manta-type shallow-water mine (Iranian) [Confidence: LOW]
│
└─ Cannot determine naval mine type
└─ Report: shape, size, location, depth, any visible features
└─ DO NOT attempt to move or neutralize without MCM authority
TREE 5 -- SUBMUNITION / BOMBLET IDENTIFICATION
Entry: Small item (<30 cm), found scattered or in clusters. Possible submunition from cluster munition.
CRITICAL RULE: If ONE submunition is found, expect MANY MORE in the area. Stop movement. Mark position. Survey area before any approach.
Node 5.0: Shape
5.0 SUBMUNITION SHAPE
│
├─[A] CYLINDRICAL, small (~50-60 mm diameter)
│ └─ Node 5.1
│
├─[B] CYLINDRICAL with PARACHUTE or RIBBON
│ └─ Node 5.2
│
├─[C] HEMISPHERICAL NOSE (shaped-charge profile)
│ └─ Node 5.3
│
├─[D] VERY SMALL CYLINDER (tin-can size, ~30 mm)
│ └─ Node 5.4
│
├─[E] CYLINDRICAL with IR SENSOR WINDOW and PARACHUTE
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — EXTREME HAZARD ***
│ │ SPBE-D SENSOR-FUZED SUBMUNITION.
│ │ IR SENSOR MAY STILL BE ACTIVE.
│ │ HUMAN BODY HEAT CAN TRIGGER = APPROACH HAZARD.
│ │ Wait 48+ hours if possible.
│ │ Cold-body/robotic approach ONLY.
│ │ EFP warhead fires DOWNWARD — do not be directly below.
│ │
│ └─ Node 5.5 (SPBE-D)
│
└─[F] BUTTERFLY / PETAL SHAPE
└─ This is a MINE, not a submunition ──► TREE 4, Node 4.1A (PFM-1)
Node 5.1: Small Cylindrical Submunition
5.1 SMALL CYLINDRICAL SUBMUNITION (~50-60 mm diameter)
│
├─ Ribbon streamer visible (trailing from body)?
│ │
│ ├─ YES — Ribbon tail
│ │ ├─ ~56 mm diameter x 205 mm length, steel body, pre-formed fragments
│ │ │ ├─ Olive drab, white/khaki ribbon
│ │ │ │ ├─ From 220mm Uragan rocket context (30 per warhead)
│ │ │ │ │ └─ ──► 9N210 Submunition [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └─ From 300mm Smerch rocket context (72 per warhead)
│ │ │ │ └─ ──► 9N235 Submunition [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ └─ Bodies look nearly identical; discriminate by:
│ │ │ - 9N210: ~1.85 kg, slightly larger
│ │ │ - 9N235: ~1.75 kg, slightly smaller
│ │ │ - Parent rocket body in area (220mm = 9N210, 300mm = 9N235)
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Intact body (no fragmentation holes) = DUD ──► ASSUME ARMED
│ │ Spin-arming failure: fuze may be in intermediate state
│ │ (neither safe nor fully armed) = MOST DANGEROUS CONDITION
│ │
│ └─ NO — No ribbon
│ └─ Ribbon may have separated on impact; check body dimensions
│ └─ Cross-reference with 9N210/9N235 above
│
├─ Dud Rate Reference:
│ - 9N210: 10-30% (older production = higher)
│ - 9N235: 15-30%
│ - If ONE found, expect 29 more (9N210) or 71 more (9N235) in area
│
└─ Cannot determine specific type
└─ ──► Generic DPICM/HE-FRAG submunition [Confidence: LOW]
└─ DO NOT handle. Mark and report.
Node 5.2: Submunition with Parachute
5.2 SUBMUNITION WITH PARACHUTE
│
├─ Large body (~15 kg), cylindrical, parachute pack, IR sensor window on bottom
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — EXTREME HAZARD ***
│ │ This is likely SPBE-D. See Node 5.5.
│ │
│ └─ Go to Node 5.5
│
├─ Smaller body with parachute/drogue, no IR window
│ └─ ──► Standard parachute-retarded submunition [Confidence: LOW]
│ May be illumination, smoke, or sensor submunition
│ Request additional photos of body details
│
└─ Parachute only (no body attached)
└─ Body has separated; search area for submunition body
Node 5.3: Shaped-Charge Submunition (hemispherical nose)
5.3 SHAPED-CHARGE / ANTI-ARMOR SUBMUNITION
│
├─ Hemispherical nose with copper liner visible
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Shaped charge. Directional explosion.
│ │ DO NOT stand/kneel directly above or below.
│ │ Impact fuze (piezoelectric) is sensitive to shock on nose.
│ │
│ ├─ ~2.5 kg, hemispherical nose, no fins
│ │ └─ ──► PTAB-2.5M (anti-armor submunition from RBK-500) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ 268 per RBK-500 bomb; 43-50 mm diameter
│ │ Dud Rate: 10-20%
│ │
│ ├─ ~1.0 kg, smaller version
│ │ └─ ──► PTAB-1M [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ └─ Copper EFP disk visible (concave copper dish, not cone)
│ └─ This is an EFP-type submunition, not HEAT
│ └─ ──► SPBE-D or similar sensor-fuzed ──► Node 5.5
│
└─ No copper liner visible but shaped body
└─ Request close-up of nose section
Node 5.4: Very Small Submunition
5.4 VERY SMALL SUBMUNITION (~30 mm diameter, ~0.5 kg)
│
├─ Small cylindrical body, packed with steel ball bearings
│ │ (approximately size of a small tin can)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ EXTREMELY difficult to detect.
│ │ Ball-bearing fragmentation lethal at close range.
│ │ 565 per RBK-500 bomb = massive contamination.
│ │
│ └─ ──► ShOAB-0.5 (anti-personnel submunition) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ Dud Rate: 15-25%
│ Impact fuzed
│
└─ Cannot determine ──► Document size with reference object
└─ May be commercial/agricultural item; request context
Node 5.5: SPBE-D Sensor-Fuzed Submunition
5.5 SPBE-D IDENTIFICATION
│
│ *** STOP — EXTREME HAZARD ***
│ IR SENSOR MAY FIRE ON BODY HEAT.
│ Battery life: hours to DAYS after landing.
│ DO NOT APPROACH without cold-body protocol.
│ Recommended: Wait 48+ hours OR robotic approach.
│ EFP warhead fires DOWNWARD.
│
├─ Physical Description Confirmation:
│ - ~15 kg body, cylindrical
│ - Parachute pack (may or may not have deployed)
│ - IR sensor window visible on bottom face
│ - Copper EFP disk (concave) visible in base
│ - Electronics package visible
│ - From Smerch 9M55K1 rockets (5 per warhead) or RBK-500U bombs
│
├─ Dud Conditions:
│ ├─ Parachute deployed, soft landing ──► HIGHEST HAZARD
│ │ Sensor most likely still active
│ ├─ Parachute failed, hard impact ──► Moderate hazard
│ │ Body damaged but warhead may be intact
│ └─ Battery failure ──► Lower hazard BUT cannot confirm remotely
│
├─ Estimated Dud Rate: 10-15%
│
└─ ──► SPBE-D Sensor-Fuzed Anti-Armor Submunition [Confidence: HIGH]
TREE 6 -- DRONE / UAS IDENTIFICATION
Entry: Item classified as drone/UAS (wings, propeller/motor, electronics visible).
Node 6.0: Size Class
6.0 DRONE SIZE CLASS
│
├─[A] LARGE (wingspan >10 m, length >5 m)
│ └─ Node 6.1 (MALE/HALE UAS)
│
├─[B] MEDIUM (wingspan 2-10 m, length 2-5 m)
│ └─ Node 6.2 (Tactical / OWA UAS)
│
├─[C] SMALL (wingspan <2 m, length <1.5 m)
│ └─ Node 6.3 (Small Tactical / FPV)
│
└─ Cannot estimate size ──► Examine wing type (Node 6.0B)
6.0B WING TYPE
├─ Delta wing (triangular) ──► Likely Shahed-type OWA ──► Node 6.2
├─ Conventional wing (straight or swept) ──► Node 6.1 or 6.2
├─ X-wing / cruciform wings ──► Likely Lancet-type ──► Node 6.2C
├─ Flying wing (no fuselage, blended) ──► Stealth UCAV ──► Node 6.1D
├─ Quadcopter/multirotor ──► Node 6.3
└─ No wings (tube-launched, cylindrical) ──► Loitering munition ──► Node 6.3B
Node 6.1: Large UAS (MALE/HALE Class)
6.1 LARGE UAS (>10 m wingspan)
│
├─ Conventional fixed-wing, inverted V-tail, retractable gear, tractor prop
│ ├─ ~16 m wingspan, EO/IR turret, hardpoints for small PGMs
│ │ └─ ──► Shahed-129 (Iranian MALE) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Check for Sadid-1 PGMs on hardpoints — may be armed
│ │
│ └─ ~21 m wingspan, resembles MQ-9 Reaper
│ └─ ──► Shahed-149 "Gaza" (Iranian MALE UCAV) [Confidence: LOW]
│ May carry multiple PGMs — high hazard
│
├─ High-wing, V-tail or Y-tail, turboprop
│ ├─ ~14 m wingspan ──► Wing Loong I / CH-4 class (Chinese) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Discriminate:
│ │ ├─ Ventral EO/IR turret, ~2 hardpoints ──► Wing Loong I (GJ-1) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │ Exported to: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, others
│ │ └─ ~18 m wingspan, Y-tail ──► CH-4B (CASC) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Exported to: Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, others
│ │
│ ├─ ~20 m wingspan, large ──► Wing Loong II (GJ-2) / CH-5 class [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Discriminate:
│ │ ├─ 4-6 hardpoints, slender fuselage ──► Wing Loong II [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ │ Exported to: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, others
│ │ └─ Wider fuselage, 6 hardpoints ──► CH-5 (Rainbow-5) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ ~20 m wingspan, twin-boom, pusher prop
│ └─ ──► BZK-005 (Chinese ISR, unarmed) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
├─[D] Flying wing / blended wing-body (no conventional fuselage)
│ ├─ Cranked kite planform, ~7-8 m wingspan
│ │ └─ ──► Shahed-171 "Simorgh" (RQ-170 derivative) [Confidence: LOW]
│ ├─ Large flying wing, jet-powered, weapons bay
│ │ └─ ──► GJ-11 "Sharp Sword" (Chinese stealth UCAV) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ Internal PGM carriage — weapons bay may be open/damaged
│ └─ Other flying wing ──► Advanced UCAV type [Confidence: LOW]
│
├─ ~10 m wingspan, Rotax-type engine, EO/IR turret, armed
│ └─ ──► Mohajer-6 (Iranian armed MALE) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ May carry 2x Qaem-series PGMs (~20-40 kg each)
│
└─ Cannot determine specific type
└─ Document: wingspan, engine type, sensors, hardpoints, markings
└─ Check for:
├─ Rotax engine markings ──► Likely Iranian (Mohajer/Shahed) or Chinese
├─ Chinese characters on components ──► Chinese-manufactured
├─ Western engine (Rotax 912/914 copy) ──► Multiple possible origins
└─ Payload hardpoints occupied ──► Armed drone; PGMs may be UXO
Node 6.2: Medium UAS (Tactical / OWA, 2-10 m wingspan)
6.2 MEDIUM UAS
│
├─[A] DELTA WING, rear pusher propeller, V-tail
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Likely Shahed-type OWA drone.
│ │ Warhead in nose — impact fuze may be armed but unfunctioned.
│ │ Do NOT approach nose-first.
│ │ Fuel (gasoline) fire hazard if intact.
│ │ LiPo/lithium batteries — thermal runaway risk.
│ │
│ ├─ ~3.5 m length, ~2.5 m wingspan, MADO MD-550 engine
│ │ ├─ Cyrillic "Geran-2" markings on body
│ │ │ └─ ──► Shahed-136 / Geran-2 (Russian-designated) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ Iranian markings or no markings
│ │ │ └─ ──► Shahed-136 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ Gray/dark gray composite body, 5-round launch rail marks on belly
│ │ │ └─ ──► Shahed-136 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ └─ Engine identification:
│ │ ├─ MADO MD-550 (4-cyl piston, 50 hp) ──► Shahed-136 confirmed
│ │ └─ Small turbojet ──► May be upgraded variant or different type
│ │
│ ├─ ~2.5 m length, ~2.0 m wingspan (smaller version)
│ │ └─ ──► Shahed-131 / Geran-1 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ Warhead: ~15-20 kg HE (smaller than 136)
│ │
│ └─ Delta wing but different configuration
│ └─ Check for Houthi designations:
│ ├─ "Wa'id" markings ──► Shahed-136 (Houthi designation) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ └─ Other ──► Possible Shahed variant or Jaffa/Yaffa (long-range) [Confidence: LOW]
│
├─[B] CONVENTIONAL WING, pusher prop, boom tail
│ │
│ ├─ ~3.25 m wingspan, ~2.88 m length, catapult-launched
│ │ └─ ──► Ababil-2 / Qasef-1/2K [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Warhead: ~30-45 kg HE (attack variant)
│ │ Discriminate:
│ │ ├─ Iranian markings ──► Ababil-2 [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ Houthi context / "Qasef" markings ──► Qasef-1/2K [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ └─ No markings ──► Ababil family [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ ├─ ~4 m length, jet engine, larger warhead
│ │ └─ ──► Arash (large Iranian loitering munition) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │
│ └─ Samad-series (Houthi):
│ ├─ Conventional wing, piston engine, ~3 m wingspan
│ │ └─ ──► Samad-1 (ISR) / Samad-2 (attack) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ ├─ Larger, jet-assisted ──► Samad-3 [Confidence: LOW]
│ └─ Largest variant, jet propulsion ──► Samad-4 [Confidence: LOW]
│
├─[C] X-WING / CRUCIFORM WINGS, electric motor, camera nose
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Likely Lancet loitering munition.
│ │ Small warhead (3-7 kg) but still lethal.
│ │ LiPo battery fire risk — DO NOT puncture.
│ │
│ ├─ ~2.95 m wingspan, ~1.2 m length, 12 kg, cruciform X-wing
│ │ ├─ Camera dome on nose, ZALA branding
│ │ │ └─ ──► Lancet-3 (Izdeliye-52) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ Improved variant (AI target recognition reported)
│ │ │ └─ ──► Lancet-3M (improved) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ └─ Smaller (~2 m wingspan)
│ │ └─ ──► Lancet-1 [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ Different X-wing configuration
│ └─ ──► KUB-BLA (ZALA, larger, ~3 kg warhead) [Confidence: LOW]
│
├─[D] JET-POWERED, target/strike drone profile
│ │
│ ├─ ~3 m length, small turbojet, Iranian
│ │ └─ ──► Karrar (Iranian jet-powered target/strike drone) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │
│ └─ Other jet-powered small UAS ──► Request additional details
│
└─ Cannot determine type
└─ Key discriminators to request:
├─ Wing shape (delta vs conventional vs X-wing)
├─ Engine type (piston pusher vs turbojet vs electric)
├─ Nose section (camera vs warhead)
├─ Body material (composite/fiberglass vs metal)
└─ Any markings, serial numbers, component labels
Node 6.3: Small UAS (<2 m wingspan)
6.3 SMALL UAS
│
├─[A] FPV ATTACK DRONE (quadcopter or small fixed-wing with improvised payload)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ FPV attack drones carry improvised ordnance payloads.
│ │ Payload may be RPG warhead, grenade, shaped charge, or
│ │ improvised explosive. Fuzing is often crude and unreliable.
│ │ LiPo battery fire risk.
│ │
│ ├─ Quadcopter frame with attached munition (grenade, RPG warhead, 3D-printed tail)
│ │ └─ ──► FPV Attack Drone (improvised) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ Thousands in daily use in Ukraine by both sides.
│ │ Payload identification:
│ │ ├─ RPG-7 warhead (conical, copper liner) ──► Shaped charge hazard
│ │ ├─ VOG-17/25 grenade ──► HE-FRAG
│ │ ├─ Modified mortar round ──► HE
│ │ ├─ 3D-printed fin assembly on modified munition ──► Variable
│ │ └─ Unknown payload ──► Treat as maximum hazard
│ │
│ ├─ Small fixed-wing with FPV camera
│ │ └─ ──► Fixed-wing FPV attack drone [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ Commercially sourced airframe (DJI, etc.) with modifications
│ └─ ──► Modified commercial drone [Confidence: HIGH]
│ Check for munition-release mechanism or attached payload
│
├─[B] TUBE-LAUNCHED LOITERING MUNITION (cylindrical, small)
│ │
│ ├─ ~9 kg total, 3.5 kg warhead, tube-launched
│ │ └─ ──► CH-901 (Chinese man-portable loitering munition) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ ├─ ~3.5 kg total, 0.5 kg warhead
│ │ └─ ──► FH-901A [Confidence: LOW]
│ │
│ └─ Small enough to be confused with commercial drone debris
│ └─ Check for warhead, military-grade electronics, tube-launch marks
│
└─[C] COMMERCIAL DRONE (no military modifications)
└─ Not ordnance — but may have been used for ISR/targeting
└─ Intelligence value; document and report if in military context
Drone Discrimination Quick Reference
DRONE QUICK DISCRIMINATION TABLE:
│
├─ Delta wing + pusher prop + V-tail = Shahed family
│ Size determines variant: 3.5m = 136; 2.5m = 131
│
├─ X-wing + electric + camera nose = Lancet family
│ ZALA branding confirms
│
├─ Conventional wing + Rotax engine + EO/IR turret = Mohajer-6 or Wing Loong/CH-4
│ Size determines: <10m ws = Mohajer; >14m ws = Wing Loong/CH-4
│
├─ Conventional wing + piston + catapult = Ababil/Qasef or Samad
│ Context (Houthi = Qasef/Samad; Iranian = Ababil)
│
├─ Quadcopter + attached munition = FPV attack drone
│ Universal in Ukraine conflict
│
└─ Flying wing = Stealth UCAV (GJ-11, Shahed-171)
Rare encounter; high intelligence value
TREE 7 -- EFP / IED IDENTIFICATION
Entry: Item has non-standard or improvised appearance. Possible IED or EFP.
CRITICAL: EFPs and IEDs are the highest-hazard items for approach. PIR (passive infrared) sensors are ALWAYS ON when armed. Movement in the sensor field initiates the device WITHOUT physical contact. Standard UXO approach procedures may trigger the device.
Node 7.0: Initial Assessment
7.0 INITIAL ASSESSMENT
│
│ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ DO NOT APPROACH any suspected IED/EFP.
│ Withdraw to minimum 300m.
│ Establish cordon.
│ Report to EOD authority.
│
│ Observe from maximum distance with optics:
│
├─[A] CYLINDRICAL DEVICE with concave metal disc visible on one end
│ │ (aimed at road/path, concealed in debris/barrier/culvert)
│ └─ Node 7.1 (EFP)
│
├─[B] IMPROVISED CONTAINER with wires, electronics, initiator
│ │ (PVC pipe, pressure cooker, gas cylinder, ammo can, concrete block)
│ └─ Node 7.2 (IED)
│
├─[C] ROCKET/TUBE pointed at target area from improvised platform
│ └─ Node 7.3 (IRAM)
│
├─[D] VEHICLE-BORNE (parked vehicle, abnormal load, reinforced)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — EXTREME HAZARD ***
│ │ Possible VBIED. Evacuate area.
│ │ 500m+ exclusion zone.
│ │
│ └─ ──► VBIED [Confidence: variable]
│ Do NOT approach. Request EOD with robotics.
│
└─[E] CANNOT DETERMINE
└─ DO NOT approach. Document with telephoto/optics.
└─ Report to EOD authority with description of:
- Size, shape, color
- Visible wires, antennas, electronics
- Location (roadside, building, vehicle)
- Any aiming mechanism
Node 7.1: EFP Identification
7.1 EXPLOSIVELY FORMED PENETRATOR
│
│ *** STOP — EXTREME HAZARD ***
│ PIR sensor may be active. ANY movement in sensor field initiates.
│ Battery life: 30+ DAYS.
│ Devices may be daisy-chained — disrupting one initiates others.
│ DO NOT APPROACH. Robotic approach only.
│
├─ Construction quality?
│ │
│ ├─ HIGH QUALITY (precision-machined copper liner, clean welds, factory finish)
│ │ └─ ──► Iranian-manufactured EFP [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Single charge, ~127mm (5 inch) diameter
│ │ │ └─ ──► Standard Iranian EFP [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ Penetrates 100mm+ RHA steel
│ │ │ HE fill: 1-5 kg C-4/PE-4/Semtex
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ Multiple charges (2-5) in single housing
│ │ │ └─ ──► Multi-Array Iranian EFP [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ Higher-tier supply; multiple penetrators
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Precursor charge visible (small shaped charge in front of main EFP)
│ │ └─ ──► Advanced EFP with reactive armor defeat [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ LOW QUALITY (rough construction, improvised liner, crude aiming)
│ └─ ──► Improvised EFP / locally manufactured [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ Still lethal but less consistent performance
│
├─ Trigger mechanism visible?
│ ├─ PIR sensor (small window/dome on device)
│ │ └─ ALWAYS ON when armed. Infrared detection = body heat trigger.
│ │ *** DO NOT enter sensor field ***
│ │
│ ├─ Command wire (wire running from device to firing point)
│ │ └─ Follow wire to confirm no operator at firing point
│ │ Wire may be booby-trapped
│ │
│ ├─ Radio-controlled (antenna visible)
│ │ └─ RF-triggered; ECM/jamming may be required
│ │
│ └─ Pressure plate / trip wire
│ └─ Mechanical initiation; unusual for EFP but possible
│
├─ Emplacement?
│ ├─ Roadside (concrete barrier, curb, debris pile) ──► Anti-vehicle EFP
│ ├─ Culvert beneath road ──► Underbelly attack EFP
│ └─ Building/structure aimed at route ──► Elevated EFP
│
└─ Context-Based Origin Assessment:
├─ Iraq ──► Iranian IRGC-Quds Force supply chain [Confidence: HIGH]
├─ Yemen ──► Houthi/Iranian [Confidence: MEDIUM]
├─ Syria ──► Shia militia/Iranian [Confidence: MEDIUM]
├─ Afghanistan ──► Limited Iranian supply in west [Confidence: LOW]
└─ Other ──► Determine from construction quality and components
Node 7.2: IED Identification
7.2 IED IDENTIFICATION
│
│ IEDs are infinitely variable. Focus on:
│ 1. Main charge type and size
│ 2. Initiation method
│ 3. Concealment
│
├─ Main Charge Container:
│ ├─ Artillery shell (105mm, 122mm, 152mm, 155mm)
│ │ └─ ──► Artillery-shell IED [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ Daisy-chained shells = massive main charge
│ │
│ ├─ Mortar round (60mm, 82mm, 120mm)
│ │ └─ ──► Mortar-round IED [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ ├─ Aircraft bomb body
│ │ └─ ──► Aviation-bomb IED (very large main charge) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ ├─ Homemade explosive in container (HME)
│ │ ├─ Ammonium nitrate / fuel oil (ANFO) indicators
│ │ ├─ Fertilizer bags, chemical containers
│ │ └─ ──► HME IED [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ Military explosive (C-4, TNT, PE-4 blocks)
│ └─ ──► Military-grade IED [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ State supply chain likely (Iranian/other)
│
├─ Initiation Method (observe from distance):
│ ├─ Command wire ──► Wire-command IED
│ ├─ Radio (antenna, receiver) ──► Radio-controlled IED (RCIED)
│ ├─ Cell phone ──► Phone-triggered IED
│ ├─ Pressure plate ──► Victim-operated IED
│ ├─ Trip wire ──► Victim-operated IED
│ ├─ PIR sensor ──► Passive infrared IED (approach hazard)
│ └─ Timer ──► Time-delay IED
│
└─ ──► IED [Confidence: variable based on observation quality]
Document all visible features for EOD response team
Node 7.3: IRAM (Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munition)
7.3 IRAM
│
├─ Large-diameter tube/cylinder on improvised launch rail
│ ├─ Propane tank / gas cylinder body with rocket motor attached
│ │ └─ ──► IRAM [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ Short range (~2-4 km); very large explosive fill
│ │ Multiple IRAM on single launch platform common
│ │
│ └─ Multiple tubes/cylinders on truck bed or ground frame
│ └─ ──► IRAM battery [Confidence: HIGH]
│ Iraqi militia / Iranian proxy signature weapon
│
└─ Context:
├─ Iraq ──► PMF / Kata'ib Hezbollah origin likely
├─ Yemen ──► Houthi origin likely
└─ Other ──► Determine from context and construction
TREE 8 -- ROCKET ARTILLERY PROJECTILE IDENTIFICATION
Entry: Cylindrical body with rocket nozzle at base and folding/fixed fins. No guidance seeker.
Node 8.0: Caliber Estimation
8.0 ROCKET ARTILLERY — CALIBER
│
├─ Use reference objects to estimate body diameter
│
├─[A] ~107 mm diameter, very small rocket (<1 m length)
│ └─ ──► 107mm rocket (Type 63 / Haseb / Katyusha-type) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ Warhead: ~1.3-2.4 kg HE-FRAG
│ Commonly used by: Hezbollah, proxies, irregular forces
│ Single-tube improvised launchers common
│ Canted fins for spin stabilization
│
├─[B] ~122 mm diameter, ~2.87 m length
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Fuze may be in any state. ASSUME ARMED.
│ │ Do not pull rocket from ground by fins (may shear off).
│ │ If 9M28K mine-dispensing variant: PFM-1 mines may surround impact point.
│ │
│ ├─ 4 folding spring-steel stabilizer fins at tail
│ ├─ Nozzle at base of rocket motor
│ ├─ Nose fuze with propeller-shaped arming vane (MRV-U type)
│ │
│ ├─ Standard HE-frag ──► 9M22U (BM-21 Grad rocket) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ Warhead: 18.4 kg HE-FRAG; Dud Rate: 5-15%
│ │
│ ├─ Mine-dispensing variant (9M28K):
│ │ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ │ If dispenser functioned: PFM-1 mines in 200-300m area
│ │ │ If dispenser did NOT function: mines inside rocket body
│ │ └─ ──► 9M28K (mine-dispensing Grad) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │
│ └─ Iranian copy (Arash/Hadid markings or Farsi text)
│ └─ ──► Iranian 122mm rocket [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│
├─[C] ~220 mm diameter, ~4.8 m length
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Critical: Check for submunition/mine contamination
│ │ in surrounding area BEFORE approaching rocket body.
│ │
│ ├─ Wrap-around fin stabilizers (folding)
│ │
│ ├─ Variant identification by body markings:
│ │ ├─ "F" marking ──► 9M27F (100 kg HE-frag) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ ├─ "K" marking ──► 9M27K (30x 9N210 submunitions) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ Survey for 9N210 submunitions in area
│ │ ├─ "K2" marking ──► 9M27K2 (24x PTM-1 AT mines) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ Survey for PTM-1 mines on roads/paths
│ │ ├─ "K3" marking ──► 9M27K3 (312x PFM-1 butterfly mines) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │ │ *** EXTREME HAZARD — 312 butterfly mines scattered in area ***
│ │ └─ "S" marking ──► 9M27S (incendiary) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ └─ ──► BM-27 Uragan 220mm rocket [Confidence: HIGH]
│
├─[D] ~240 mm diameter
│ │
│ ├─ Russian/Soviet markings
│ │ └─ Likely M1985/M1991 240mm MLRS rocket
│ │ *** POTENTIAL CHEMICAL FILL (nerve agent, blister agent) ***
│ │ If DPRK context: confirmed chemical warhead capability
│ │ Treat as potential CHEM until confirmed otherwise
│ │
│ └─ Iranian markings
│ └─ ──► Falaq-1 (240mm Iranian heavy rocket) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ Warhead: ~50 kg HE
│
├─[E] ~300 mm diameter, ~7.6 m length (VERY LARGE)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ Massive rocket. Check for cluster submunition contamination.
│ │ If 9M55K variant: 72x 9N235 submunitions per rocket
│ │ If 9M55K1 variant: 5x SPBE-D sensor-fuzed submunitions
│ │
│ ├─ Standard HE-frag ──► 9M55F (258 kg explosive) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ ├─ Cluster variant ──► 9M55K (72x 9N235 submunitions) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ ├─ SPBE-D variant
│ │ │ *** STOP — EXTREME HAZARD ***
│ │ │ SPBE-D submunitions with IR sensors. See TREE 5, Node 5.5.
│ │ └─ ──► 9M55K1 (5x SPBE-D) [Confidence: HIGH]
│ │
│ ├─ Guided variant (electronic guidance section)
│ │ └─ ──► Tornado-S 300mm (GLONASS-guided) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ │ Electronic fuzing; lithium batteries
│ │
│ └─ ──► BM-30 Smerch 300mm rocket [Confidence: HIGH]
│
├─[F] ~600 mm diameter (SUPER-LARGE)
│ │
│ │ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ │ This is functionally a ballistic missile, not standard rocket artillery.
│ │ Warhead: 500+ kg estimated.
│ │ Treat as ballistic missile ordnance.
│ │
│ └─ ──► KN-25 (DPRK 600mm guided MLRS) [Confidence: MEDIUM]
│ GPS/INS guided; ~380 km range; ~8.2 m length, ~3,000 kg
│
└─ ~220 mm diameter, thermobaric
│
│ *** STOP — EXTREME HAZARD ***
│ THERMOBARIC FILL is MORE SENSITIVE than conventional HE.
│ If leaking: FLAMMABLE/EXPLOSIVE VAPOR CLOUD.
│ NO radio/phone, spark-generating tools, or smoking near item.
│ Maximum standoff BIP. Do NOT attempt RSP.
│
└─ ──► TOS-1A 220mm thermobaric rocket [Confidence: MEDIUM]
~3,300 mm length; nozzle at rear; folding fins
TREE 9 -- TORPEDO IDENTIFICATION
Entry: Elongated body, propeller at tail, maritime context.
9.0 TORPEDO IDENTIFICATION
│
│ *** STOP — HAZARD ***
│ Torpedoes contain large warheads and propulsion fuel/batteries.
│ Otto Fuel II (liquid monopropellant) is TOXIC by inhalation and skin contact.
│ Lithium or silver-zinc batteries present fire/explosion hazard.
│ DO NOT approach without proper PPE.
│
├─ Size estimation:
│ │
│ ├─ 533 mm diameter (heavyweight)
│ │ ├─ Chinese origin
│ │ │ └─ ──► Yu-6 (heavyweight, Otto Fuel II) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ │ Wire + active/passive acoustic + wake-homing
│ │ │ ~300 kg HE warhead
│ │ │
│ │ ├─ DPRK origin
│ │ │ ├─ Acoustic/wake homing, no trailing wire
│ │ │ │ └─ ──► CHT-02D [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ │ │ CONFIRMED KILL: ROKS Cheonan (2010), 46 KIA
│ │ │ │ ~250 kg warhead
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ └─ Soviet-pattern, wire-guided
│ │ │ └─ ──► SET-65 / SAET-60 type [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ │
│ │ └─ Russian origin
│ │ └─ ──► UGST or similar (wire-guided + acoustic) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │
│ ├─ 324 mm diameter (lightweight)
│ │ ├─ Chinese origin ──► Yu-7 (electric, battery hazard) [Confidence: LOW]
│ │ └─ Iranian / Chinese derivative ──► ET-52C derivative [Confidence: LOW]
│ │
│ └─ Supercavitating (very high speed, cavitation plate on nose)
│ └─ ──► Hoot (Iranian VA-111 Shkval derivative) [Confidence: LOW]
│ ~200 knots; unguided; ~210 kg HE
│
├─ May be confused with:
│ ├─ 3M14 Kalibr cruise missile body (533 mm diameter, torpedo-tube compatible)
│ │ └─ Check for wings, air intake, turbojet ──► If present: Kalibr, not torpedo
│ └─ Submarine-launched missile canister
│
└─ Cannot determine specific type
└─ Document: diameter, length, propulsion type, nose shape, any markings
└─ Report to naval EOD authority
APPENDIX A -- CONFIDENCE LEVEL DEFINITIONS
| Level | Label | Definition | Agent Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | >85% | Multiple confirming visual features match; size, shape, markings consistent | Present identification with high confidence |
| MEDIUM | 50-85% | Several features match but some ambiguity remains | Present identification with caveats; ask discriminating follow-up questions |
| LOW | <50% | Limited features visible; multiple candidates possible | Present top 2-3 candidates; request additional photos, measurements, or context |
| INDETERMINATE | <25% | Insufficient visual data for identification | Request additional images, measurements, markings, context; do NOT guess |
APPENDIX B -- UNIVERSAL HAZARD WARNINGS
These warnings apply regardless of identification outcome:
STOP-HAZARD Trigger Conditions
The agent MUST present these warnings IMMEDIATELY when detected, before continuing identification:
| Trigger | Warning | Action Required |
|---|---|---|
| Crystalline deposits on explosive body | SENSITIZED EXPLOSIVE — increased sensitivity | Maximum standoff. Do not touch or vibrate. |
| Liquid seepage from mine/munition | EXPLOSIVE FILL LEAKING — sensitized | Maximum standoff. Do not touch. |
| Partially rotated fuze vanes | PARTIALLY ARMED — most dangerous state | Do not approach. Mark and report. |
| IR sensor window on submunition | SPBE-D — fires on body heat | 48+ hour wait or robotic approach only. |
| Thermobaric fill indicators | VAPOR CLOUD HAZARD — no sparks, no RF | No electronic devices, no open flame. Max standoff BIP. |
| Toxic propellant staining (orange/red) | IRFNA/UDMH/TG-02 — chemical hazard first | Full HAZMAT before EOD. 300m upwind. |
| PIR sensor on device | IED/EFP — sensor always on when armed | Do not enter sensor field. Robotic approach only. |
| Wires/antenna on improvised device | IED — command/radio initiated | Cordon 300m+. ECM if available. |
| Cluster bomb body with intact seams | UNDISPENSED SUBMUNITIONS inside | Survey area. Multiple armed submunitions in body. |
| Dual-capable system (DF-26, Qiam-2) | POSSIBLE NUCLEAR — cannot determine fill | Maximum caution. Report to chain of command. |
| LiPo battery damage (swelling, heat) | THERMAL RUNAWAY — fire/toxic fumes | Do not puncture. Clear area. |
| Green band on Russian bomb body | CHEMICAL FILL INDICATED | CBRN response before EOD approach. |
APPENDIX C -- MARKING SCRIPT IDENTIFICATION
When stenciled text is visible on ordnance body:
| Script | Language | Likely Origin | Common Countries |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cyrillic (АБВГД) | Russian | Russian Federation | Russia, Soviet-era exports worldwide |
| Simplified Chinese (simplified hanzi) | Chinese (Mandarin) | People's Republic of China | PRC, exported to dozens of countries |
| Farsi/Persian (right-to-left, connected script) | Persian | Islamic Republic of Iran | Iran, Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias |
| Hangul/Chosongul (Korean characters) | Korean | DPRK (North Korea) | DPRK, proliferated to Iran, Syria, others |
| Arabic (right-to-left, connected script) | Arabic | Various | May be local marking by proxy force |
| Latin alphabet (ABCDE) | English or other | Western / NATO | If on non-Western ordnance: export variant or captured/reverse-engineered |
| No markings | -- | -- | Proxy use, markings removed, or field-prepared |
APPENDIX D -- CROSS-REFERENCE TO DATABASE
After identification, the agent should cross-reference the identified item against the following database documents for full technical details, hazard data, and RSP references:
| Document | Content |
|---|---|
docs/order-of-battle/russia.md | Russian ordnance full inventory |
docs/order-of-battle/china-prc.md | Chinese ordnance full inventory |
docs/order-of-battle/iran-proxies.md | Iranian and proxy ordnance |
docs/order-of-battle/north-korea-dprk.md | DPRK ordnance |
docs/conflicts/russia-ukraine.md | Ukraine UXO-specific data, dud rates, field observations |
docs/conflicts/iran-proxies.md | Iranian proxy ordnance detailed specifications |
docs/conflicts/iran-proxies-drones.md | Drone/UAS detailed specifications |
docs/conflicts/yemen-houthis.md | Houthi-specific ordnance and employment |
docs/indopacom/china-prc-drones.md | Chinese UAS full catalog |
docs/indopacom/russia-pacific-drones.md | Russian UAS full catalog |
APPENDIX E -- DECISION TREE USAGE PROTOCOL
For the Identification Agent:
- Start at TREE 1 (Master Category) for every new identification request.
- Follow the branching logic using visual features from the submitted image.
- When ambiguous, follow BOTH branches and present the user with the specific discriminating question that would resolve the ambiguity.
- Present STOP-HAZARD warnings IMMEDIATELY when any trigger condition is detected -- before continuing identification.
- State confidence level at every identification output.
- Cross-reference the final identification against the database documents listed in Appendix D.
- If LOW confidence or INDETERMINATE, ask for:
- Additional photos from different angles
- Close-up of nose/fuze section
- Close-up of markings/stenciling
- Measurement against reference object
- Context: where found, what else is nearby, operational environment
- Never present a single identification as definitive at LOW confidence. Always present alternatives.
- Always conclude with the safety warning appropriate to the identified item.